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"What beauty is I know not but it dependeth upon many things. " 
-Albrecht /Jurer1 
Aesthetic policy, as currently formulated and implemented at the 
federal, state, and local levels, often partakes more of high farce than 
of the rule of law. Its p urposes are seldom accurately or candidly 
portrayed, let alone understood, by its most vehement champions. 
Its diversion to dubious or flatly deplorable social ends undermines 
the credit that it may merit when soundly conceived and executed. 
Its indiscriminate, often quixotic demands have overwhelmed legal 
institutions, which all too frequently have compromised the integrity 
of legislative, administrative, and judicial processes in the name of 
"beauty." 
While the reasons for this regrettable state of affairs are many, 
l. A. DORER, Introduction [to an unfinished work variously titled Teaching in Pai�(ing, 
/)ishfar Young Painters, Salus 1512 and Salus 1513), in THE WRITINGS OF ALBRECHT DuRER 
179 (W. Conway trans. 1958). 
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most trace in one way or another to misconceptions and abuses at­
tending the very idea of aesthetics. Ideas do have consequences, as 
Dostoevski admonished, 2 and the unfortunate effects of this power­
ful idea gone awry have been far-reaching indeed. 
This Article both examines these consequences and explains why 
they have departed so frequently from the ostensible goals of the 
policies that produced them. It also surveys the principal legal di­
lemmas that attend aesthetic policy-making, which is sensitive to the 
values actually at stake in the type of "aesthetic" controversies that 
legal institutions are called upon to resolve in American society. The 
aesthetic controls addressed are those adopted in such areas as zon­
ing, historic or environmental preservation, and urban design to 
shape the visual appearance of the built and natural environments. 
The content of the aesthetics idea is explored through two hypothe­
ses advanced to explain the social interest underpinning these con­
trols. The first, which has dominated aesthetic-legal thought 
throughout this century, locates that interest in the preservation or 
creation of a visually beautiful environment. The second, which is 
outlined in Part IV of this Article, de-emphasizes visual beauty in 
favor of the compulsion of groups to protect their identity and, more 
broadly, cultural stability itself by forestalling threats to environ­
mental features and settings that anchor or reinforce these reciprocal 
values. 
My contentions are basically three in number. First, the visual 
beauty interest is a defective predicate for aesthetic policy-making 
because "beauty," as John Dewey has advised, 
is at the furthest remove from an analytic term, and hence from a con­
ception that can figure in theory as a means of explanation or classifi­
cation. Unfortunately, it has been hardened into a peculiar object; 
emotional rapture has been subjected to what philosophy calls hypo­
statization, and the concept of beauty as an essence of intuition has 
resulted . . . . It is surely better to deal with the experience itself and 
show whence and how the quality proceeds.3 
Second, the effort to "deal with the experience itself and to show 
whence and how the quality proceeds" discloses that the visual 
beauty interest, insofar as it has any discernible legal content, is sub­
sumed under the stability interest. It is true, of course, that viewers 
respond affirmatively to particular visual configurations in the envi­
ronment. Their responses, in fact, are often sufficiently patterned to 
refute the objection that aesthetics is too subjective to warrant legal 
2. Wolfe, From Bauhaus to Our House (pt. 1), HARPER'S, June 1981, at 33, 37. 
3. J. DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE 129-30 (1934). 
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�rot�ction. But these ��nfigurations are comp�ll�g. because they s1gmfy values that stabilize cultural, group, or md1v1dual identity 
not because their visual qualities conform to the canons of one 0; 
another school of aesthetic formalism. 
Third, however accurately the stability hypothesis may describe 
the source of society's demands for aesthetic regulation, its adequacy 
as a normative basis for aesthetic controls raises a host of legal di­
lemmas of its own, propelling legal institutions into foreboding ter­
rain that they have desperately attempted to avoid. Visual beauty 
reasoning has served as a superb avoidance device thanks to its 
premise that standards of beauty are ontologically based and hence 
exist "out there," ready to be plucked by aesthetic experts and trans­
formed into legal ukases by policy-makers. Although unverifiable 
by legal means, this premise has mesmerized these institutions be­
cause it dovetails neatly with their attraction to standards that have 
the semblance of objectivity, impartiality, and predictability. 
Stability reasoning, on the other hand, candidly acknowledges 
that aesthetic response is a social construct, not an ontological 
given.4 How individuals or groups respond to an environmental fea­
ture depends on how they construe its message, a process profoundly 
shaped by the conventions of culture and time. If there is a case for 
aesthetic regulation, therefore, it must be fashioned from intersub­
jective patterns of communal aesthetic response. The argument must 
establish that protecting the stability of these patterns is a proper 
concern of the police power's "general welfare." It must provide 
reasonable assurance as well that overriding social and legal values 
are not sacrificed at the altar of stability. 
Neither my view of the stability interest's primacy nor my reser­
vations concerning the state of aesthetic policy or jurisprudence are 
widely shared at this time. On the contrary, both appear to contra­
dict modem legislative and judicial trends that have been over­
whelmingly endorsed in legal and social commentary. 
My argument, therefore, is necessarily lengthy,5 and is developed 
4. This distinction is extensively probed in P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CON­
STRUCTION OF REALITY (1967). See generally K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (1936). 
5. This Article's length also refiects my effort to address a variety of mixed l�gal:social 
issues not considered in my earlier writings, many of which deal favorably with histonc and 
environmental preservation and the design techniques whose consequences are unfavorably 
reviewed here. See, e.g.' SPACE ADRIFT: LANDMARK PRESERVATION AND THE 
MARKETPLACE 
(1974); Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L. J. 75 (1973). Th� 
writings assumed the social value of these initiatives, limiting themselves to an asscssme� 
the initiatives' validity from a traditional legal perspective. While I see no reason tom .Y 
the legal positions advanced in them, I am less persuaded now of the val�c of legal ��o  
that accepts the theoretical constraints under which I earlier wrote. Unlike these wnungs. 
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in five principal sections. Part I assesses trends in current aesthetic 
policy and in aesthetic jurisprudence as the latter has evolved over 
the century. It contends both that the consequences of selected aes­
thetic policies have indeed varied distressingly from the policies' os­
tensible goals, and that the modem judicial position that government 
may regulate "solely for aesthetics" is incoherent if "aesthetics" is 
defined in terms of the visual beauty interest. Preliminarily consid­
ered as well are the basic requirements that any rationale. for aes­
thetic regulation must satisfy with respect to the constitutional values 
of vagueness-due process, substantive due process, freedom of ex­
pression, and a broader set of dilemmas to which a cogent theory of 
aesthetic jurisprudence must respond. The vagueness-due process -
or standards - requirement is highlighted at this and later points in 
the Article because the failure of an aesthetic measure to satisfy it 
derives from considerations that largely, although not exclusively, 
create difficulties under the other two requirements as well. 
Part II posits that coherent responses to the troublesome issues 
besetting aesthetic regulation will not be forthcoming, absent a co­
herent framework for inquiry. Accordingly, it seeks to limn that 
framework - now lacking in commentary - by describing the ele­
ments of what may loosely be termed the "aesthetic regulation sys­
tem" as well as those of a proposed prototypical format for legal­
aesthetic controversies generally. An actual controversy - that trig-
gered by the 1980 designation of the Isaac L. Rice Mansion as a New 
York City landmark - illustrates the format. The section concludes 
that, descriptively considered, the root questions underlying the aes­
thetic regulation puzzle are two: On what basis are environmental 
resources selected for preservation and how is new development, 
which is perceived to threaten them, regulated? In light of this basis, 
to which social needs is aesthetic regulation targeted? The responses 
of the visual beauty and cultural stability-identity hypotheses are 
preliminarily outlined as a point of departure for the discussion that 
follows. 
Part III substantiates the Article's contention that the currently 
dominant visual beauty rationale should be de-emphasized, if not 
abandoned altogether. It summarizes the rationale's key premises 
Article seeks deliberately to bridge the legal and social spheres, and at many points works from 
the social back to the legal rather than the other way around. A number of the conclusions 
suggested by this approach have been painful to me, and my expectations concerning what 
legal intervention can realistically be expected to accomplish have had to be revised accord­
ingly. But the approach has made vivid for me the overriding importan<:e of the process values 
that the rule of law should and must safeguard, even at the cost of foregoing particular desired 
outcomes, if need be. 
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and pinpoints their conceptual defects in arguing that the rationale is 
repugnant to the previous constitutional values. 
Parts IV and V tum to the cultural stability-identity hypothesis. 
The former describes the principal elements of that hypothesis and 
employs it to unravel the earlier-identified dilemmas, which, it con­
cludes, are largely gratuitous offshoots of misconceived visual beauty 
reasoning. Its major effort, however, is to elaborate and firm up by 
specific illustration my notion of "associational dissonance," which 
lies at the heart of all legal-aesthetic controversies. The section uses 
the aesthetic regulation system and prototypical format constructs to 
explain and support these contentions. 
Part V approaches the social interest in cultural stability and 
identity from a normative, rather than a descriptive, angle. Premised 
upon Part !V's contention that these values afford the impetus be­
hind demands for particular aesthetic initiatives, it asks whether and 
under what conditions such demands should be honored by legal 
institutions. It responds by testing these values, as exemplified in the 
cultural stability-identity rationale, against the previously considered 
vagueness-due process, substantive due process, and freedom of ex­
pression strictures. The vagueness-due process question is examined 
in terms of the challenge it poses for legislators, who must initially 
assess these demands, while problems posed by all three constitu­
tional norms are probed from the perspective of the courts, which 
are, or at least should be, their ultimate guardians. 
My tentative conclusions will be unsettling to many, particularly 
special interest groups bent on transforming the idea of aesthetics 
into an ideology of power to serve their parochial ends. I do not 
argue that the aesthetics enterprise is inherently repugnant to sound 
legal or social values.6 But I am persuaded that its second-genera­
tion problems - those relating to its actual effects rather than to its 
ostensible goals - confirm that aesthetic policy-making and juris­
prudence must be disciplined by courts and legislatures if the rule, 
rather than the pretense, of law is to govern. My recommendations 
reduce to the single prescription that, consonant with appropriate in­
stitutional constraints, legislatures and courts should take a much 
harder look at these demands than they do at present. Legislators 
should insist that they reflect values that are reasonably representa­
tive of community-wide sentiment; that their implementation falls 
within the capabilities of the agencies designated to administer them 
and thus are not unduly vulnerable to subversion; and that they be 
6. See Part V in.fro. 
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confined by standards intelligible to property owners, the foregoing 
agencies, and reviewing courts. Absent any of these factors, legisla­
tors should simply refuse to endorse the demands. Similarly, the ju­
diciary should take its oversight role more seriously, given the reality 
that poorly conceived or drafted aesthetic measures often endanger, 
if not actually violate, first and fourteenth amendment substance and 
process values. In particular, courts should disapprove measures 
that lack intelligible standards, not rubber-stamp them on the often 
fanciful premise that their authors have thoughtfully attempted to 
accommodate them with these values. 
What is extraordinary about these conclusions, of course, is that 
they are so utterly unextraordinary. That they should require re­
statement at all reveals how totally the appeal of "beauty" has hyp­
notized legislators and courts. Less obvious are the stubborn 
dilemmas, outlined in Part V, that beset aesthetic regulation even 
when its social impetus is accurately grasped. Formulated in terms 
of the foregoing triad of constitutional values, each traces to the 
challenge of specifying the "harm" that aesthetic regulation seeks to 
forestall and of ensuring that these values are not compromised in 
the attempt to prevent that harm. It is these tasks, I believe, that 
should and will dominate the law-aesthetics agenda in the coming 
years. 
I. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL CRITIQUE 
A. Recent Trends in Aesthetic Policy 
Long dormant in the nation's folklore, aesthetic values have re­
cently burst into prominence. Singly or combined with other values, 
they now determin� how a substantial part of the nation's wealth is 
allocated, demand the attention of policy-makers, administrators, 
and judges, and account for the sprouting of constituencies that seek 
their implementation in varied environmental contexts. Over the 
past two or three decades, aesthetic initiatives have proliferated and, 
many feel, flourished as never before. Visual beauty reasoning, 
moreover, seems to have found a welcome home in modem judicial 
opinions that extol regulation enacted "solely for aesthetics."7 But 
appearances in both spheres are as deceiving as they are dramatic, as 
this and the following subsection illustrate. 
Examples of these developments abound. The National High­
way Beautification Act8 (NHBA), which was intended to restrict 
7. See state court cases cited in note 53 infra. 
8. 23 U.S.C. §§ 131, 136, 319 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
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sharply the number and placement of billboards along federally as­
sisted highways, is a product of this period. Urban renewal was sold 
to the public in no small part on aesthetic grounds, prompting Jus­
tice Douglas's seminal pro-aesthetics dictum in Berman v. Parker.9 
Incentive zoning, 10 a tool proposed to enhance urban design by trad­
ing off bonus building rights for developer-provided plazas, galler­
ias, and other design amenities, has been embraced by cities 
nationwide. The historic preservation movement has also come of 
age, exponentially increasing its membership, building bridges to 
powerful allies in political, financial, ethnic, and environmental cir­
cles, and successfully lobbying for preservation legislation.11 The 
neighborhood conservation movement, a creature of the citizen par­
ticipation fever of the 1960s, has become a force that no astute 
mayor or city council takes lightly. 
Perhaps the most extraordinary achievements were registered by 
the environmental movement in the 1970s - the "Environmental 
Decade." The National Environmental Policy Act of 196912 
(NEPA) broadcasts the convergence of environmental and aesthetic 
values. Among the Act's purposes are ensuring "esthetically and 
culturally pleasing surroundings" 13 and preserving "important his­
toric, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage."14 It ob­
ligates all federal agencies to engage in an "integrated use of the 
natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts"15 and 
to consider "presently unquantified environmental amenities and 
values." 16 Finally, it directs the Council on Environmental Quality 
to respond "to the . . . social, esthetic, and cultural needs and inter­
ests of the nation . . . .  "17 The aesthetics-environmental linkage is 
also featured in the "little NEPAs" of the states.18 
9. The C<?�cept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .. . .  The values it repre­
sents are spmtual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power 
of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, 
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. 
348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (citation omitted). 
10. See generally Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of 
Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972). 
11. See generally Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic 
Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1981). 
12. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1976). 
13. 42 u.s.c. § 4331(b)(2) (1976). 
14. 42 u.s.c. § 4331(b)(4) (1976). 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (1976). 
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B) (1976). 
17. 42 u.s.c. § 4342 (1976). 
18. T
_
he Minneso� Environmental Rights Act, MINN. STAT. § 116B.02 (1980), for exam­
ple, provides substantial safeguards for that state's environmental resources, which are broadly 
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But caution rather than euphoria is called for in assessing these 
developments. The NHBA has been excoriated as the "environmen­
tal movement's greatest failure"19 because it has hindered rather 
than expedited billboard removal. Urban renewal is less kindly re­
garded today than when Justice Douglas lauded it. Many feel that 
its ostensible goal of battling "slums" and "blight" often served as a 
ruse enabling powerful downtown interests to profit by wresting con­
trol of strategically located areas from their former residents - usu­
ally the poor and minority groups. 2o 
Incentive zoning has become "Frankenstein zoning"21 in a 
number of cities. In New York City, for example, it has sanctioned 
buildings that outstrip even the bulky, light- and air-blocking slabs 
that frightened the City into adopting zoning in 1916. It has trans­
formed reasonably predictable and impartial zoning procedures into 
a bazaar, whose wheeler-dealers include the handful of shrewd de­
velopers' lawyers who actually understand what is written -and not 
written - in the code; a planning staff overly eager to design devel­
opers' buildings or to select favored architects for the job; developers 
willing to go along in return for outsized zoning dispensations; and 
mayors panicked by fears of municipal bankruptcy and developer­
authored threats to "take their buildings to Houston." Off to the 
side, the public is demoralized by a "system" that has spun out of 
control, and puzzled by "amenities" that are unused, unwanted, or if 
defined to include "quietude, recreational and historical resources" as well as "all mineral, 
animal, botanical, air, water, [and] land" resources. The Act was successfully invoked in State 
v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1979), to prevent the demolition of an historically signifi­
cant structure that municipal authorities had determined threatened public safety due to the 
structure's dilapidated state. 
19. See c. FLOYD & P. SHEDD, HIGHWAY BEAUTIFICATION (1979). These authors contend 
that the Act has become the captive of the group it ostensibly was enacted to regulate, as 
reflected in the Act's requirement that compensation be paid for billboard removal even in 
cases where no compensation would be required under the federal and applicable state consti­
tutions. In consequence, environmentalists "eagerly await (its) repeal." See Outdoor Advertis­
ers Read the Small Print, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1980, § 4, at 8, col. 3. 
20. Substantiation for this darker view is found in M. ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULL­
DOZER (1964); and H. GANS, PEOPLE AND PLANS 209-25 (1968). 
21. Huxtable, New York's Zoning Law is Out of Bounds, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1980, § 2, at 
41, col. l. The misuse of incentive zoning in New York City is also recounted in Barnett, 
Onward and Upward with the Art of Zoning, 6 N.Y. AFF. No. 3, at 4 (1980); Davis, Brody & 
Associates & Kwartler/Jones, Midtown Development Project: Zoning Regulation Study, in 
MIDTOWN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT: DRAFT REPORT, App. 1 (N.Y.C. Dept. City Planning, 
June 1980). 
The New York City Planning Commission has acknowledged the problem, and has pro­
posed a thorough overhaul of its incentive system in response. See CITY OF NEW YORK DEPT. 
OF CITY PLANNING, MIDTOWN DEVELOPMENT 9, 19 (June 1981). Similar problems have been 
experienced in San Francisco in recent years. Hedman, A Skyline Paved with Good Intentions, 
PLANNING, Aug. 1981, at 12; personal interview with Rai Okamoto, Director, San Francisco 
Planning Dept., July 30, 1980. 
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attractive, would have been built without a zoning bonus. Whether 
the buildings constructed under that system are "better architecture" 
than those that would have been built without it is conjectural at 
best. That many of them fail to respect their urban design context is 
clear. 
The results on the historic preservation, neighborhood conserva­
tion, and environmental quality fronts are also mixed. Historic dis­
tricting legislation has received the backhanded compliment of 
Richard Babcock and Clifford Weaver as a "splendid if somewhat 
contrived device" because the term "[h]istoric has come to mean 
practically anything that is, in some fashion or another, not run-of­
the-mill. "22 
Why this has become so demonstrates how aesthetic initiatives 
can assume a life of their own - often with disturbing consequences. 
It reflects that the standards of most preservation ordinances are so 
vague that, literally read, they qualify almost any building or neigh­
borhood as a landmark or historic district. 23 It is an outcome of zon­
ing debacles that cause shocked neighborhood groups to look to the 
landmark commission to do the planning commission's job, and to 
assume that preservation ordinances adequately substitute for zon­
ing and planning codes. 24 I n  the face of frightful visions of block-
22. C. WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, CITY ZONING 35 (1979). Norman Williams pointedly 
adds: 
To the extent that a designation for historic preservation becomes a symbol of prestige, it 
is likely to be sought by and on behalf of all sorts of neighborhoods/communities with no 
historical value whatsoever - in which case ii becomes not much more than a vekicle for 
local real estate promotion. 
3 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 71A.05 (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added). 
See R. NELSON, ZONING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 20, 21 (1977) (historic districting legislation 
is often used as a subterfuge to achieve "greater collective control and discretion over neigh­
borhood quality"). 
23. The New York City Landmark Ordinance, for example, defines an "historic district" as 
any area containing improvements which have a "special character or special historical or 
aesthetic interest or value, represent one or more periods or styles of architecture typical of one 
or more areas in the history of the city," and "by reason of such factors .  . constitute(s] a 
distinct section of the city ... . " NEW YORK CITY CHARTER & Ao. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A, 
§ 207-1.0(h) (Williams 1976). Other examples of problematic standards are those reviewed in, 
e.g. , Sleeper v. Old King's Highway Regional Historic Dist. Commn., Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 
609, 417 N.E.2d 987 (March 13, 1981) (new development barred that is incompatible with the 
"aesthetic tradition of Barnstable County, as it existed in the early days of Cape Cod"); Gum­
ley v. Board of Selectmen, 371 Mass. 718, 722, 358 N.E.2d !Oil, 1014 (1977) (new development 
barred that is "obviously incongruous to the historic aspects of [its] surroundings"); Town of 
Deering ex rel Bittenbender v. Tibbets, 105 N.H. 481, 485, 202 A.2d 232, 235 (1964) (new 
development barred that is incompatible with the town's "atmosphere"). 
24. !hese problems arc underlined in the complaint of a former chairperson of the New 
York City Landmarks Preservation Commission: 
It is becoming increasingly apparent that there is a growing tendency to use designation 
for purpose� o�tside the jurisdiction of the law and even at times explicitly denied to the 
. . Comm1ss1on by the law . . . [L]andmarking is being used to stop demolition, to 
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busters invading tranquil neighborhoods, the likelihood that 
spurious designations will result or that the landmark commission 
possesses neither staff nor expertise to meet the burdens imposed are 
ignored.25 
To relieve these burdens, landmark commissions, which seldom 
enjoy much budgetary or political clout, are tempted to form alli­
ances with private groups, particularly those in prestigious neighbor-
prevent development and change, to prevent a high-rise with change in use, bulk, scale, 
etc. These are planning isues reserved for the City Planning Commission. . . . 
. . . [P)eople are requesting and gaining designation for a whole array of . . . [im­
proper] reasons: to maintain the status quo, to prevent development, to revitalize an area, 
to gentrify or gain tax benefits. 
Spatt, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1980, at 16, col. 5. See note 22 supra. 
25. See id 
For example, all 33 speakers who testified in favor of the Upper East Side Historic District 
before the New York City Board of Estimate cited the objection in text, while only 15 identi­
fied the need for preserving the East Side's purported architectural-visual unity as a basis for 
their position. See Transcript of the Stenographic Record of the Discussion on Calendar 
Number 96: Held at the Meeting of the Board of Estimate on Sept. IO, 1981, City of New 
York (1981). That this unity exists at all is denied by restoration architect Giorgio Cavaglieri 
who writes that the "'[c]haracter' of [the District] is not due to the preponderance of carefully 
designed facades with constant elements of style and compatible selections of materials. . . . 
{Rather it] is created by the small size of the properties and the low level of the roofs {and} . . . 
{the/ strong social force. . . [oj] the recollection of the elegance of these addresses which reminds 
one of the famous names of New York Society." G. Cavaglieri, Regarding the Designation of 
(the] Upper East Side District, I,  2 (open letter, June 19, 1979) (emphasis added). Accordingly, 
he advocates a zoning solution that preserves the District's bulk, height, and scale constancies 
rather than an historic districting solution addressed to the District's ersatz uniformity of archi­
tectural detail. Id. 
Confirmation that zoning rather than preservation concerns principally account for the 
Upper East Side's designation appears in the objections of "preservationists" to the first of the 
development proposals - a 20-story apartment tower on East 7 lst Street - to come before the 
Landmarks Preservation Commission following the designation. As described by Paul 
Goldberger: 
Preservationists are arguing that the designation . . . was intended to prevent tall buildings, 
not to permit them . . . and that the proposed project would destroy the gentle nature of the 
. . . block on which it would be localed, now one of the few full city blocks on the Upper East 
Side to contain no tall buildings, and that it represents another al/empt to shoehorn develop­
ment into tight Manha/Ian sites. 
Debate over Proposed 71st St. Tower, N.Y. Times, Nov. IO, 1981, at 88, col. 3 (emphasis 
added). For the view that control of broader design constancies rather than of fine-tuned 
details is typically the proper or only practicable solution to legal-aesthetics controversies, see 
text at notes 294-96 infra. 
Quite apart from the impropriety of a historic preservation solution to a zoning problem, 
the designation presents the puzzle of what standards the Commission will employ in passing 
upon this or any other development proposal for the Upper East Side. By the Commission's 
own count, the District contains 63 different architectural styles, ranging from various Beaux 
Arts variants to "styles" that the Commission labels as "none" or "modern. " See Designation 
of the Upper East Side Historic District (N.Y.C. Landmarks Preservation Commn. 1981). 
Inexplicably, the Commission has issued no standards governing the basis upon which new 
development within the 60-block, 1000-building district will or will not be deemed compatible 
with the District's existing architecture. Of its massive report's 1387 pages, only three, id at 
1385-87, set forth the Commission's findings and recommendations, and one and one-half of 
these, id at 1385-86, are devoted to an enumeration of the District's boundaries. The remain­
der describe the District's development history, inventory its buildings, and list the architects 
who designed some of these buildings. 
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hoods. The price extracted for the alliance, however, may be a de 
facto devolution to these groups of the commissions' powers to con­
trol development - the most intrusive of all land use powers and 
hence potent weapons for deciding what gets built, what gets 
changed, and what stays the same. With that devolution comes the 
leverage of private elites to impose or influence design outcomes that 
would otherwise be denied them in our aesthetically pluralistic soci­
ety. Ultimately, authority is dislodged from the public agencies es­
tablished to ensure that development serves city-wide interests, and 
exercised by groups whose perspective may vanish at their neighbor­
hood boundaries or be confined by their often-autocratic preferences 
for this or that architectural style. 
Babcock and Weaver confirm similar trends in their portrayal of 
the neighborhood conservation movement's abuse of land use meas­
ures, many of which include a strong aesthetic component. Despite 
their sympathy for the movement, they compare recently arrived res­
idents of gentrified or gentrifying neighborhoods to 
folks who are still fighting to keep the walls up around their suburb or 
the Vermont environmentalist who moved from New York last year 
... [who] have implicit faith in their own good motives but are con­
vinced that the public health, safety, and welfare demand a zoning or­
dinance to control the libidinal tendencies of others to pillage, plunder 
and rape "their" turf. 26 
The territorial imperative motivates residents of other types of 
neighborhdods as well. The evidence is compelling, for example, 
that New York City's Little Italy Special District was adopted at the 
behest of its Italian-American residents to restrain further movement 
into and commercial development of the District by an adjacent Chi­
nese-American population.27 Bernard Frieden concurs with Bab­
cock and Weaver in his parallel attack on the abuse of 
environmental legislation by suburbanites. In The Environmental 
Protection Hustle, he blasts Marin County, a wealthy area north of 
San Francisco, as 
the best place to look for an understanding of what it means to stop 
sub1:1rban growth in the name of environmental protection. It means 
closmg the gates to people who may want to move in and, where possi­
ble, even to people who may want to visit; turning to state and federal 
governments for help in p aying the costs of exclusivity; and maintain­
ing a tone of moral righteousness while providing a better living envi­
ronment for the established residents. 2s 
26. C .  WEAVER & R. BABCOCK, supra note 22, at 37. 
27. See Wang, Plans and Promises: Like Lellers to Santa Claus, 6 N.Y. AFF. 70 (1980). 
28. B. FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE 37 (1979). For a similar as­
sessment of the Storm King Mountain controversy litigated in Scenic Hudson Preservation 
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Taken together, these trends signal that aesthetic policy's second­
generation issues are considerably more worrisome than is generally 
recognized. Aesthetics has been transformed from an idea into an 
ideology that is being employed by preservationists, environmental­
ists, and developers alike to rationalize pursuits that are at best tenu­
ously related to visual beauty. Some of these pursuits may be 
unobjectionable under a properly reformulated concept of aesthetics; 
others are deplorable under any formulation. 
As a concept, aesthetics is peculiarly vulnerable to the metamor­
phosis that it has experienced. However defined, its scope is inher­
ently vague and expansive. Its conventional definition as the pursuit 
of visual beauty, conceived as an ontological fact rather than as a 
social construct, confers upon it an aura of legitimacy which special 
interest groups have exploited.29 Its emotional appeal discourages 
dissent - everyone is, after all, a lover of "beauty." And its seem­
ingly unique concerns appear to set it apart from other land use and 
environmental endeavors, which are widely recognized as the prod­
uct of warfare among contending groups to control the pace and 
character of environmental change. 
The metamorphosis also conflicts with the pluralism that has 
been the lifeblood of American art and politics. Ours is not the cul­
ture of the Medicis' Florence, Julius H's Rome, or Louis XIV's Ver­
sailles, design ensembles that are the envy of many American 
proponents of aesthetic regulation. In these despotic societies, style 
Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), see Tucker, Environmentalism and the Leisure Class, 
HARPER'S, Dec. 1977, at 49. 
The admonition of Babcock, Weaver, Frieden, and Tucker that the expansion of tradi­
tional land use controls to encompass aesthetic and environmental concerns enlarges the risk 
that they will be used for exclusionary or other troubling purposes is reflected as well in, e.g., 
Ackerman, lmpacl S1a1emen1s and Low Cos/ Housing, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 754 (1973); Daffron, 
Using NEPA lo Exclude 1he Poor, 4 ENVTL. AFF. 81 (1975). Litigation that confirms that the 
issue is a serious and continuing one includes, e.g., Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Assn. v. 
Lynn, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); Town of Groton v. Laird, 
353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972); Home Builders League v. Township of Berlin, - N.J. -, 
405 A.2d 381 (1979); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); National Land & Inv. Co. v. 
Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Polygon Corp. v. 
City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978). 
29. In their discussion of "reification," Berger and Luckmann clarify how the characteriza­
tion of a phenomenon as an ontological fact rather than as a social construct can serve authori­
tatively to legitimate it: 
Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in 
non-human or possibly super-human terms. . . . [It] is the apprehension of the products 
of human activity as !f they were something else than human products - such as factors 
of nature, the results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will . . . . The basic 
"recipe" for the reification of institutions is to bestow on them an ontological status in­
dependent of human activity and signification . . . . Through reification, the world of 
institutions appears to merge with the world of nature. 
P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 89-90 (emphasis in original). 
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was monopolized by signorie, popes, and kings who employed fa­
vored artists, supported academies, enshrined particular canons of 
beauty, and preempted the art market to glorify themselves and their 
unilaterally proclaimed political and cultural ideals. The styles that 
they decreed were official styles in the most fundamental sense of 
that term, and aesthetics was one and the same with ideology.Jo 
With the principal exception of Washington, D.C. - which most 
American design critics prefer to forget3 1 - the design of American 
cities is the product of cultural, political, legal, and economic forces 
that embrace pluralism. Louis Sullivan's dictum that "[t]he Roman 
temple can no more exist in fact on Monroe Street, Chicago, U.S.A. 
than can Roman civilization exist there,"32 succinctly portrays the 
formative influence of these forces on the built environment. The 
premise that America can have the unified design philosophies or 
cityscapes of the past while remaining faithful to its own pluralistic 
traditions is naive, objectionable, or both. Democracy and aesthetic 
orthodoxy are antithetical. Regrettably, this antithesis has generally 
been ignored by the Le Corbusiers, Wrights, Gropiuses, and other 
leading architectural propagandists, by many design critics, and by 
many members of the preservation movement. The lip service that 
they pay to the values of pluralism is belied by their desire to impose 
personal design preferences on society as autocratically as did the 
despots of the past. JJ 
30. See generally 2 A. HAUSER, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF ART (1957). 
Illustrating his position by reference to the status of art in Louis XIV's France, Hauser 
comments: 
Like all the forms of life and culture of the age, . . . the aesthetic of classicism is 
guided by the principles of absolutism - the absolute primacy of the political conception 
over all the other expressions of cultural life . . . . [T]he representatives of official classi­
cism want to put an end to all artistic freedom, to every effort to achieve a personal taste, 
to all subjectivism in the choice of theme and form. They demand that art should be 
universally valid - that is to say, a formal language . . .  which corresponds to the idea�s 
of classicism as the regular, lucid, rational style par excellence. . . . Their universalism IS 
a fellowship of the elite - of the elite as formed by absolutism. 
Id. at 1 92-93. 
3 1 .  One noted design critic grieves, for example, that "Washington's 'development' is so 
wrong-headed that it wrings the heart." A. HUXTABLE, KICKED A BUILDING LATELv? 172 
(1976). 
32. L. SULLIVAN, KINDERGARTEN CHATS 39 (1947). 
33. For this Article's purposes, the most striking aspect of such works as W. GROPIUS, THE 
NEW ARCHITECTURE AND THE BAUHAUS ( 1965); LE CORBUSIER, WHEN THE CATHEDRALS 
WERE WHITE ( 1 947); and F.L . WRIGHT, WHEN DEMOCRACY BUILDS (1 945), is the antinomy 
manifested between ostensible commitment to individual artistic freedom and political plural· 
ism on the one side, and the authors' evident disposition to read their personal preferences as 
Holy Writ on the other. See generally G. BROADBENT, DESIGN IN ARCHITECTURE (1973); R. 
VENTURI, D. BROWN & S. lzENOUR, LEARNING FROM LAS VEGAS (rev. ed. 1977); Wolfe, supra 
note 2. 
Design critics, too, are dubious sources of public policy, however insightful their percei: 
tions of their subject may be. Thoughtful critics appreciate that design criticism and public 
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In addition to their threat to pluralism, recent trends illustrate 
that aesthetic law and policy are frail vessels for achieving "better" 
design. Conceiving "better" design in the abstract is virtually impos­
sible;34 and, while conceiving it in the context of preserving or en­
hancing existing environmental features is possible, the task is by no 
means simple. Js Constituencies for a resource may offer little help 
policy formulation are entirely distinct enterprises. Huxtable, for example, observes that the 
critic's role is to "have taught someone to see." A. HUXTABLE, WILL THEY EVER FINISH 
BRUCKNER BOULEVARD? 2 (1970). Dewey sharply distinguishes between "aesthetic" and "le­
galistic" criticism, and notes that a desire for authoritative standing similar to that of the law 
court judge often leads the critic to "speak as if he were the attorney for established principles 
having unquestioned sovereignty." J. DEWEY, supra note 3, at 229. 
But even critics as sensitive to Dewey's distinction as is Huxtable sometimes have difficulty 
honoring it, and their followings seldom make the effort at all. In an essay entitled Pop Archi­
tecture, for example, Huxtable advances the following view: 
Except for a pathetically small showing, the cultural aristocracy is no longer responsible 
for most building styles. It is barely holding its own with those isolated examples that 
represent structural and design excellence, against the tide, or better, flood, of . . . Pop 
Architecture. 
Pop Architecture is the true democratization of the art of architecture in that it repre­
sents not just mass consumption but mass taste. 
Its standards are set not by those with an informed and knowledgeable judgment, but 
by those with little knowledge or judgment at all. It is the indisputable creation of the 
lower rather than of the upper classes. 
A. HUXTABLE, supra , at 173. In a subsequent essay, she transforms this view into a public 
policy prescription that supports the Upper East Side Historic District while largely ignoring 
or misconceiving the issues of policy and pluralism that the designation posed. See Huxtable, 
A Plan to Preserve the Upper East Side, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2 1, 1981, § 4, at 26, col. 1.. In that 
essay, she insists that the root conflict posed by the designation pits the "enrich[ment of) a few 
builders" against the "impoverish[ment of] the city"; that the Landmark Preservation Com­
mission's report is "meticulously researched and compiled"; that the District qualifies "as a 
'toute ensemble,' or coherent whole, as established legally many years ago in New Orleans' 
Vieux Carre"; that the designation entails a "sensitive and cordial collaboration" between the 
city's preservation and planning agencies; and that the former agency has devised procedures 
guaranteeing expedited and principled review of future proposals for change. In fact, the 
designation's root conflict traces to the very purposes of preservation itself and the role and 
capabilities of preservation agencies as municipal development control bodies, see notes 22-25 
supra ; the report's findings and recommendations conceal rather than justify the basis for the 
designation, see note 25 supra; the District, as boundaried, is not visually or historically uni­
fied, see id. ; with the acquiescence of the Board of Estimate, the Landmarks Preservation Com­
mission has substituted itself for, rather than collaborated with, the Planning Commission, see 
notes 18-2 1 supra and accompanying text; and such procedures as the former body may have 
disclosed to Huxtable are not intelligibly detailed in its report, see note 2 5  supra . 
My point is not, of course, that architects and critics are not entitled to their personal views 
or to the privilege of advocating them forcefully. In the free marketplace of aesthetic ideas, 
they clearly are entitled to a hearing. But in a democracy, those ideas are by no means author­
itative simply because they are held by design professionals. They are likely, in fact, to be 
suspect as sources of public policy because these professionals, like architectural propagan­
dists, tend to ignore process values and tend to engage in what Dewey terms "legalistic" 
rather than aesthetic criticism. For two views on the implications of this observation, compare 
0. Y GASSET, REVOLT OF THE MASSES (1932) (expressing consternation over the democratiza­
tion of taste accompanying the evolution of social democracies in the West), with H. GANS, 
POPULAR CULTURE AND HIGH CULTURE 52 (1974) (a critique of the "plea for the restoration 
of an elitist order by the creators of high culture . . . who are unhappy with the tendencies 
toward cultural democracy that exist in every modem society"). 
34. See notes 149 & 254 infra and text at note 253 infra. 
35. See text at notes 254, 286-303 infra. 
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because they are often unsure why they seek its protection. Does the 
demand, for example, that Building X or Neighborhood Y be desig­
nated reflect a genuine conviction that either resource is historically 
or architecturally distinguished? Or does it derive instead from a 
diffuse fear of change qua change, from romanticism of the past, or 
from lack of confidence in the city's administration of its zoning 
code? Even if a design obj ective is determined, can it be rendered in 
syntax that both is faithful to that objective and satisfies legal re­
quirements of generality, impartiality, and predictability? The legal 
and design lexicons and professions, after all, are worlds apart. 
Because aesthetic regulation is administered by public bureau­
cracies, moreover, it is subject to the vicissitudes of public adminis­
tration. 36 Some bureaucrats are extraordinarily competent; others 
far less so. Even the best are often no match for the battery of law­
yers and lobbyists eager to tum problematic aesthetic measures to 
their clients' advantage. Strong political support for aesthetic meas­
ures is seldom guaranteed because coalitions favoring them are not 
easily forged or maintained, and because politicians tend to sacrifice 
them to more basic bread-and-butter concerns in a crunch. The be­
deviling problems of practical implementation must also be consid­
ered. Incentive zoning programs, for example, require detailed, 
current knowledge of market trends, which public officials often 
lack.37 
Related to these concerns is planning's Murphy's Law of unin­
tended consequences. In the late 1 950s, for example, the tower-in­
the-plaza format, illustrated by the van der Rohe-Johnson Seagram 
Building, became the architectural fad in New York City. Accord­
ingly, policy-makers modified the City's zoning code to encourage 
use of that format. The result: scores of "bargain-basement Mies 
buildings" - cheap, bland imitations of the original; disruption of 
formerly uniform street walls by redundant, windswept plazas; and 
buildings that are discordant in scale and bulk with their neighbors 
and with the streets on which they front. Aghast at these conse­
quences, policy-makers, urged on by neighborhood groups and 
wounded design critics, then frenziedly embraced preservation to get 
the genie back in the bottle. Since we have no idea whether the fu-
36. For sober accou�ts of these vi�issi�udes and the often insuperable obstacles they pose 
to the balanced conception and effective implementation of any planning policies, let alone 
those as fragile as aesthetic policies, see A. ALTSHULER, THE CITY PLANNING PROCESS (1967); 
E. BANFIELD, POLITICAL INFLUENCE ( 1 96 1); J. BARNETT, URBAN DESIGN AS PuBLIC POLICY 
( 1974); A. CATANESE, PLANNERS AND LOCAL POLITICS ( 1 974); A. JACOBS, MAKINO CITY 
PLANNING WORK ( 1978). 
37. See authorities cited in note 21 supra. 
January 1982) Law and Aesthetics 371 
ture will bring more of the same or perhaps even something worse, 
their thinking goes, we should save what we have. No matter that it 
may not be distinguished - indeed when it was built fifty or a hun­
dred years ago, the contemporary design avant garde was calling it 
derivative, effete, and corrupt. But at least it is comfortable and · 
known .38 
There is, moreover, the seeming paradox that speculative devel­
opment constructed with loose or no public controls is often re­
garded as superb, while development erected with detailed public 
intervention is not. New York City's Soho, Greenwich Village, and 
Gramercy Park, London's great squares, and the widely respected 
buildings and ensembles authored by the Chicago School of Archi­
tecture in that city's Loop illustrate the former; New York City's 
Sixth Avenue and the whole of Washington, D.C.'s civic architec­
ture, the latter. This paradox dissolves with the recognition that the 
built environment results from a host of forces, among which the law 
is but a minor factor. Perhaps the current unhappiness with modem 
architecture is attributable to a dearth of "good" architects. If so, the 
law can off er nothing to remedy the problem, but its indiscriminate 
intervention can do a good deal to compound it. 
Finally, recent trends indicate that aesthetic initiatives redistrib­
ute power to control what does and does not get built, and, hence, to 
determine who wins and who loses in the community development 
game. My earlier discussion of historic districting suggests, for ex­
ample, that power may drift from the planning commission to the 
landmark commission and even to influential private groups. Or, as 
the Little Italy Special District example illustrates, power may be 
exercised on behalf of one ethnic group to the disadvantage of an­
other. More generally, vague legislative declarations of aesthetic 
policy augment the power of administrators because they must pro­
vide the content for these generalities. This power shift is accentu­
ated by the refusal of most modern courts to scrutinize 
administrative decisions undertaken in the name of "aesthetics." 
B. Trends in Aesthetic Jurisprudence 
My reservations might also be faulted as out of step with the 
modem courts' enthusiastic endorsement of aesthetic values. Again, 
38. Id. 
The preference for the bland known over the feared unknown appears in architectural 
critic Paul Goldberger's comment that "[w]e cry not because we think the architectural past 
was so good, but because we cannot believe the architectural future will be better." P. GOLD­
BERGER, THE CITY OBSERVED xvi (1979). 
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the charge is superficially appealing. Norman Williams, for example, 
is surely correct when he asserts that "[i]n no ot�er 
_
are� 
_
of pla�ing 
law [than in the aesthetic area] has the change m JUd1c1al attitudes 
been so complete."39 His appraisal is readily confirmed by a sample 
of recent Supreme Court opinions addressing such diverse topics as 
standing,40 urban renewal,41 zoning for historic preservation42 or 
community character,43 and, strikingly enough, first amendment ex­
pression. 44 These opinions mirror profound shifts in national atti­
tudes and concomitant legislative responses that elevate aesthetic 
values to the first rank and bring aesthetic, land use, and environ­
mental concerns together under a common rubric, which the Court 
has termed the "quality of life."45 
39. l N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 1 1 .02 ( 1 974 & Supp. 1981). 
40. See, e.g. , Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 ( 1 972) ("Aesthetic and environmen­
tal well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our 
society . . . .  "); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 
( 1970) (injury upon which standing may be predicated includes impairment of " 'aesthetic, 
conservational, and recreational' as well as economic values"). 
4 1 .  See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 ( 1954). 
42. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 1 04, 129 (1978). 
43. See, e.g. , Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, JOI S. Ct. 2882 ( 1 981); Schad v. 
Borough of Mount Ephraim, J O I  S. Ct. 2 1 76 ( 1 98 1); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 
( 1980); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); 
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 ( 1976); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 
427 U.S. 50 ( 1 976); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I ( 1 974). 
44. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 ( 1 978) (FCC regulation of scatological 
broadcasts); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 4 1 3  U.S. 49 ( 1 973) (governmental ban on obscene 
movies). In both opinions, a majority of the Court recognized that controls that ban "offen­
sive" environmental objects and controls that ban "offensive" speech each affect a medium -
the physical environment in the case of the former, the social environment in the case of the 
latter - so pervasively that the introduction of "offensive" activities into it threatens to under­
mine the "quality of life." Thus, in Pacifica, the Court stressed that "the broadcast media have 
established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans," 438 U.S. at 748, and 
justified the FCC's restrictions in part on the pig-in-the-parlor metaphor employed by the 
Court to sustain the constitutionality of zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
U.S. 365, 388 ( 1 926) ("A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, - like a pig 
in 
.
the parlor �stead of the barnyard."). In Slaton, the Court premised obscenity bans on "the 
pnmary requuements of decency," among which it included "the interest of the public in the 
quality ef l!fe and the Iota/ community environment . . . .  " 4 1 3  U.S. at 58 (emphasis added). 
The C�urt also relied on aesthetic reasoning in observing that obscenity control, like aesthetic 
regulation, may be based on "imponderable aesthetic assumptions," 4 1 3  U.S. at 62, and in 
analogizing obscenity to "garbage" and "sewage," which the government may regulate not 
only to "protect . . . public health," but to safeguard "the appearance of public places" as 
well. 4 1 3  U.S. at 64. 
In Metrr.:media, Young, and Mount Ephraim, see note 43 supra, the Court acknowledged 
that aestheucally based land use and environmental controls can raise serious first amendment 
i�sues when they ba� or restrict a�t�vities on the basis that their expressive character is olfen· 
s1ve to the commumty. These oplDlons and the first amendment issues that aesthetic regula­
tion may pose are discussed in Part V (C) infra. 
45. Hence the Court's explicit endorsement in Penn Central of the comment that "historic 
consef".ation is but one aspect of �he much larger problem, basically an environmental one, of 
enhancmg - or perhaps develop1:llg for the first time - the quality of life for people." Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, J 08 ( 1 978) (quoting Gilbert, Precedents/or 
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Lest too much is made of the recent endorsement of aesthetics, 
however, we should examine how the courts arrived at their present 
position. Commentary46 has distinguished three stages in the evolu­
tion of aesthetic jurisprudence, termed here the early, middle, and 
modem period views. The early period view was hostile to the claim 
that government's police power encompassed aesthetic initiatives.47 
In part, this hostility reflected opposition to public measures restrict­
ing private property rights.48 These courts' opinions also intimated a 
concern that, to use the syntax of current first amendment doctrine, 
the state should not impede the interests in expression and self-ful­
fillment associated with aesthetic activity.49 But their most serious 
objection was that aesthetic preferences are too subjective and arbi­
trary to constitute a proper object of public ordering. Observing that 
"[c)ertain legislatures might consider that it was more important to 
cultivate a taste for jazz than for Beethoven, for posters than for 
the Future, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 1 1 , 3 1 2  (1971), (quoting address by Robert Stipe, 
197 1 Conference on Preservation Law, Washington, D.C. (May l, 1 97 1))). 
46. Among the more frequently cited law review contributions on law and aesthetics are 
Anderson, Architectural Controls, 1 2  SYRACUSE L. REV. 26 ( 1960); Dukeminier, Zoning for 
Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 2 1 8  (1955); Michelman, To­
ward a Practical Standard for Aesthetic Regulation, 15 PRAC. LAW. 36 ( 1 969); Williams, Subjec­
tivity, Expression and Privacy: Problems of Aesthetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REV. I (1977); 
Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics and the First Amendment, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 8 1  (1964); Note, 
Beyond the Eye ef the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity, 7 1  MICH. L. REV. 1438 (1973); 
Note, Aesthetic Nuisance: An Emerging Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1075 (1970); Com­
ment, Architectural Controls: Aesthetic Regulation efthe Urban Environment, 6 URB. LAW. 622 
(1974). The most exhaustive and thoughtful treatment of the topic in treatise form is 1 N. 
WILLIAMS, supra note 39, § 1 1 .01-.21 ( 1 974 & Supp. 1980); 3 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 39, 
§ 7 1 .01- .14 (1974 & Supp. 198 1 ); id. at § 7 lA.01-. 1 1 . 
47. Representative early period cases are collected in 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at 
§ 1 1 .04-.06. 
48. The observation cited in City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign 
Painting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 287, 62 A. 267, 268 ( 1905) is representative: 
No case has been cited . . .  which holds that a man may be deprived of his property 
because his tastes are not those of his neighbors. Aesthetic considerations are a matter of 
luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the 
exercise of the police power to take private property without compensation. 
49. In Curran Bill Posting & Distrib. Co. v. City of Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 227, 107 P. 261, 
264 ( 19 10), both concerns were implicated in the following comment: 
The cut of the dress, the color of the garment worn, the style of the hat, the architec­
ture of the building or its color, may be distasteful to the refined senses of some, yet 
government can neither control nor regulate in such affairs. The doctrines of the com­
mune invest such authority in the state, but ours is a constitutional government based 
upon the individuality and intelligence of the citizen, and does not seek, nor has it the 
power, to control him, except in those matters where the rights of others are injuriously 
affected or imperiled. 
Similar concerns have been expn;ssed in dissents to more recent opinions as well. See 
People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 47')A3, 1 9 1  N.E.2d 272, 278, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 742, appeal 
dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963); cf Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 1 1 9 Ohio App. 67, 76, 
192 N.E.2d 74, 81 ( 1963). 
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Rembrandt, and for limericks than for Keats," a representative opin­
ion concluded that "[t]he world would be at continual seesaw if aes­
thetic considerations were permitted to govern the use of the police 
power."50 
The middle and modem period courts have been less hostile to 
public intervention, although for different reasons. The former side­
stepped their predecessors' principal objection by upholding particu­
lar measures, not because they served aesthetic ends per se but 
because they also advanced such traditional police power goals as 
the preservation of property values.5 1 But the asserted linkages be­
tween aesthetics and these goals were often dubious, if not trans­
parently fictional. 52 By contrast, the modem period courts purport 
to break with the early and middle periods by proclaiming that gov­
ernment may indeed regulate "solely" for aesthetic ends.53 
50. City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 1 12 Ohio St. 654, 661 -62, 148 N.E. 842, 
844 ( 1925). 
5 1 .  Representative cases are collected in I N. WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at §§ 1 1 .07-.09. 
52. Perhaps the favorite target of the commentators' ire on this ground is St. Louis Gun­
ning Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S. W. 929 (191 1), appeal dismissed, 
23 1 U.S. 761 ( 19 1 3), which sustained a billboard ban on the grounds, inter a/ia, that billboards 
were 
constant menaces to the public safety and welfare of the city; they endanger the public 
health, promote immorality, constitute hiding places and retreats for criminals and all 
classes of miscreants . . . . [T]he evidence shows . . . that the ground in the rear thereof 
is being constantly used as privies and dumping grounds for all kinds of waste and delete­
rious matters, and . . . behind these obstructions the lowest form of prostitution and other 
acts of immorality are frequently carried on, almost under the public gaze . . . .  
235 Mo. at 145, 137  S.W. at 942. 
53. See, e.g. , Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. 
Rptr. 5 10, revd on other grounds, IOI  S. Ct. 2882 (198 1); State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 
Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 ( 1967); John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 369 
Mass. 206, 339 N.E.2d 709 (1975); Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 255 N.E.2d 749, 279 
N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal 
dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 ( 1963). The status of the modem period view in the 50 states is sur­
veyed in 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at § 1 1 . 10-.21. 
The status of aesthetic values has proven as controversial under the National Environmen­
tal Policy Act of 1 969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (NEPA), in cases arising s�ce 
its enactment as it has been under zoning for most of this century. Although the principal 
positions expressed in these cases do not fully correspond to the early, middle, and modern 
views expressed in the text, instructive comparisons can be noted. The NEPA cases can be 
interpreted as endorsing one of three positions - the "hard look," the "semi-soft look," and 
the "soft look" - concerning the manner in which a court should review the obligation of 
federal agencies to consider aesthetic values both in making the threshold dete�ati�n 
whether to file an environmental impact statement and, should the decision be affirmative, m 
preparing that statement. The "hard look" view requires that the agency thoroughly consid�r 
aesthetic values at both stages because Congress has explicitly mandated that it do so m 
§ 433 l(b)(2) of the NEPA, which includes among its purposes the assurance of "healthful, 
productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings." The agency's failure. to �o 
so entitles aggrieved parties to a mandatory injunction requiring that the agency r�ufy its 
omission. See Ely v. Velde, 45 1 F .2d 1 130, 1 134 (4th Cir. 1971) (proposed construction of a 
prison in the Virginia Historic Green Springs area; "other environmental . . . factors" than 
those directly related to health and safety are "the very ones accented in . . .  NEPA"); cf. 
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1965) (proposed con-
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Two points stand out in this picture. First, the judges of all three 
periods have assumed that visual beauty is the primary or exclusive 
referent of the term "aesthetics."54 To be sure, comments comport­
ing with stability interest reasoning appear from time to time.55 
Nonetheless, the conclusion overwhelmingly asserted and lauded in 
commentary56 is that "aesthetics" and "visual beauty" are essentially 
struction of a storage pump plant on Storm King Mountain; Federal Power Commission must 
consider as a "basic concern the preservation of natural beauty and of historic national 
shrines" under § I O  of the Federal Power Act). The "semi-soft look" position also acknowl­
edges Congress's concern for aesthetic values, but reasons that the impossibility of quantifying 
them frees the agency of supporting its assessment of them with the type of objective evidence 
that would be possible in measuring a project's health or safety impacts. See City of New 
Haven v. Chandler, 446 F. Supp. 925, 930 (D. Conn. 1978) (proposed construction of three 
transmission towers over New Haven Bay; "elusive character of aesthetics does not mean that 
such concerns are less weighty," but does indicate that the agency's "finding as to the role of 
aesthetics need not be supported by statistical evidence"). The "soft look" view is best exem­
plified by Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972), and 
Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1 973) (proposed 
construction of a detention facility in a mixed commercial-residential high density urban dis­
trict). In these opinions, the Second Circuit appears to distinguish four types of project im­
pacts: first, those relating directly to health and safety; second, those relating to the "quality of 
life"; third, those relating to psychological and sociological effects; and fourth, by implication, 
those relating to visual beauty. It ruled in both Hanly opinions that the agency must consider 
the first two types of impacts in making its threshold decision whether to file an impact state­
ment. Despite the apparently broad scope of the phrase "quality of life," however, it indicated 
in the second Hanly decision that the second category of impacts does not include psychologi­
cal and sociological effects such as those that might, for example, cause residents of a neigh­
borhood to object to the construction of a detention facility in their midst. See 471 F.2d at 833. 
In the court's terms, "it is doubtful whether psychological or sociological effects upon neigh­
bors constitute the type of factors that may be considered in making [a] detennination [to 
prepare an environmental impact statement] since they do not lend themselves to measure­
ment." 471 F.2d at 833. That aesthetic values are indeed low on the NEPA totem pole for 
"soft look" courts is confirmed in City of Columbia v. Solomon, 1 3  Envir. Rep. Cas. 1 301  
(D.S.C. 1979) (proposed construction of a parking garage blocking vistas to historic district), 
which stated that "aesthetic considerations alone may [not] be used as a basis for requiring an 
[environmental impact statement]." 1 3  Envir. Rep. Cas. at 1307. See Maryland-National 
Capitol Park & Planning Commn. v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1038-39 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973) (proposed construction of postal facility in suburban Maryland; aesthetic impacts do 
not justify the same hard look by reviewing courts as "more significant environmental effects 
relating to both health and injury to natural resources"). 
54. See, e.g., Maryland-National Capitol Park & Planning Commn. v. United States Postal 
Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1038-39 (D.C. Cir. 1973); City of Columbia v. Solomon, 1 3  Envir. Rep. 
Cas. 1301, 1307-08 (D.S.C. 1979); Mayor of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc. 268 Md. 79, 91, 
299 A.2d 828, 835 ( 1973); City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 1 12 Ohio St. 654, 661-
62, 148 N.E. 842, 844 (1925). Representative of this view is  the statement that "[b]eauty may 
not be queen but she is not an outcast beyond the pale of protection or respect." Perlmutter v. 
Greene, 259 N.Y. 327, 332, 182 N.E. 5, 6 ( 1 932). 
55. See cases cited in note 1 19 infra. 
56. See authorities cited in note 46 supra. 
Representative of the approach adopted in commentary is Norman Williams's analysis. 
Having earlier posited that "matters which are essentially aesthetic . . . (are those) which are 
perceived by tlte sense of siglt ," I N. WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at § 1 1 .01 (emphasis added), 
Williams defines the central legal problem posed by aesthetic regulation as follows: 
When an attempt is made to apply legal sanctions in connection with aesthetics, one sim­
ple but very important problem arises: how to define wltat is attractive and wltat is ugly. 
1!1e problem of !tow to define good taste, long debated among philosophers, has a special 
significance in a legal context; for when legal sanctions arc involved, it is essential to 
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synonymous in American aesthetic jurisp�u?,en�e. Accordingly, the 
modern period courts' "solely for �esthetics . dicta may be read as 
expressing the rationale for aesthetic regulation. 
Second, the visual beauty interest is only an assumption. Inexpli­
cably, the courts have refrained from washing it in cynical acid. The 
assumption and its premise�, however, n? longer co�mand the �s­
sent of the extralegal discipbnes from which they denve.57 The vis­
ual beauty interest can be taken seriously as a predicate for aesthetic 
regulation only if visual beauty itself can be rendered by intelligible 
standards. That task leads inevitably to confusion. The early and 
middle period courts comprehended this problem, and, however 
flawed in other respects, their opinions reflect principled responses to 
it. The courts of both periods withheld their endorsement of aesthet­
ics by reasoning that the pursuit of visual beauty alone falls outside 
of the police power's ambit. For those who question the visual 
beauty rationale but believe that courts should uphold soundly for­
mulated and implemented aesthetic measures, the flaw in both sets 
of opinions is obvious: They fail to attempt any reformulation of the 
visual beauty assumption to take account of the social values that 
aesthetic measures can advance. In a sense, the middle period courts 
moved in this direction when they searched for purposes other than 
the pursuit of visual beauty to sustain aesthetic measures. But they 
were sidetracked by their attempts to assimilate aesthetics to tradi­
tional police power ends. Had they recognized that aesthetics is 
neither derivative of the latter nor exhausted by visual beauty con­
cerns, aesthetic jurisprudence might have been spared many of its 
present infirmities. 
In contrast to their predecessors, the modem period courts have 
posited that aesthetics and visual beauty are interchangeable. If aes­
thetics connotes visual beauty alone, the modern view becomes 
mired in the standards morass that caused the courts of the earlier 
periods to reject aesthetics as a proper governmental concern. Why 
the modem period courts should have opted for this view, if indeed 
they have, is unclear. Their opinions offer little to refute their prede­
cessors' objection that visual beauty is hopelessly subjective and ar-
define rather precisely what is permitted and what is not. Because of the obvious diffi­
culty of dr�wing the line in such cases, the courts have long been reluctant to recognize 
the aesthetic factor as an appropriate basis for land use controls. 
Id at § 11.02 (emphasis added). 
In contrast to t�is position, Professor Rose advances a position similar in vital respects to 
that offered here m her . arg.ument that the "chief function of [historic] preservation is to strengthen loc�l community ties and community organization," Rose, supra note 11, at 479, or, 
as she alternatively states that function, "community building." Id 
57. See text at notes 128-79 infra . 
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bitrary. Perhaps the modern judges, like the commentators, simply 
grew impatient with the fanciful linkages that middle period courts 
had posited between aesthetic and police power pursuits. Perhaps 
the answer is to be found in recent history. Since the modem period 
commenced roughly at the same time as the shift in national atti­
tudes favoring aesthetic values, modem judges may have been 
caught up in the spirit of the times. 
It is also conceivable, however, that modem period judges did 
not intend to link aesthetics exclusively with visual beauty, but inad­
vertently became prisoners of language that failed to express a more 
discerning position: namely, that aesthetics connotes the pursuit of 
cultural stability, in which visual form plays a significant but not 
dispositive role. Concededly, their "solely for aesthetics" phraseol­
ogy affords, at most, ambivalent support for this hypothesis. But I 
find the cultural stability hypothesis both defensible as a description 
of the direction in which contemporary aesthetic jurisprudence is 
moving, and more attractive - if still problematic - as a prescrip­
tion for what that direction ought to be. The hypothesis is consistent 
with the decisions and, from time to time, the explicit reasoning of 
the more thoughtful of the modern period opinions. Under it, the 
modem view can be interpreted as carrying forward the fumbled 
middle period insight that because aesthetics and visual beauty may 
not be interchangeable concepts, the search for standards need no 
longer be identified with the futile quest for a definition of "beauty." 
In addition, it establishes a framework for constructing a rationale 
for aesthetic jurisprudence that comports more faithfully with such 
nonaesthetic legal values as those set forth in the first and fourteenth 
amendments. 
2. Aesthetic Policy and Nonaesthetic Constitutional Values 
But I am getting ahead of my argument. For the moment, let it 
be conceded that the modem period courts accept the visual beauty 
rationale. If so, a cogent justification for aesthetic regulation must 
begin by specifying the harm that warrants state intervention to pre­
vent "ugly" development or to promote "beautiful" development. 
On that specification hinges aesthetic regulation's defense against the 
objection that it violates these constitutional values. 
The vagueness-due process challenge is rebutted only if the stan­
dards incorporated in the aesthetic initiative meet a threshold of in­
telligibility so that the regulated class can understand its 
requirements, the implementing agency can administer it purpos­
ively and impartially, and the courts can review it and related ad-
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ministrative actions. 58 Draftsmen of such initiatives cannot meet 
that threshold absent a reasonably precise sense of both the social 
interest that they intend to safeguard and the harm that threatens the 
interest. The freedom of expression challenge is overcome only by a 
showing that the initiative is "narrowly drawn and . . . further[s) a 
sufficiently substantial governmental interest. "59 It is not enough 
that the proscribed development is "offensive," i e. ,  ugly, in the eyes 
of some members of the community. A state ban on expression 
solely on the basis of its offensiveness is censorship pure and sim­
ple. 60 Rather, the quid pro quo for aesthetically based infringements 
on expression is the state's obligation to demonstrate a plausible 
nexus between offensiveness and a threat to some independent "suf­
ficiently substantial governmental interest."61 The further limitation 
that the measure be "narrowly drawn" reinforces the need for ade­
quate standards compelled by the vagueness-due process charge.62 
The substantive due process63 challenge essentially reduces to the 
58. For thoughtful judicial assessments of these problems and their source in inadequate 
standards, see, e.g. , The Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Va. 
1980) (discussed in note 303 infra); City of West Pahn Beach v. State ex rel Duffey, 158 Fla. 
863, 30 So. 2d 491 (1 947); Morristown Road Assocs. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 163 N.J. 
Super. 58, 394 A.2d 1 57 (1 978); Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh, 55 N.J. Super. 132, 150 A.2d 
63 (1959). 
59. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, IOI S. Ct. 2176, 2 1 82-83 (1981). 
60. See, e.g. , Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, IOI S. Ct. 2 1 76 (1981); Erznoznik v. 
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 ( 1 975); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15  (1971). See gener­
ally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-2 to - 1 0  (1 978); Ely, Flag IJesecralion: 
A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1482 ( 1975). For treatment of this issue as it bears specifically on architectural 
expression, see Kolis, Architectural Expression: Police Power and the First Amendmenl, 16 
URB. L. ANN. 273 (1979); Williams, supra note 46; Note, Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning, and Jlte 
First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1 79 ( 1 975). 
6 1 .  See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, IOI S. Ct. 2 1 76 (1981). 
62. When transposed to the first amendment context, the vagueness objection may reap­
pear under the same name, see, e.g. , Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974); L. TRIBE, 
supra n.ote 60, §§ 10-8 to - I  1 ;  or is intimately linked to prior restraint, see, e.g. , Southwestern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552-53 ( 1 975); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559-
60 (19�8); L. TRIBE, supra note 60, at §§ 12-3 1 to -33; or overbreadth doctrines, see, e.g., 
Broadnck v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 ,  606-07 (1972); Stromberg v. California, 238 U.S. 359, 
369 (193 1); L. TRIBE, supra note 60, at §§ 12-24, 12-28, 12-35; or to the requirement that the 
challenged measure be narrowly drawn to avoid over- and underinclusiveness, see, e.g. , Schad 
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, IOI S. Ct. 2176, 2 1 86 ( 1 981); Erznozn.ik v. City of Jacksonville, 
422 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1975); L. TRIBE, supra note 60, §§ 1 2-24 to -26. 
. 63. Other objecti?n� to which aes�etic measures may be vulnerable in particular instances mclude, but are not 
�inut�d to, the clauns that they deny equal protection to excluded classes of 
persons, see cases cited m �ote 28 supra; they are uncompensated ''takings," see Penn Cent. 
T�ansp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 ( 1978); they, or actions taken under them, are ultra 
v1res the power of the enacting agency, see Gumley v. Board of Selectmen, 371 Mass. 718, 358 N .E.2d l 0 I I ( 1977); or they deny procedural due process rights aside from vagueness, see In re 
Equitable Funding Corp., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1 978, at IO, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.). For a thoughtful 
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proposition that government may proscribe only development that 
"harms" neighboring property owners_ or the community as a 
whole. 64 Traditionally recognized harms include depreciation of 
property values and threats to community health and safety. The 
visual beauty rationale encounters serious, if not insuperable, obsta­
cles in satisfying the first two tests, and may fail the third as well 
because the social interest that it guards and the harms it purportedly 
prevents are intolerably imprecise.65 
3. Dilemmas of Current Legal-Aesthetic Theory 
The rationale's imprecision leads to a variety of theoretical im­
passes as well. It does not specify, for example, the relationship be­
tween aesthetic regulation and other forms of land use and 
environmental regulation. Should aesthetic regulation be split off 
treatment of many of these issues as they are posed by recent developments in the historic 
preservation field, see Rose, supra note 1 1 . 
My views on the "ta.king issue," as it bears on historic and environmental preservation, arc 
detailed in Costonis, The .Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal .Decision, 
91 HARV. L. REV. 402 (1977), and Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation 
Power: Antidoiesfor the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1021 
(1975). Broadly speaking, they are more demanding of government than those of commenta­
tors who favor extensive public intervention in these spheres, see, e.g. , F. BosSELMAN, D. 
CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973); D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND EQ­
UITY ( 1981), but less so than those who do not, see, e.g. , B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT 
ZONING (1972); Dunham, Property, City Planning, and Liberty, in LAW AND LAND 28 (C. Harr 
ed. 1964). My position that government be required to compensate landowners in a greater 
number of instances than urged by the first group of commentators results from differences in 
our respective assessments of the legal, political, and equity factors outlined in my earlier 
articles. This Article's portrayal of the problems attending the definition of aesthetic standards 
and of the grave abuses to which those problems have given rise comports with the position 
advanced in those articles by stressing the supporting role that the fifth amendment can play in 
disciplining indiscriminate aesthetic policymaking. Unlike Justice Brennan, I do not agree 
that 
quite simply, there is no basis whatsoever for a conclusion that courts will have any 
greater difficulty identifying arbitrary or discriminatory action in the context of landmark 
regulation than in the context of classic zoning or indeed in any other context. 
Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 1 33 ( 1978) (footnote omitted). 
Both the analytical difficulties attending aesthetics standards setting, see Part V (A) infra, and 
the judiciary's fl.awed record to date in policing inadequate standards, see Parts II (A), III 
(C)(I) & V (A)(2) infra, argue to the contrary. Moreover, such post-Penn Central preservation 
initiatives as New York City's designation of its Upper East Side as a historic district, see notes 
25 & 33 supra and notes 296 infra, warn that the distortions besetting the nation's "aesthetic 
regulation system," see Part II (A) infra, will intensify if the discipline afforded by the fifth 
amendment was jettisoned in accordance with the prescriptions of such commentators as Bos­
selman and Mandelkcr. 
64. The "harm" or, as economists put it, "externalities" rationale wa8 employed by the 
Supreme Court to uphold roning against a facial constitutional attack on substantive due pro­
cess grounds in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and has consist­
ently been invoked by state courts ever since. See, e.g. , Home Builders League v. Township of 
Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 405 A.2d 381 (1979); Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897 (1968). 
On the role of the externalities rationale for land use regulation throughout this century, sec 
generally R. NELSON, supra note 22. 
65. See text at notes 1 15 & 196-2 16 infra. 
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from the latter as an ephe meral venture mesmerized by its quest for 
visual beauty? Or, as suggested earlier, is it not, like them, a weapon 
unsheathed by contending interest groups to secure control over the 
use and allocation of environmental resources? If it is, in which re­
spects, if any, can it be differentiated from them? 
A j urisprudence founded upon the concept of beauty, moreover, 
will be as radically nominalistic as it is inelegant if, as John' Dewey 
correctly counseled, the concept only reifies individual responses to 
an obj ect's visual form.66 What can be anticipated of that jurispru­
dence is a mishmash of opinions dealing with billboards, clotheslines 
in front yards, j unkyards, landmarks, historic districts, adult thea­
ters, urban design relationships, and natural area preserves. Rela­
tionships among these c ategories will remain unspecified, as will 
linkages between aesthetic initiatives, on the one side, and, on the 
other, constitutional values and land use and environmental regula­
tion generally. 
In addition to its patent imprecision, the visual beauty rationale 
can be faulted for borrowing from the concert hall or museum as­
sumptions that have little or no place in the courtroom or legislative 
chamber. One example is the assumption that the judgments re­
quired to establish, administer, or review aesthetic programs tum on 
distinctions comparable in kind and refinement to those made by 
concertmasters or art critics. Another is the conversion of the prem­
ise that beauty can be made to answer to abstract canons of aesthetic 
formalism into the conceit that legal institutions can use these ca­
nons to create a visually beautiful environment. 67 Not only are such 
assumptions descriptively inaccurate, but they intensify aesthetic 
regulation's legal vulnerability.6s 
The visual beauty rationale's most regrettable legacy, however, is 
that it has diverted attention from aesthetic regulation's root con-
66. See text at note 3 supra. 
Illustrative is Justice White's preface to his discussion of the aesthetics-first amendment 
issue ii_i Metromedia: "We deal here with the law of billboards." Metromedia, Inc. v. City of 
San D1egct, 101  S. Ct. 2882 ( 1981)  (emphasis added). 
67. The influence of this reasoning is patent in the guiding premise set forth in PLANNING 
AND COMMUNITY APPEARANCE, REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITIEE ON DESIGN CONTROL OF 
THE NEW YORK CHAPTER AIA AND THE NEW YORK REGIONAL CHAPTER AIP (H. Fagin & R. �einbcrg e.d.s. 1958) .. "The central theme of our philosophy then," states the Joint Committee, ts the positive creatro'! of urban beau_ty, �ot the mere conservation of past achievements of 
natur
� 
and 
�:u1
· 
nor JUSt the preven
�
1on m present building activities of additional ugliness 
and disorder. Id. at 1 1 . For the view that aesthetics law and the public ordering system 
sho
11:1
d ?; employed not only to preserve the aesthetic character of the nation's regions, but to 
speetfy a character to be created," see K. LYNCH, MANAGING THE SENSE OF A REGION 48 
( 1976). 
68. See Part III (C) infra. 
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fi cts. The debate over visual beauty is in truth a surrogate fo r  the 
debate over environmental change itself, or, to be more specific, the 
question whether that change is culturally disintegrative or culturally 
vitalizing.69 At stake are whether change should be permitted, what 
form it should take, what its pace should be, who should be benefit­
ted and who injured by it, and what role public administration can 
play as a vehicle for managing change. These questions are crucial 
because change, as we experience it in the built and natural environ­
ments, is strikingly visible and often profoundly destabilizing. To 
view the debate as a clash among the design set is to trivialize it and 
thereby miss its point altogether. False, ultimately unanswerable 
questions are tiresomely batted back and forth while fundamental, 
perplexing problems go unexamined. Ignored as well are the con­
flict's consequences for the integrity of the law's decisional processes 
and for the quality and social consequences of the nation's aesthetic 
policies. 
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE LAW-AESTHETICS DEBATE 
How should the debate be framed? A century of fruitless ex­
change counsels against an abstract inquiry into the "nature of 
beauty." The approach adopted in this Article instead defines the 
debate's framework in terms both of the larger system from which 
aesthetic policy emerges and of the format displayed by aesthetic 
disputes generally. The subsection below outlines the elements of 
that system, identifies the conditions that its sound functioning as­
sumes, and indicates the respects in which the current system fails to 
measure up to these conditions. The next subsection employs the 
Rice Mansion dispute as a point of departure in portraying the ele­
ments of the prototypical format. It then sets forth the lead descrip­
tive quest ions underlyi n g  the law-aesthetics debate, and 
preliminarily sketches the responses to them advanced by visual 
beauty and cultural stability-identity reasoning. Part III details the 
content and conceptual and constitutional defects of the visual 
beauty rationale. The content of the stability hypothesis is addressed 
in Part IV, and its legal adequacy is the topic of Part V. 
A. The Aesthetic Regulation "System '' 
Broadly considered, aesthetic policy emerges from a complex set 
of transactions between American society and its legal institutions. 
What may loosely be termed the aesthetic regulation "system" fea-
69. See text at notes 223-3 1 infra . 
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tures a number of participants on both sides. The societal actors di­
vide principally into constituencies that oppose and constituencies 
that favor modifying existing environmental features or settings (ex­
isting resource). No-change constituencies include neighborhood or­
ganizations that oppose various kinds of development in their 
neighborhoods, historic preservationists who seek to block the altera­
tion or demolition of landmarks or structures within historic dis­
tricts, and environmentalists who contest development in wilderness, 
coastal, and other natural areas. The environmental features or set­
tings that serve as existing resources and the groups that may qualify 
as no-change constituencies are open-ended, as the recent prolifera­
tion of aesthetic regulation addressed to novel types of resources and 
supported by novel interest groups attests. 
Change constituencies favor new entrants that alter or replace the 
existing resources. These constituencies include the new entrant's 
sponsor, which may be a private developer or a public agency. La­
bor unions and suppliers of capital, building materials, and other 
real estate services or products are often prominent change agents as 
well. Also featured may be the new entrant's potential beneficiaries 
- prospective occupants of a housing development, customers of 
utility companies that wish to construct or enlarge facilities in natu­
ral areas, or students of universities that plan to expand into a sur­
rounding neighborhood. 
New entrants, like existing features, cannot be delimited in ad­
vance. A random sampling of the former includes billboards, 70 rag­
strewn clotheslines,7 1  trailers,12 junkyards,73 high-rise buildings,74 
pump storage plants,75 transmission towers,76 prisons,77 recreational 
facilities, 78 and boathouses. 79 They may be fought because they are 
proposed as replacements for their correlative existing resource; 
more frequently, however, the coexistence of the two is in issue. Re­
placement is illustrated by the demolition of a landmark to make 
70. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981). 
7 1 .  See People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 1 9 1  N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dis-
missed, 375 U.S. 42 (1 963). 
72. See City of Euclid v. Fitzthum, 48 Ohio App. 2d 297, 357 N.E.2d 402 (1976). 
73. See Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 400 P.2d 255 ( 1 965). 
74. See Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 ( 1978). 
75. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971). 
76. See City of New Haven v. Chandler, 446 F. Supp. 925 (D. Conn. 1978). 
77. See Ely v. Velde, 45 1 F.2d 1 130 (4th Cir. 1971). 
78. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
79. See McCormick v. Lawrence, 83 Misc. 2d 64, 372 N.Y.S.2d 156 ( 1975). 
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way for a modern office building; coexistence, by the erection of bill­
boards along a scenic highway. 
Other societal actors who influence the formation of aesthetic 
policy include "taste-makers" and design professionals. The most 
prominent of the former are architecture and urban design critics 
who enjoy a strong media following. Design professionals - archi­
tects, urban designers, and the like - may function in two roles: as 
actual designers of new entrants or existing resources (when the lat­
ter are components of the built environment), and as propagandists 
for particular schools or traditions of aesthetic formalism (in which 
case they may double as taste-makers). 
The principal legal actors in the system are legislatures, adminis­
trative agencies, and the courts. As the conduit through which the 
exchange between legal institutions and the larger society com­
mences, legislators perch uneasily on a tightrope, one end of which 
leads to the larger society, the other, to administrators and the courts. 
They are the system's cardinal policy-makers because legislation is 
the major vehicle through which aesthetic policy is formally ex­
pressed in the American governmental system. But unlike the 
signorie, popes, and kings of an earlier day, legislators neither con­
ceive that policy autonomously nor legitimate it by their endorse­
ment alone. Instead, they must respond to concerns originating from 
either end of the tightrope. On the one side, societal preferences af­
ford both the raw material for aesthetic policy and the ultimate basis 
for its legitimacy,80 providing, of course, that the policy is consistent 
with constitutional requirements. This does not mean that legisla­
tors, by themselves or in conjunction with the professional staffs of 
administrative agencies, do not or ought not to initiate or design aes­
thetic measures. These functions are as inevitable as they are com­
monplace in all fields of lawmaking. Aesthetic policy is often too 
complex to be handled by New England town meeting procedures, 
and a popular consensus on defensible aesthetic values may fail to 
emerge absent legislative leadership. What differentiates that leader-
80. For judicial recognition of the indispensable role that patterned community prefer­
ences play as the legitimizing basis of all aesthetic regulation, see, e.g. , John Donnelly & Sons, 
Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206; 224-25, 339 N.E.2d 709, 720-2 1 (1975); Gen­
eral Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 1 72-73, 193 N.E. 
799, 8 10 (1935); Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528, 544, 324 A.2d 
1 13, 122 ( 1 974); Oregon City v. Hartke, 24 Or. 35, 49-50, 400 P.2d 255, 263 (1965). Additional 
confirmation of essentially the same point is found in the many cases that stress the centrality 
to valid aesthetic regulation of community consensus as reified in the person of "average visual 
sensibilities," see People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 468, 191 N.E.2d 272, 276, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 
739, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963), or as reflected in "concepts of congruity held so 
widely that they are inseparable from the enjoyment and hence the value of property," see 
United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. I, 5, 198 A.2d 447, 449 (1 964). 
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ship from despotic rule is the capacity of citizens or groups who disa­
gree to voice their dissatisfaction during the policy-making process 
and, if need be, in the courts or at the polls as well. 
Administrative agencies, prevailing legal folklore suggests, im­
plement legislatively declared aesthetic policy. Their purported sub­
ordination to the legislative will is secured chiefly by legislative 
standards that delineate the values incorporated in that policy. In 
addition, the more significant decisions of administrative agencies, 
their budgets, and, at the executive level at least, the appointment of 
their personnel, are typically subject to legislative ratification. These 
channeling devices will be effective, of course, only to the extent that 
legislatures employ them discerningly. 
Unlike legislators and administrators, the courts play no direct 
role in the formulation of particular aesthetic measures. A distinc­
tion can thus be drawn between legislatively declared law and court­
applied law. Legislative law is affirmative, derivative, and aestheti­
cally oriented: affirmative because it defines positive measures au­
thorizing various forms of public intervention; derivative because its 
values are extralegal, i e. societal, in origin; and aesthetically ori­
ented because these values, by definition, are aesthetic in content. 
By contrast, the law used by the courts in reviewing aesthetic regula­
tion is negative, autonomous, and constitutionally oriented: negative 
because court-applied law is interposed to constrain legislative pol­
icy-making; autonomous because it is rooted in constitutional values 
rather than in transitory community preferences; and, therefore, con­
stitutionally oriented because its decisional principles trace to the 
federal and state constitutions. 
The courts' exclusion from direct participation in formulating 
aesthetic measures, however, does not deprive them of an influential 
role in the aesthetic regulation system. The two senses of aesthetics 
"law,, are related, often shading into one another at their edges and 
beyond. Thoughtful legislators, for example, are reluctant to initiate 
or endorse community demands for measures that clash with court­
applied law, and frequently invoke the latter when refusing to do 
so. 8 1  In this sense, aesthetic jurisprudence circumscribes legislatures' 
aesthetic policies. Similarly, judges do not invariably ignore the 
public policy dimensions of the measures that they police. While 
federal judges do not frequently invalidate measures on substantive 
8 1 .  New York City authorities, for example, rejected the appeals of religious and other 
groups that adult theaters and bookstores be zoned out of all of the city's boroughs but Man­
hattan on the basis that this course would run afoul of first amendment strictures. See Marcus, 
Zoning Obscenity: Or, the Moral Politics of Porn, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. I, 17- 18  (1977). 
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due process grounds, 82 they often read constitutional provisions to 
suit their policy preferences. 83 
If the aesthetic regulation system is to function tolerably well, its 
legal participants must exercise a discipline appropriate to their re­
spective roles in that system. Not all demands for regulation merit 
legal endorsement. Some demands may be flatly objectionable as a 
matter of policy84 or of court-applied law;85 if provisionally meritori­
ous, they may be presented in a form that precludes intelligent policy 
analysis or implementation without unfortunate side effects.86 
Accordingly, legislators should spurn demands of the first type 
and thoroughly rework those of the second to avoid either under­
mining the fairness or rationality of the resulting policies or over­
whelming administrators and the courts. Administrators should 
provide legislators with background information to facilitate the as­
sessment of regulatory proposals. They should, moreover, flesh out 
standards often necessarily left somewhat open-ended by legislators, 
and justify agency actions with cogent findings to demonstrate their 
compatibility with these standards. While courts _should defer to leg­
islative determinations of the legitimacy of particular aesthetic val­
ues, they should safeguard the integrity of the aesthetic policy­
making process itself and of important nonaesthetic values by using 
court-applied law to check the abuse of either. 
82. For the status of the substantive due process doctrine in federal constitutional law, see 
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 385-450 (1978); 
Komesar, Jn Search of a General Approach lo Legal Analysis: A Comparative Institutional Alter­
native, 79 M1cH. L. REV. 1350 ( 198 1 ). 
83. A recent illustration is Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Metromedia, Inc. v. 
City of San Diego, 10 1  S. Ct. 2882 ( 198 1), where the Court invalidated a billboard ban. Al­
though he acknowledged that "[o)f course, it is not for a court to impose its own notion of 
beauty on San Diego," his commitment to first amendment values induced him to evaluate 
San Diego's overall planning beautification efforts, and to disapprove the ban in part because 
"San Diego has failed to demonstrate a comprehensive coordinated effort in its commercial 
and industrial areas to address other obvious contributors to an unattractive environment." 
IO I  S. Ct. at 2904 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). His aggressive scrutiny of the sub­
stance of San Diego's planning determinations in Metromedia contrasts quite sharply with his 
evident deference to those of New York City in Penn Central, which centered on a taking 
rather than on a freedom of expression issue. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104 ( 1978). 
84. Included in this group might be the prescription that "America's great historic skylines 
should be declared national monuments to be carefully preserved, thoughtfully changed and 
improved, if necessary, but not expanded," w. VON ECKARDT, BACK TO THE DRAWING 
BOARD 85 ( 1978), or the suggestion of the French writer Albert Guerard that ''the entire city of 
Paris be listed as a monument." N. EVENSON, PARIS: A CENTURY OF CHANGE 1878-1 978, at 
3 1 1  (1979). 
85. Illustrative is the proposal for excluding "adult uses" from New York City's outer bor­
oughs. See note 8 1  supra. 
86. Community group efforts, see text at notes 22-25 supra, to employ historic preservation 
measures as generic growth control tools arc illustrative. 
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The breakdowns in the aesthetic regulation system recorded ear­
lier are attributable to the failure of the system's legal actors to at­
tend to these imperatives. Legislatures often neglect to think 
through the implications of indis
.
criminate approval or st�n�ardless 
formulation of particular aesthetic measures. 87 That adm1mstrators 
have been unable to implement them or that courts have been un­
able to judicially review them is no less surprising, therefore, than 
that private groups have too often succeeded in diverting them to 
goals quite contrary to their ostensible purposes. 
Legislative irresponsibility has confronted the courts with a terri­
ble dilemma. Should they rigorously review aesthetic measures and 
risk aborting potentially meritorious social goals? Or should they 
instead effectively abdicate their oversight responsibilities and risk 
compromising the integrity of the aesthetic policy-making process 
and the primacy of nonaesthetic, constitutional values? Understand­
ably perhaps, the courts have opted for the latter course. In doing 
so, however, they have inflicted deep structural damage on the sys­
tem by failing to furnish a much needed discipline over legislative 
and administrative processes and over society's expectations con­
cerning the proper bounds of aesthetic policy. 
Instead of operating with all three of its legal cylinders firing in 
balanced sequence, therefore, the system's motor has often limped 
along on only one - its administrators. Little wonder that the sys­
tem endorses bogus historic district or landmark designations, per­
mits incentive zoning debacles, or acquiesces in the transfer of its 
public powers to private groups. 
B.  A Format for Aesthetic Controversies 
1 .  Isaac L. Rice Mansion .Dispute 
"[P)erhaps the most agonizing landmark fight in Manhattan in 
some years,"88 opined the New York Times over the designation of 
the Isaac L.  Rice Mansion as a city landmark. 
The Mansion, an eclectic blend of Beaux Arts and Nee-Georgian 
styles designed by the carriage trade architects Herts and Tallant, 
was built in 1 90 1  for Isaac L. Rice, a railroad and electric car mag­
nate. Orig�nally surrounded by the mansions of other fin de siec/e 
plutocrats, It alone survives, its neighbors replaced with fifteen-story 
87 
· �ee text at notes 8-28 supra for examples of legislative initiatives that have backfired in part or m whole due to the reasons identified in the text. 
1 8
2
8.  Goldberger, Rice Mansion Dispute Has Many Sides, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1 980, at B2, co . .  
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apartment houses and four-story rowhouses. In 1 954, the Yeshiva 
Chofetz Chaim acquired the Mansion for use as a religious school 
for Jewish children. Unlike Rice, the Yeshiva is not wealthy. "We 
come always with a deficit,"89 Rabbi Feigelstock, the Yeshiva's dean, 
grumbled after the battle erupted. The casus be/Ii was the Yeshiva's 
proposed $ 1 .5 to $2 million sale of the Mansion to a developer who 
would replace it with a thirty-story, tower-plaza building that would 
include modern school facilities for the Yeshiva. 
The battlelines formed quickly as news of the impending sale cir­
culated. Arrayed on one side were the Yeshiva, large segments of 
the city's Orthodox Jewish community, the developer, and advocates 
of increased residential construction to alleviate Manhattan's hous­
ing shortage. Leading the opposition was Community Planning 
Board No. 7, the dominant West Side neighborhood organization. 
Its ranks were filled with angry West Siders, and it formed alliances 
with gold-plate, city-wide groups, like the Municipal Arts Society 
and Citizens Union, and with celebrities like Jackie Onassis and 
Itzahk Perlman. Ultimately, it was favored with a pro-designation 
column from the Times' architectural critic.90 
Formally defined, the issue for the Landmarks Preservation 
Commission and Board of Estimate, the municipal bodies charged 
with ruling on the proposed designation, was whether or not the 
Mansion possessed "special character" or "special historical or aes­
thetic interest or value."91 A richer assessment was offered by a jour­
nalist who, comparing the dispute to an onion, observed: "Peel away 
a layer . . . and all you find are more layers."92 
One layer, certainly, was provided by the ordinance's delphic ter­
minology. For the Citizen Union's spokesman, however, that lan­
guage was crystal clear. The Mansion, he intoned, "is a landmark, it 
always was a landmark, it always will be a landmark."93 Rabbi 
Feigelstock, on the other hand, was perplexed. "By me, Isaac Rice is 
not anybody," he sulked. "We suddenly heard his name when this 
whole thing came up."94 
Perhaps the arts groups genuinely believed that the Mansion 
89. Haberman, Yeshiva Tries To Void Sia/us as Landmark, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1980, at 
Bl, col. I ,  at B2, c.ol. 3. 
90. See Goldberger, supra note 88. 
9 1 .  See 2 NEW YORK CITY CHARTER & AD. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A § 207- IO(n) (Williams 
1976) Qandmarks ordinance). 
92. Haberman, supra note 89, at B I .  
93. Haberman, Board of Estimate Approves, 6-5, Rice Mansion's Landmark Status, N.Y. 
Times, June 27, 1980, at B4, col. I .  
94. See Haberman, supra note 89, a t  82, col. 4. 
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merited landmark status. But accounts of the proceedings leave little 
doubt that Board No. 7's concern for the Mansion's preservation was 
secondary to its apprehension about how a thirty-story tower might 
change the West Side's land use and socioeconomic character. As is 
typical of so-called "aesthetic controversies," the concern was neither 
clearly spelled out nor di.ff erentiated. But it apparently encompassed 
fears that the tower would block existing views, eliminate the open 
space around the free-standing Mansion, bring "different" people 
into the neighborhood, and, through its tower-plaza configuration, 
project an image dissonant with the image of their neighborhood 
that many West Siders held. In a prior fight against a similar build­
ing elsewhere on the West Side, Board No. 7 bemoaned the invasion 
of the area by "East Side Buildings," advising that "[i]f you want to 
live in a solid, low-rise, low-key, family-type building, you have to 
go the West Side and we want to keep that alternative intact."95 
The Yeshiva, for its part, insisted that the designation proposal 
was engineered by neighborhood and elitist city-wide groups for 
ends that paled in the face of the religious and cultural goals that the 
Mansion's sale would secure. Among the former, the Yeshiva ar­
gued, were the view-blockage objection, the designation proponents' 
readiness "to place bricks and stones above our children,"96 and 
Board No. 7's generic opposition to new development that clashed 
with its architectural and socioeconomic preferences. Hostility to 
Orthodox Jewish religious and family life was also cited, one rabbi 
proclaiming: "A vote against the Yeshiva is literally a vote against 
the Jewish religious community on the West Side/'97 
An anguished Board of Estimate finally approved the designa­
tion. The Board was aggressively lobbied by powerful supporters for 
both sides; it split sharply in its vote; and its members accompanied 
their votes with delicately worded justifications. The audience lis­
tened intently: one group sporting insignia imprinted with a sketch 
of the Rice Mansion; another, mostly Hasidic Jews, wearing Torah­
inscribed escutcheons. 
Summarizing the controversy, the Times concluded: "Virtually 
lo�t in the t.urmoil was a discussion of the architectural quality of the Rice Mansion - lost almost as much as Isaac L. Rice himself."98 
95. Gray, A West Side Sale Leads To Calls For Revision in The Zoning Law, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1979, § 8, at I, col. 5. 
96. Haberman, supra note 93. 
97. Haberman, supra note 89, at B2, col. 4. 
98. Id 
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2. Prototypical Format 
.Scrutiny of the Mansion dispute reveals a format encompassing 
the following six elements: 
( 1 )  an existing resource, the preservation of which is at issue 
(depending upon the constituency, the Mansion as a landmark 
building or the West Side as possessing a distinctive character); 
(2) no-change constituencies (the Municipal Arts Society and 
Citizens Union for the preservation of the Mansion, and Board No. 7 
and neighborhood residents for the preservation of the West Side's 
character); 
(3) a new entrant (the thirty-story apartment tower); 
(4) change constituencies (the Yeshiva as landowner and as 
provider of religious education, members of the Orthodox Jewish 
community as consumers of the Yeshiva's services, the developer as 
a profit-making entrepreneur, and persons desiring housing on the 
West Side but unable to obtain it because of its scarcity and high 
cost); 
(5) a basis upon which no-change constituencies favor the ex­
isting resource; and 
( 6) a basis upon which the no-change constituencies oppose the 
new entrant. 
An equivalent format can be discerned in aesthetic controversies 
generally.99 Illustrative are disputes triggered by proposals for a 
pump storage plant on Storm King Mountain, 100 a 307-foot tourist 
tower adjacent to Gettysburg National Cemetery, 101 a tall office 
tower complex within the perceptual field of the National Capitol, 102 
power transmission lines across New Haven Bay, 103 a tower atop 
Grand Central Terminal,104 a Disney resort in Mineral King Val­
ley, 105 and, less sensationally, billboards106 and junkyards on the 
99. Although not explicitly delineated, the elements of the prototypical format described in 
the text can be discerned in e.g. , R. BABCOCK & c. WEA VER, supra note 22; B. FRIEDEN, supra 
note 28; R. NELSON, supra note 22; c. PERRIN, EVERYTHING IN ITs PLACE (1977); Tucker, 
supra note 28. 
100. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 473-76 (2d Cir. 1971). 
IOI .  :See Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 23 1, 302 A.2d 886, ajfd. ,  454 Pa. 193, 3 1 1 A.2d 588 (1973). 
102. See United States v. County Bd., 487 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Va. 1979). 
I03. See City of New Haven v. Chandler, 446 F. Supp. 925 (D. Conn. 1978). 
104. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
I05. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
106. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, IOI S. Ct. 2882 (1981); United Advertising 
Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. I, 198 A.2d 447 (1964). 
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outskirts of residential communities. 107 
The first four elements have already been discussed. 108 But the 
last two have not, and it is in their analysis that the implications for 
legal-aesthetics theory of the visual beauty and cultural stability ap­
proaches become explicit and sharply differentiated. 
Preliminary to this analysis, two sets of distinctions must be 
drawn. First, one must differentiate between aesthetic controls deal­
ing with the selection of existing resources for preservation and those 
affecting the modification of these resources by new entrants. Illus­
trative of the former are the landmark designation procedures em­
ployed in the Mansion dispute. Other examples include measures 
providing for the designation . of historic districts, nonhistoric design 
districts, or nature preserves (when these preserves are targeted on 
the basis of aesthetic as well as ecological characteristics). 109 The 
latter appear in restrictions on changes to these resources, once des­
ignated. Had the Yeshiva sought to add five stories to the Mansion 
or to alter its facade, for example, it would have been required to 
obtain the Landmarks Preservation Commission's prior certification 
that these changes were compatible with the Mansion's existing ar­
chitectural or aesthetic character. 1 10 Other examples might include 
controls on modern architecture in historic districts or on plaza­
fronted buildings in a design district where unified street walls are 
mandated. 
The second distinction, which deals only with the control of new 
entrants, distinguishes between measures that assume the prior im­
position of some formal design classification on an existing resource 
and measures that do not. The immediately preceding examples il­
lustrate the former. An example of the latter would be a planning 
agency's aesthetically based refusal to permit thirty-story apartment 
towers on the West Side despite the agency's failure beforehand to 
impose some kind of design district status on the neighborhood. 1 1 1  
Other examples include billboard or junkyard controls, which are 
rarely imposed in conjunction with formal design classification. 
107. See Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965). 
108. See Part II (A) supra. 
109. For judicial recognition that the preservation of natural ecological areas may in part 
stem from aesthetic motives, see Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy 
Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 551 ,  193 A.2d 232, 239 (1963); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 18, 
201 N.W.2d 76 1, 768 (1972). 
1 10. See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER & Ao. CODE ANN. ch. 8-A § 207-4.0 to -6.0 (Williams 
1976). 
1 1 1 . For the suggestion that the root problem underlying the Mansion dispute was the 
absence of zoning controls that roughly fulfilled this function, see text at notes 254-55 infra. 
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With these distinctions in place, the lead question confronting 
legal-aesthetics theory can be simply put: On what basis are existing 
resources selected for preservation and new entrants controlled? As 
important as this question is its corollary: To what social needs does 
aesthetic regulation respond? Visual beauty and cultural stability 
reasoning, illustrated by reference to the Mansion dispute, offer dif­
fering responses. 
3. Responses of the Alternative Rationales 
a. Visual Beauty Rationale 
Visual beauty reasoning responds to the first question syllogisti­
cally. Major Premise : Aesthetic regulation's purpose is to maintain 
a visually pleasing environment by preserving "beautiful" existing 
resources or by banning "ugly" new entrants. Minor Premise: The 
existing resource (either the Mansion or the West Side) is visually 
beautiful or, alternatively, the new entrant (the thirty-story tower) is 
"ugly." Conclusion : Therefore, aesthetic regulation should preserve 
the existing resource (the Mansion or the West Side), or, alterna­
tively, ban the new entrant (the thirty-story tower). 
With respect to the tower, two versions of visual beauty reason­
ing must be distinguished. The more simplistic predicates beauty on 
the new entrant alone, viewed as if it were an isolated work of art. 1 12 
Under this view, the tower was banned because it was "bad architec­
ture." Its more sophisticated variant predicates beauty on the rela­
tionship of the new entrant's visual characteristics to the visual 
characteristics of its surroundings or, in this Article's terms, its cor­
relative existing resource. 1 1 3 This variant deems a new entrant 
"beautiful" if the entrant's visual relationship with the existing re­
source is "harmonious," "congruent," or "compatible." 1 14 
1 12. For example, the United States Secretary of the Interior opposed the construction of a 
complex of office buildings in Rosslyn, Virginia. His contention that the buildings would con­
stitute an "aesthetic nuisance" did not prevail in litigation. See United States v. County Bd., 
487 F. Supp. 137, 142-44 (E.D. Va. 1979) (discussed in note 1 19 infra). Similarly, a modernis­
tic house that was the subject of an architectural control ban litigated in State ex rel. Stoyanoff 
v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970), was decried by the municipality as a "monstrosity of 
grotesque design." 458 S.W.2d at 307. 
1 13. For illustrations of judicial reasoning that may be interpreted in this manner, see, e.g. , 
Maher v. City of New Orleans, 5 16 F.2d 105 1 ,  1063 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 905 
(1976); Ely v. Velde, 45 l F.2d 1 1 30 (4th Cir. 1971); Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of 
Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528, 544-46, 324 A.2d I 13, 122-23 (1974). q: text at note 1 19 (inter­
preting these and similar opinions as predicating beauty on the �isua/-semiotic relationship that 
new entrants bear to existing resources). 
1 14. The prevalence of these terms is the most striking and consistent feature of the 35 
historic districting and landmarking ordinances summarized in chart form in 3 N. WILLIAMS, 
supra note 39, at § 71.14. 
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Visual beauty reasoning's response to the second question - the 
societal need addressed by aesthetic regulation - is less easily 
stated. The "solely for aesthetics" rhetoric of the modern period 
courts, if taken seriously, suggests that no response is necessary. It is 
strikingly reminiscent of the "art for art's sake" aphorism used by 
nineteenth-century Romantics to deny that any justification was re­
quired for their artistic pursuits beyond the making of art itself. 
Likewise, the modern period opinions, if read literally, appear to ex­
press the uncharacteristically metaphysical - even Keatsian 1 15 -
sentiment that beauty is an absolute social good whose pursuit by 
government requires no justification by reference to some identifi­
able value beyond itself. Or, it might perhaps be asserted that intelli­
gible standards of visual beauty do exist, that they are exemplified by 
the Mansion's Beaux Arts and Neo-Georgian styles and by the West 
Side's stereometric form, and that the social interest they nurture is 
the visual delight the public experiences upon exposure to resources 
exemplifying these formal canons. Conversely, the tower negates 
these canons, and must therefore be banned to protect the public 
from visual offense. 
These contentions and the premises from which they derive are 
evaluated in Part III of this Article. 
b. Cultural Stability-Identity Rationale 
Summarizing stability-identity reasoning's response to the lead 
questions requires a brief glimpse ahead to Part IV, which empha­
sizes the semiotic properties of existing resources and new entrants1 1 6 
rather than their visual form as such. These properties, it posits, can 
function as signs, conveying cognitive and emotional meanings to 
their human audiences. The meanings derive from two sources: a 
resource's functional and nonfunctional associations. The former re­
late to the resource considered in utilitarian terms, much as it might 
be considered in a zoning ordinance. The Mansion, for example, is a 
1 15. I refer, of course, to John Keats's passage in his Ode on a Grecian Urn: 
"Beauty is truth, truth beauty," - that is all 
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. 
Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn, in THE POEMS OF JoHN KEATS 372-73 (J. Stillinger ed. 1978). 
1 16. The literature on the semiotic properties of the built and natural environments is vast 
and diverse, technical and impressionistic. Among the sources that have influenced my formu­
lation of the cultural stability hypothesis are the following: G. CLAY, CLOSE-UP (1973); W. 
KIDNEY, THE ARCHITECTURE OF CHOICE (1974); K. LYNCH, THE IMAGE OF THE CITY ( 1960); 
L. MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY ( 196 1); L. MUMFORD, THE CULTURE OF CITIES ( 1938) 
[hereinafter cited as THE CULTURE OF CITIES]; D. PREZIOSI, THE SEMIOTICS OF THE BUILT 
ENVIRONMENT (1 979); S. RASMUSSEN, TOWNS ANO BUILDINGS (195 1 ); R. VENTURI, D · 
BROWN & s. IZENOUR, supra note 33; MEANING IN ARCHITECTURE (C. Jencks & G. Baird eds. 
1969); Appleyard, The Environment as a Social Symbol, 54 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 143 (1 979). 
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structure for residential and institutional uses; the West Side, a phys­
ical container for residential and commercial activities; and the 
tower, a high density, residential building. Nonfunctional associa­
tions, on the other hand, derive from the resources' nonutilitarian 
characteristics. 1 17 The Mansion is also the former palatial home of a 
plutocrat, the neighborhood's sole surviving specimen of a gilded 
age, and, in its Beaux Arts and Neo-Georgian design, an icon of 
associations that trace back to the neoclassical and classical ages of 
Western history. The West Side, as characterized by Board No. 7, is 
a "solid, low-rise, low-key, family-type" neighborhood, quite unlike, 
the Board implies, the trendy, high-rise, fast-paced, swinging singles 
East Side. As an "East Side building," the tower is a harbinger of an 
alien lifestyle. 
Cultural stability reasoning also posits that environmental re­
sources can enter into the cognitive and emotional lives and, ulti­
mately, help shape the identities of individuals, groups, and 
communities. These resources do so principally by virtue of their 
nonfunctional associations, which typically - although not invaria­
bly - are more influential in this respect than functional associa­
tions. "A house," the aphorism goes, "is not a home." Because 
identity and cultural stability are reciprocal values, these associa­
tions can buttress cultural stability as well. 
With these premises in place, stability-identity reasoning's re­
sponses become apparent. Identity-nurturing associational bonds 
binding the West Side or the Mansion to their respective constituen­
cies predominantly account for the former's selection as existing re­
sources. The West Side, Board No. 7 believes, is both a physical 
container and a community integrated by its members' shared com­
mitment to living in a "solid, low-rise, low-key, family-type" neigh­
borhood. So conceived, the West Side is home for its constituency, a 
social construct that anchors their cultural identity. Similarly, the 
Mansion's associations for the groups that fought for its preservation 
are a source of cultural continuity, shaping both their conception of 
New York City as a social entity and their identity as integral ele­
ments of that entity. 
Nor was the tower banned because it was visually "ugly." In­
deed none of the opposition groups had even seen an architectural 
rendering of it. They reacted instead to the idea of the tower as as-
1 17. Strictly speaking, utilitarian characteristics are also largely socially determined, see 
Rapaport & Watson, Cu/Jura/ Variability in Physical Standards, in PEOPLE AND BUILDINGS, 33 
(R. Gutman ed. 1972), but the distinction in the text between the two is serviceable for the 
purposes of this Article. 
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sociationally dissonant with the Mansion or the West Side. True, the 
tower's construction would have necessitated the Mansion's demoli­
tion. But the landmark groups were driven less by their desire to 
save the Mansion as a physical entity than to preserve the message 
that the Mansion broadcasts. For the Mansion, like any other semi­
otically powerful feature or ensemble, is both a signifier and the 
message that it signifies. Destroying such resources destroys their 
messages as well, as Hitler recognized in his persistent question: "Is 
Paris buming?" 1 1 8 
The West Side constituency's objection was more complex. Per­
haps some of its members genuinely believed that thirty-story apart­
ment towers are inherently ugly or are ugly in relation to the West 
Side's prevailing stereometry. Perhaps others believed, contrary to 
the city's planning commission, that the tower would create conges­
tion and other externalities traditionally addressed through zoning 
and planning controls. A more discerning explanation, I submit, 
must also account for Board No. 7's distaste for "East Side Build­
ings" on the West Side, its association of the former with an alien 
lifestyle, and its root concern that the tower's advent threatened to 
disintegrate the West Side's existing social fabric. Only because the 
Time's journalist ignored these factors was he puzzled by the appar­
ent anomaly that the Mansion's "architectural quality was virtually 
lost in the turmoil." 
Stability reasoning concludes, therefore, that the social impetus 
to which aesthetic regulation responds is the preservation of stabil­
ity-identity values. The meanings that no-change constituencies 
both read into and derived from the Mansion and the West Side 
reinforced these values. But the tower imperiled the latter because, 
as a new entrant, it was associationally dissonant with these existing 
resources. 1 1 9 
118. L. COLLIN & D. LAPIERRE, Is PARIS BURNING? (1965). 
119. Despite the ostensible dominance in this century's aesthetic jurisprudence of the vis· 
ual beauty rationale and its premise of aesthetic formalism, many courts have implicitly or 
expressly recognized that the cultural stability rationale, and its premise of associational con· 
gruence or dissonance, lies at the heart of the aesthetic regulation enterprise. See, e.g. , Schad 
v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 101 S. Ct. 2176 (1981) (discussed in text at notes 357-82 infra); 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (discussed in text at notes 347-56 
infra); Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 
(1976); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. County Bd., 487 F. Supp. 
137 (E.D. Va. 1979); Commissioner v. Benenson, 329 A.2d 437 (D.C. 1974); General Outdoor 
Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935); Parker v. 
Commonwealth, 178 Mass. 199, 59 N.E. 634 (1901); Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison Heights, 
41 Mich. App. 47, 199 N.W. 525 (1972); Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield, 129 
N.J. Super. 528, 324 A.2d 113 (1974); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 
N.J. I, 198 A.2d 447 (1964); A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 
(1979); Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa. Commonw. Ct. 
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Ill. VISUAL BEAUTY RATIONALE: CONTENT AND CRITIQUE 
Three propositions are developed in this Part. First, visual 
beauty cannot be defined in a manner that meets the threshold re­
quirements of the vagueness-due process test. Second, state dictation 
of aesthetic outcomes based on a preference for certain canons of 
aesthetic formalism over others flatly violates interests protected by 
the first amendment. Third, the grounds advanced to support public 
intervention in beauty's name may be unpersuasive even under the 
lesser strictures of substantive due process applied by state courts; 
these grounds certainly do not satisfy the "sufficiently substantial 
governmental interest" test required to overcome first amendment 
objections. 
In framing my analysis, I have taken seriously the references in 
aesthetic jurisprudence120 and commentary12 1  to "beauty" as aes­
thetic regulation's organizing principle. While I doubt that judges 
actually mean what they say or would say it if they did, the "solely 
for aesthetics" phraseology exists in the opinions nonetheless. Com­
munity groups, legislators, and administrators, moreover, are guided 
by judges' opinions, not by their decisions. The judiciary has failed 
to discipline the aesthetic regulation system by clearly articulating 
23 1,  302 A.2d 886, ajfd. , 454 Pa. 193, 3 1 1  A.2d 588 (1973); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 
400 P.2d 255 (1 965). 
The aesthetic controversy underpinning the litigation in United States v. Coun1y Bd. deline­
ates the role of associational dissonance more sharply than the Mansion dispute because the 
status of the National Capitol as the existing resource in the former is more evident than the 
status of the West Side as the existing resource in the latter. The United States Secretary of the 
Interior sued in 1979 to block construction in Rosslyn, Virginia of a group of office towers 
across the Potomac from, and soaring above, the Capitol building. The Secretary complained 
that the towers would be an "[a]esthetic nuisance," 487 F. Supp. at 143, blasting them as 
"monsters that would visually deface the skyline surrounding the national monuments," see 
Stewart, Rosslyn: A Monumental Intrusion, ENVTL. COMM., July 1980, at 7. But did he really 
mean that they were execrable architecture taken by themselves, as the first version of visual 
beauty reasoning advises? Not at all. It would have made no difference and indeed probably 
would have increased their offensiveness if they were the finest work of a Pei or a van der 
Rohe. See note 177 infra . Was the objection, as the second version would suggest, solely or 
even primarily that the towers were "too big" considered in terms of their stereometric relation 
to the Capitol and the other great monuments? Again, that characterization misses the point 
of the dispute entirely. By parity of meaning, the Washington Monument would "visually 
deface" the skyline of the White House, yet obviously no American "sees" the Monument that 
way. The root objection was that speculatively built commercial towers dwarfing the Capitol 
would constitute an associationally repugnant intrusion on that cherished totem of national 
identity, just as the construction in medieval times of a private or government building over­
whelming the town's cathedral would have been. One of the Secretary's witnesses got it right 
in testifying that the towers would "interfere with the perception of the general visitor to 
Washington . . .  in terms of [that city's] historic role . . .  as a pilgrimage site for the great 
national memorials of this Nation." United States v. County Bd., 487 F. Supp. at 145. The 
outrage, in short, is explicable in terms of associational dissonance, not aesthetic formalism. 
120. See note 54 supra. 
121 .  See note 46 & 56 supra . 
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principles of court-applied law as a check on abusive or misguided 
aesthetic initiatives. 
A. Summary 
"Aesthetics," as the term is used in the visual beauty rationale, 
connotes pleasure or offense to the sense of sight resulting from the 
visual form of environmental features or settings. Consequently, 
aesthetic regulation's purpose is assumed to be the creation or pres­
ervation of features or settings that are "beautiful" - pleasing to the 
eye - or, conversely, the proscription of those that are "ugly" -
offensive to the eye. 122 This conclusion is founded upon a variety of 
outmoded premises that, consciously or otherwise, have been im­
ported into the law from the writings of aesthetic philosophers and 
other observers of human aesthetic response. 
At the outset, it emphasizes the sensory dimension of human aes­
thetic response over its intellectual, emotional, and cultural aspects. 
This sensory bias perhaps explains why the term "taste," which orig­
inally referred to sensations experienced by the tongue, has become 
interchangeable with aesthetic sensitivity generally. The bias di­
rectly underpins its equation of ugly sights with offensive noises and 
odors in reasoning that since the latter two phenomena may be 
banned as "nuisances," so too may the former. 123 It also underlies 
the claim that only sighted persons124 or, as the courts put it, persons 
of "average visual sensibilities" 125 benefit from aesthetic regulation. 
The visual beauty approach posits that an obj ect's formal visual 
qualities - color, line, proportion, and the like - determine 
whether it will be perceived as beautiful or ugly. Accordingly, the 
search for aesthetic standards reduces to an attempt to determine 
which sets of characteristics can be correlated systematically with 
positive or negative aesthetic responses. 126 It necessarily assumes the 
122. See notes 46, 54 & 56 supra. 
123. See, e.g. , Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 272, 225 N.E.2d 749, 755, 279 N.Y.S.2d 
22, 30 (1967); People v. Rubenfeld, 254 N.Y. 245, 248-49, 172 N.E. 485, 486-87 (1930). Noel, 
Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances, 25 CORNELL L.Q. I (1 939). 
Such reasoning has also given rise to the concept of "visual pollution," a term employed by 
Chief Justice Burger in defending the San Diego billboard ban: "Pollution is not limited to the 
air we breathe and the water we drink; it can equally offend the eye and the car." Metromedia, 
Inc. v. City of San Diego, IOI S. Ct. 2882, 2920 (1981)  (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
124. In his influential article, Professor Dukeminicr offers the following operational defini­
tion of "aesthetics": "[I]f a use is offensive to persons with sight but not offensive to a blind 
man in a similar position, the use is primarily offensive aesthetically." Dukeminier, supra note 
46, at 223 (emphasis original). 
125. See People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 468, 191 N.E.2d 272, 276, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 739, 
appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963). 
126. Skepticism that such correlations can be established obviously underpinned the belief 
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physiological or sensory predisposition of human beings to experi­
ence visual qualities in a relatively uniform manner, the objective 
existence and discoverability of the qualities that produce visual 
pleasure or offense, and the capacity of legislators and administra­
tors to render those qualities in a legal form that is faithful to the 
qualities themselves and to the legal values of clarity, impartiality, 
and predictability. Implicit in these assumptions is the portrayal of 
human beings as passive participants in the aesthetic process. Like 
wax, which receives a seal's imprint, they are acted upon by an exter­
nal object, it is assumed, but do not themselves enter independently 
into the process or influence aesthetic response. 
A third premise, which grows out of the analogy between works 
of art and environmental features, is that aesthetic response is deter­
mined by the feature viewed as if it existed in isolation from the 
context in which it is experienced. Just as paintings attached to a 
wall are viewed independently of the wall, environmental features, it 
is thought, are also perceived without regard to their contexts. Per­
haps this explains why architectural renderings of new buildings typ­
ically show only the buildings themselves, not the buildings as 
elements of the existing physical context into which they will be in ­
serted. The premise, increasingly questioned by courts and com­
mentators, 127 leads to the conclusion that the predicate of the terms 
"beautiful" or "ugly" is the environmental feature alone, not the re­
lationship between the feature and its surroundings.  
Framed in this manner, the visual beauty rationale is either fun­
damentally incomplete or flatly erroneous. Its conceptual weak­
nesses, which I have labelled the sensory, formalistic, and semantic 
fallacies, are discussed in Section B. Section C then addresses the 
defects that render it vulnerable to legal attack. 
B.  Conceptual Defects 
1 .  Sensory Fallacy 
Linking aesthetic response to the impact of sensory data upon the 
eye is unobjectionable as far as it goes, but it hardly goes very far. 
All of the senses are engaged by the physical environment, 128 as a 
of the early period courts that aesthetics was too subjective a field for legal regulation. As one 
court put it, "[t]he world would be at continual seesaw if these conditions were permitted to 
govern the use of the police power." City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 1 1 2 Ohio 
St. 654, 661 -62, 148 N.E. 843, 844 (1925). 
127. See note 1 13 supra; Michelman, supra note 46, at 37. 
128. Many aesthetic evaluations of environmental features, settings, or entire cities treat 
them primarily as works of art - paintings or stage settings. See, e.g. , P. GOLDBERGER, supra 
note 38; P. ZUCKER, ToWN AND SQUARE ( 1959). In contrast, Jane Jacobs has commented that 
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stroll through New Orleans' French Quarter or a dash through New 
York City's Grand Central Terminal confirms. Hawkers' cries or 
shrieking brakes, the inviting smell of freshly baked beignets or hot 
pretzels, and the tactile prompting of rough brick facades or of sinu­
ous marble tracery shape our response to these places just as much as 
their Creole or Beaux Arts visual form. 
If pushed too far, moreover, the sensory premise confuses physio­
logical with aesthetic response. Were they identical, two critical 
pieces of the aesthetic regulation puzzle would fall neatly into place: 
the offense that aesthetic regulation seeks to prevent, and the assur­
ance that all or most human beings will incur that injury upon expo­
sure to the offensive object. If repeated long enough, for example, a 
factory whistle's 120-decibel blast will be a nuisance in law as well as 
in fact because it can damage the ear. Similarly, exposure to a 
searchlight's intense beam can damage the eye. 129 
But suppose there is substituted for the blast a Brahms symphony 
or for the searchlight a Chicago School building. Whatever its na­
ture, the "offense" suffered by persons who adjudge these works 
"ugly" is obviously of a different order. 1 30 Whether they will be ex­
perienced as inspiring or grotesque, moreover, is hardly as certain as 
the prediction that most people will find loud noises or glaring lights 
offensive. 1 3 1  It is a false analogy, therefore, to treat sights that cause 
no physical harm as "nuisances" like loud noises or visual phenom-
"fa/ city cannot be a work of art . . . .  To approach a city, or even a city neighborhood, as if it 
were a larger architectural problem, capable of being given order by converting it into a disci­
plined work of art, is to make the mistake of attempting to substitute art for life." J. JACOBS, 
THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 372-73 (1961) (emphasis in original). 
Other writers confirm that cities engage not merely or even primarily the sense of sight, but all 
of the senses as well as their "viewers' " emotions, myth-making propensities, and intellects. 
See generally E. BACON, DESIGN OF CITIES ( 1 967); Fitch, The Aesthetics of Function, in PEO· 
PLE AND BUILDINGS 3 (R. Gutman ed. 1 972); Ittelson, Environmental Perception and Con/em· 
porary Perceptual Theory, in ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 141 (H. Proshansky, w. Ittelson 
& L. Rivlin eds. 2d ed. 1976). 
129. See Shelburne, Inc. v. Crossan Corp., 95 N.J. Eq. 1 88, 1 9 1 ,  122 A. 749, 750 (1923) 
(glare of 66-foot high, 72-foot long illuminated billboard shining colored lights into plaintitrs 
hotel ruled a "nuisance"). 
130. Susanne Langer has rejected the attempt to explain human aesthetic response in terms 
of physiological factors as an "empty hypothesis, because there is no elementary success that 
indicates the direction in which neurological aesthetics could develop." S. LANGER, FEELING 
AND FORM 38 ( 1953). 
To like effect, see generally G. BROADBENT, DESIGN IN ARCHITECTURE (1 973); J. DEWEY, 
supra note 3; R. FRY, VISION AND DESIGN (1920); E. GOMBRICH, THE SENSE OF ORDER 
(1979). 
1 3 1 .  It is on this basis that a number of courts have properly rejected the analogy between 
offenses to the senses of hearing and smell, on the one hand, and those to the sense of sight, on 
the other. See, e.g. , Mayor of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, 88, 299 A.2d 828, 
833 (1973); Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 1 18 W. Va. 608, 609- 10, 191  S.E. 
368, 369 ( 1937). 
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ena that may cause such injury. Even if the nuisance analogy is apt, 
the visual phenomena comprehended by it are acutely fewer than the 
wide-ranging group of entries with which aesthetic regulation deals. 
Graver still, the environment-as-sensorium approach insuffi­
ciently attends to the power of nonsensory factors to shape human 
aesthetic response, and thus repeats the enduring error of an entire 
branch of aesthetic thought. Alexander Baumgartner, who coined 
the term "aesthetics" in 1 735, defined it as the "science of sensory 
cognition." 132 The British Empiricists followed suit. Edmund Burke 
summed up the common view of Locke, Hume, and Hogarth in his 
claim that beauty is "some quality in bodies, acting mechanically 
upon the human mind by the intervention of the senses." 133 Kevin 
Lynch, a modem-day exponent of similar sentiments, states that 
"aesthetic experience is a specially heightened phase of sensation, 
different in degree, not in kind." 1 34 In his view, aesthetic regulation's 
purposes are not only to proscribe aesthetic nuisances, but "to bring 
the world within sensory reach, to increase the depth and fineness of 
our sensations, and to confer that immediate pleasure and well-being 
that come from vivid perception . . . .  " 135 
But the sensory premise tells only part of the story and its less 
informative part at that. Whether in the museum or beyond its 
walls, we respond not merely to an object's sensuous qualities but, 
more vitally, to its symbolic import - the meanings ascribed to it by 
virtue of our individual histories and our experiences as members of 
political, economic, religious, and other societal groups. Absent the 
intervention of thought, feeling, and culture, these meanings would 
largely vanish, and aesthetic response would lack the rich and engag­
ing character that Lynch rightly associates with it. 
The integration of sensory and nonsensory factors and the domi­
nance of the nonsensory are recurring themes in the writings of mod­
em aesthetic philosophers, psychologists, and social scientists. 
Susanne Langer insists that art "is not sensuously pleasing and also 
symbolic; the sensuous quality is in the service of its [symbolic) im­
port." 136 Most modem psychologists, building on research in gestalt 
psychology, information theory, and allied fields, reject the British 
132. A. BAUMGARTNER, REFLECTIONS ON POETRY (K. Aschenbrenner & w. Holther 
trans. 1954). 
133. E. BURKE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF THE SUB-
LIME AND BEAUTIFUL 210 (2d ed. London 1759). 
134. K. LYNCH, MANAGING THE SENSE OF A REGION 9 (1976). 
135. Id. at 15.  
136. S. LANGER, supra note 1 30, at 59. 
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Empiricists' "bucket theory" of the mind, which treats human per­
ception as a passive process. 1 37 They favor instead a "searchlight 
theory," in which the perceiver's intellect and feelings actively enter 
into and influence the process's outcome. 138 Social scientists take the 
searchlight theory further and reject the view that, by itself, the phys­
ical environment predetermines human response to it. In a much 
noted passage, for example, Herbert Gans observes that 
the physical environment is relevant to behavior insofar as this envi­
ronment affects the social system and culture of the people involved in 
it or as it is taken up into their social system. Between the physical 
environment and empirically observable human behavior there exists a 
social system and a set of cultural norms which define and evaluate 
portions of the physical environment relevant to the lives of people 
involved and structure the way people will use and react to this envi­
ronment in their daily lives. n9 
1 37. The debate between the "bucket" and "searchlight" schools is reviewed in E. GoM· 
BRICH, supra note 130, at 1-16 ( 1979). Gombrich concludes that the simplistic views of the 
former, whose major postulates trace to John Locke, have largely been discredited by the find­
ings of modem psychological research. Gombrich's study itself brings together much of that 
research, particularly in the gestalt psychology and information theory fields, in defense of his 
overall argument that "[i]n contrast to any stimulus-response theory I would wish to point to 
the need to regard the organism as an active agent reaching out towards the environment, not 
blindly and at random, but guided by its inbuilt sense of order." Id. at 5. Researchers in other 
fields agree. Despite his overemphasis on the sensory dimension of human perception, see text 
at notes 1 34-35, Lynch, for example, has observed: 
Environmental images are the result of a two-way process between the observer and his 
environment. The environment suggests distinctions and relations, and the observer -
with great adaptability and in the light of his own purposes - selects, organizes, and 
endows with meaning what he sees. The image so developed now limits and emphasizes 
what is seen, while the image itself is being tested against the filtered perceptual input in a 
constant interacting process. Thus, the image of a given reality may vary significantly 
between different observers. 
K. LYNCH, supra note 1 16, at 6. 
138. Illustrative are the conclusions of one commentator that 
[v]isual perception, far from being a mere collector of information about particular quali­
ties, objects, and events, tum[s) out to be concerned with the grasping of generalities 
. . . . The mind, reaching far beyond the stimuli received by the eyes directly and mo­
mentarily, operates with the vast range of imagery available through memory and or­
ganizes a total lifetime's experience into a system of visual concepts. The thought 
mechanisms by which the mind manipulates these concepts operate in direct perception, 
but also in the interaction between direct perception and stored experience, as welf as in 
the imagination of the artist, the scientist, and indeed any person handling problems "in 
his head." 
R. AR.NHEIM, VISUAL THINKING 294 ( 1969). 
139. H. GANS, supra note 20, at 5 (1968). 
Urbanists agree. Grady Clay, for example, writes that "[a] city is not as we percieve it by 
vision alone, but by insight, memory, movement, emotion and language. A city is also what 
we caU it and becomes as we describe it." G. CLAY, supra note 1 1 6, at 17. Donald Appleyard 
adds: 
lmageability is not merely an aesthetic quality of the city or a means for orientation, but 
the most powerful attribute of the urban symbol system. Aesthetics is not an abstract set 
of qualities, but something directly linked to the values and tastes of different population 
groups. 
Appleyard, supra note 1 16, at 36. 
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We do not so much discover aesthetically compelling properties in 
the environment, therefore, as ascribe them to it on the basis of our 
individual and cultural beliefs, values, and needs. 
2. Formalistic Fallacy 
Visual beauty reasoning also assumes ontologically based canons 
of beauty which, like natural laws, are obj ective, discoverable, and 
renderable in legal form. Objects are beautiful because they exem­
plify these canons in their proportion, color, line, interval, and re­
lated features. Accordingly, the canons afford both a checklist for 
singling out which existing environmental features should be pro­
tected and a recipe for creating beautiful forms. 14o 
This premise and its corollaries have had their defenders over the 
ages. Mathematicians from Pythagoras141 to Birkhoff142 have hy­
pothesized that universal laws of beauty can be stated abstractly in 
terms of number and interval. Followers of Descartes believed that 
they could be deduced from "pure reason." "Every art," one Carte­
sian proclaimed, "has certain rules which by infallible means lead to 
the ends proposed." 143 British Empiricists and many experimental 
psychologists since have looked to observation and inductive reason­
ing to determine the "qualities in bodies" that cause them to be per­
ceived as beautiful or ugly. 144 Other writers, enthralled by a 
140. See note 67 supra. 
Although the courts have not explicitly articulated the distinction between regulation that 
preserves an existing feature thought to be "beautiful" and regulation that purports to create 
beauty afresh, a number have expressed positions premised on the view that the latter is 
neither a proper nor a feasible goal of aesthetic regulation. Maryland's highest court, for ex­
ample, invalidated a billboard ban because its purpose ''was not the preservation or protection 
of something which was aesthetically pleasing, but rather was intended to achieve by regula­
tion an aesthetically pleasing result . . . .  " Mayor of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 
79, 92, 299 A.2d 828, 835 (1973). That the court's position was premised on this distinction is 
evident in its quotation, of the following language from E. FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERI­
CAN LEGISLATION I J5-16 (2d ed. 1965): 
[l]t is undesirable to force by law upon the community standards of taste which a repre­
sentative legislative body may happen to approve of . . . .  But it is a different question 
whether the state may not protect the works of nature or the achievements of art or the 
associations of history from being wilfully marred. In other words, emphasis should be 
laid upon the character of the place as having an established claim to consideration and 
upon the idea of disfigurement as distinguished from the falling short of some standard of 
beauty. 
268 Md. at 92, 299 A.2d at 835. Justice Hall's qualms about employing the law "to legislate 
affirmatively" on the subject of beauty, see note 286 infra, would also appear to be premised on 
the distinction. 
141.  Pythagoras's views arc summarized in M. BEARDSLEY, AESTHETICS FROM CLASSICAL 
GREECE TO THE PRESENT 27-28 (1966). 
142. G. BIRKHOFF, AESTHETIC MEASURE (1933). 
143. Beardsley ascribes the quotation to George de Scudery. See M. BEARDSLEY, supra 
note 141, at 146. 
144. For a summary of the positions of Locke, Hume, Burke, Hogarth, and other figures in 
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particular official or traditional style, have established their "univer­
sal" canons by generalizing from the principles of form and propor­
tion reflected in their chosen style. Before 1750, for example, 
architectural beauty in the West was generally regarded as a harmo­
nious system based on abstract mathematical intervals and analogies 
to man's proportions.145 The static, absolutistic conception of beauty 
that results from this approach is summed up in the contention of 
Alberti, the Renaissance codifier of this system, that beauty is a "har­
mony of all the parts," such that "nothing could be added, dimin­
ished, or altered, but for the worse." 146 
However formulated, the premise is seductive that beauty can be 
encapsulated in a set of abstract canons relating to the formal ap­
pearance of objects. As individuals, we do experience objects as 
pleasurable or offensive, and describe them by their visual form. We 
often find, moreover, that our individual response coincides with 
broader patterns of community response. But the conclusion that 
these patterns can be explained by formal canons of beauty is a non 
sequitur for a variety of reasons. 
First, no one has succeeded in setting forth these canons despite 
centuries of trying. With refreshing if anguished candor, Albrecht 
Diirer, himself an advocate of aesthetic formalism, evidenced the fu­
tility of these efforts in his confession: "What beauty is I know not, 
but it dependeth upon many things." 147 Although the conventions of 
particular styles can be recorded with reasonable fidelity, 148 they 
the British Empiricist School, sec M. B EARDSLEY, supra note 141,  at 166-208. The influence of 
the School's approach to beauty upon subsequent experimental psychologists can be seen in 
the variety of research projects probing the relation between visual form and· human aesthetic 
response surveyed in C. v ALENTINE, THE EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BEAUTY (1962). 
145. See P. COLLINS, CHANGING IDEAS IN MODERN ARCHITECTURE 47 ( 1965). 
146. N. EVENSON, supra note 84, at 36 1 .  
147. A. DORER, supra note l ,  at 179. 
148. For judicial recognition of this fact in the context of historic districting legislation, see, 
e.g. , Maher v. City of New Orleans, 5 1 6  F.2d 105 1 , 1 060-61 ,  1067 ( 1 975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 
905 ( 1976); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 4 1 0, 416-17, 389 P.2d 13, 17-18 
( 1964); A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 2 1 6, 258 S.E.2d 444, 450 (1979). 
The indispensable and credible role that past styles play in resolving the standards issue in 
the historic district context has received Norman Williams's favorable comment. In the case of 
"areas where the historic architectural style [is] distinctive and quite clearly defined," he notes, 
there are 
no really difficult problems for an administrator in deciding whether an alteration (or 
even a new building) conform[s] to the prevailing style; the style provided the standards in 
New Orleans, Santa Fe, Nantucket, Beacon Hill and so on . . . . In these instances, the 
delegation-of-power problem more or less solves itself. 
3 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at § 7 lA.06. From the perspective of a fourteenth amendment 
vagueness-due process analysis and certainly in relation to many other forms of aes�hetic regu­
lation, Williams is correct. From the perspective of preservation architects and other design 
professionals, however, the standards problem remains a complex one. Its many facets are 
surveyed in the various essays contained in NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, 
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neither substitute for universal canons of beauty nor authoritatively 
exemp!ify a subset of such canons. 149 
Since agreement has not been reached on first principles, it comes 
as no surprise that design professionals have disagreed violently over 
the aesthetic merits of particular styles, features, and settings. To 
Ada Louise Huxtable, the New York Public Library is "one of the 
last of the great nineteenth century buildings"; 150 to Lewis Mumford, 
it reverberates with the "hollow echoes of expiring breath." 1 5 1  The 
uniform street walls, cornices, and building facades of Baron Hauss­
mann's Paris, which so delight tourists and Parisians alike, caused 
Camillo Sitte intense pain. "Why," he groaned, "must the straight­
edge and the compass be the all powerful masters of city build­
ing?" 152 New York City's gridiron street system, a product of its 
1 8 1 1  Official Street Plan, is disdained by many urbanists as a monu­
ment to execrable planning and greedy real estate speculation. 153 
Paul Goldberger, on the other hand, extols its "neat, tight, ramrod­
straight views that stretch from river to river." 154 Le Corbusier adds 
that it is a "model of wisdom and greatness of vision." 155 In Edith 
OLD AND NEW ARCHITECTURE: DESIGN RELATIONSHIP (1 980) [hereinafter cited as OLD AND 
NEW ARCHITECTURE). Giorgio Cavaglieri, the noted restoration architect, refiects a concern 
shared by many of his co-essayists in his plaint that "the problem of what is harmonious, what 
is artistically effective, is so variable that it is not possible to draw up [design review] guidelines 
and still favor creativity." Cavaglieri, The Harmony Thal Can't be Dictated, in id. at 37. 
149. John Dewey, for example, has observed that "[t]here is no art in which there is only a 
single tradition. The critic who is not intimately aware of a variety of traditions is of necessity 
limited and his criticisms will be one-sided to the point of distortion." J. DEWEY, supra note 3,  
at 3 1 1 . 
The distinction in the text has also been explored in two studies by Professor Gombrich. 
See E. GOMBRJCH, ART AND ILLUSION (1960) and THE SENSE OF ORDER, supra note 130. He 
addresses whether formal rules can be adduced on the basis of which past styles can be evalu­
ated - the topic of the former study - and on the basis of which design and decoration, 
considered independently from a past style, can be judged - the topic of the latter. Concern­
ing the first question, his conclusions are strikingly similar to those of Norman Williams re­
garding standards for historic districts. See note 148 supra. "[T]he skill of imitation can be 
judged by objective standards," Gombrich writes, "(because] it presents limited problems ca­
pable of clearcut solutions." E. GoMBRICH, supra note 130, at x. But standards for design and 
decoration "lack such touchstones of success and failure." Id. His analysis of the problems 
that they present leads to three conclusions. First "[t]he geometrical structure of a visual de­
sign can never, by itself, allow us to predict the effect it will have on the beholder." Id. at 1 1 7. 
Second, the subjectivity of individual aesthetic response ''vitiate[s] the attempts to establish the 
aesthetics of design on a psychological basis." Id. Third, very little can be gained from inves­
tigating "the inherent qualities of form . . .  [or] invariable properties of visual configurations" 
because human aesthetic response cannot be accounted for on these bases alone. Id. at 1 1 8. 
150. A. HUXTABLE, supra note 3 1 ,  at 222. 
1 5 1 . THE CULTURE OF CITIES, supra note 1 16, at 438. 
1 5? .. c. SiTTE, THE ART OF BUILDING CITIES 32 (C. Stewart trans. 1945). 
153. See THE CULTURE OF CITIES, supra note 1 16, at 1 83-86; J. REPS, THE MAKING OF 
URBAN AMERICA 294-99 (1965). 
154. P. GOLDBERGER, supra note 38, at xiii. 
155. LE CORBUSIER, supra note 33, at 50. 
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Wharton's eyes, the city's brownstones, the pride of a number of its 
designated historic districts, are loathsome buildings clad in "choco­
late-coloured coating of the most hideous stone ever quarried [and 
set within a] cramped horizontal gridiron of a town . . .  hide-bound 
in its deadly uniformity of mean ugliness." 156 
The Hundred Years' War still raging between neoclassicists and 
post-modernists in one camp and modernists in the other, exempli­
fies similar, if far broader, disagreements over the ideal appearance 
of the city as a whole. 157 The neoclassicists, who favored Beaux Arts 
urban design and architectural styles, held sway in the late nine­
teenth and early twentieth centuries but were driven from the field 
by the modernists in the following half-century. Regrouped under 
the postmodernist banner, however, latter-day neoclassicists have 
counterattacked. They endorse elaborate ornamentation, masonry 
construction, uniform street walls, buildings fit snugly within larger 
urban compositions, and the eclectic embrace of traditional architec­
tural styles. Modernists, in contrast, champion monumental build­
ings standing aloof from their surroundings, irregular street walls, 
lean ornamentation, and a wide variety of building materials and 
technologies. 
Faith in universal principles of beauty is no longer asserted as 
dogmatically as in earlier times, moreover, and repeated efforts to 
verify it empirically have yielded meager results. 1 58 Social scientists 
and urbanists dispute the assumptions of that faith as hopelessly nar­
row and mechanistic. 1 59 Aesthetic philosophers since Kant's time 
have followed suit by abandoning the attempt to define beauty as the 
;concordance between these supposed principles and an object's for­
mal visual qualities. 160 Many have come instead to regard beauty as 
. the outcome of an exchange, emotional in nature, between artist and 
.audience. 16 1  Even architects themselves are skeptical of the art-as-
156. c. TUNNARD & H. REED, supra note 1 16, at 1 3 1 .  
157. Th� cpµtours of the debate appear in, e.g. , W. KIDNEY, supra note 1 16 (reviewing the 
basic elements of the neoclassicist position); L. SuLLivAN, supra note 32 (sounding the mod­
ernists' battle cry); B. BROLIN, THE FAILURE OF MODERN ARCHITECTURE ( 1976) (summoning 
the postmodernists to the counterattack). The ebb and flow of the battle in Paris is recounted 
in N. EvENSON, supra note S4, and in San Francisco in M. CORBETT, SPLENDID SuRvivORS 
( 1979). 
158.  See note 130 supra. 
1 59. See note 139 supra. 
160. See M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 14 1 ,  at 209-82. 
16 1 .  Illustrative of expressions of this viewpoint are R. FRY, supra note 1 30; S. LANGER, 
supra note 1 30. Fry has written: 
In my youth all speculations on aesthetics had revolved with wearisome persistence 
around the question of the nature of beauty. Like our predecessors we sought for the 
criteria of the beautiful, whether in art or nature. And always this search led to a tangle of 
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rules approach: Louis Sullivan, for example, counseled that 
all mechanical theories of art are vanity, and . . . the best of rules are 
but as flowers planted over the graves of prodigious impulses which 
splendidly lived their lives, and passed away with the individual man 
who possessed these impulses . . . . [I]t is within the souls of individ­
ual men that art reaches culminations. 162 
A second problem is that aesthetic formalism ignores the dimen­
sion of time. Yet time and the process of habituation that occurs 
over time often condition aesthetic response to an environmental 
feature or setting more vitally than do formal visual qualities. Over 
time 
[t]he "ugly" building may survive to become "interesting" or "amus­
ing," and finally "beautiful." What was once deemed "monotonous 
and mechanical" may later be seen as "harmonious and orderly," and 
the "excessive and vulgar" become "imaginative and vital. " 163 
Examples of this process are commonplace, but none illustrates it 
more vividly than the shift in Parisians' opinion of the Eiffel Tower 
some years after its construction. Shortly before it was erected in 
1 889, it was scorned as the "dishonor of Paris" by Gounod, 
Prudhomme, and other distinguished French writers and artists, or­
ganized under the banner of the Committee of Three Hundred (one 
member per meter of the Tower's height). "ls Paris going to be asso­
ciated with the grotesque, mercantile imaginings of a constructor of 
machines . . . ?" 164 the group implored. Although scheduled for 
demolition twenty years later, the Eiffel Tower still stands, the be­
loved signature of the Parisian skyline and an officially designated 
monument. 
Aesthetic formalism must also be faulted for its implicit sugges­
tion that judgments akin to those of the museum underlie aesthetic 
legislation. 165 Most aesthetic controls employ cruder gauges. The 
aesthetic preferences operative in the decisions to preserve the San 
Francisco Bay, Virginia's Historic Green Springs, or the New Jersey 
Pine Barrens cannot be equated in aesthetic complexity or refine­
ment with those underlying a choice between the art of Picasso and 
contradictions or else to metaphysical ideas so vague as to be inapplicable to concrete 
cases . . . .  Tolstoy [beginning with What is Art?] saw that the essence of art was that it 
was a means of communication between human beings . . . . [O]f immense importance 
was the idea that a work of art was not the record of beauty already existent elsewhere, 
but the expression of an emotion felt by the artist and conveyed to the spectator. 
R. FRY, supra note 130, at 292-93. 
162. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 32, at 185 .  
163. N. EVENSON, supra note 84, at 124. 
164. Id at 132. 
165. See text at note 67 supra. 
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Turner, Bach and Copland, or Sullivan and Pei. Cruder still are the 
preferences resulting in bans on frontyard clotheslines in exclusive 
residential neighborhoods, billboards along scenic highways, or un­
fenced junkyards on a community's outskirts. 166 
It might be retorted that the gap between museum and legal aes­
thetics closes in the case of landmark buildings and historic districts. 
After all, city councils and landmark preservation commissions must 
make judgments about design ensembles and building facades and 
detailing that are as intricate and refined as any made by architec­
tural historians or museum curators. This argument, although accu­
rate, largely misses the point because beauty, as conceived under the 
visual beauty rationale, plays a secondary role in the designation 
process. Many landmarks and historic districts are not even de­
scribed as "beautiful" by their defenders. 167 Even those that do ex­
emplify the design principles of a particular school of aesthetic 
formalism with fidelity and grace fail to substantiate the visual 
beauty rationale. To argue to the contrary is to commit the error of 
those who equate the canons of form that describe their favored style 
166. Many courts are alert to the differences between museum and legal standards noted in 
text. See, e.g. , Mayor of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, 88, 299 A.2d 828, 833 
(1973) (standards may not be those of an "idiosyncratic group"); Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 
N.Y.2d 263, 272, 225 N.E.2d 749, 755, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22, 30 (1 967) (standards do not embrace 
"every artistic conformity or nonconformity); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Me­
tuchen, 42 N.J. 1 ,  5, 198 A.2d 447, 449 ( 1964) (standards do not extend to "some sensitive or 
exquisite preference"); Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 159, 196 N.W. 451, 455 ( 1923) (stan­
dards may not include "ultra-aesthetic taste"). 
Alternative evidence of the antimuseum view of many courts is their insistence that only 
those uses or activities that are offensive or attractive to broad segments of the community may 
be addressed in aesthetic legislation. See note 80 supra and note 286 infra. For example, in 
the same opinion announcing its approval of the "solely for aesthetic purposes" position, the 
New York Court of Appeals was careful to note that the uses proscribed by aesthetic regula­
tion must be those that are offensive to the "visual sensibilities of the average person." People 
v. Stover, 1 2  N.Y.2d 462, 468, 191 N.E.2d 272, 276, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 739, appeal dismissed, 
375 U.S. 42 (1963). Likewise, in a decision invalidating a billboard measure, the Maryland 
Court of Appeals quoted approvingly the observation in Quintini v. City of Bay St. Louis, 64 
Miss. 483, 490, 1 So. 625, 628 ( 1887), that "(t]he law can know no distinction between citizens 
because of the superior cultivation of the one over the other. It is with common humanity that 
courts and legislators must deal . . . .  " Mayor of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, 
89, 299 A.2d 828, 834 ( 1973). 
167. Visual beauty cannot seriously be predicated, for example, of Chicago's landmarked 
Water Tower, a Disneyesque parody of a turreted castle erected to cloak the waterworks and 
standpipes hidden within, or of New York City's Greenwich Village Historic District, which 
Norman Williams aptly describes as an "architectural melange." See 3 N. WILLIAMS, supra 
note 39, at § 7 1A.06. To like effect is Jane Jacobs's comment concerning the Village's Jefferson 
Market Courthouse, the trophy in one of the City's bloodier landmark wars, that 
now abandoned as a courthouse, [the landmark] occupies a prominent site abutti!-1& on 
one of the community's busiest areas. It is an elaborate Victorian building, and op1mons 
differ radically as to whether it is architecturally handsome or architecturally ugly. H�w­
ever, there is a remarkable degree ef unanimity, even among those who don't like the build­
ing, that it must be retained and used for something. 
J. JACOBS, supra note 128, at 397 (emphasis added). 
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with universal canons of beauty or with some subset of these 
canons. 168 
Finally, the faith that beauty can be made to answer to abstract 
rules of visual form is easily transformed into the conceit that legal 
institutions can employ these rules to create a beautiful environ­
ment. 169 But conservation or preservation, not creativity or original­
ity, is aesthetic regulation's province. 17° Aesthetic measures derive 
their standards from an existing style or set of visual characteristics 
exemplified by an existing environmental feature or setting selected 
on the basis of the community's attachment to it. These measures 
never prescribe rules of visual form in advance of the style's exem­
plification in some existing resource or aesthetic tradition. 
The Mansion dispute, for example, teaches not only that 
landmarks or distinctive neighborhoods must exist before aesthetic 
regulation comes into play, but that the preservation of their exist­
ence is aesthetic regulation's raison d'etre. It is true, of course, that 
new entrants, such as the thirty-story apartment tower, are regulated 
by law. But in no sense can that regulation be deemed creative or 
original. What it seeks to do - and it is no small job at that171 - is 
to ensure that the new entrant is "compatible" with its correlative 
existing resource. 
Modem critics, artists, and aesthetic philosophers confirm this 
conclusion. Aesthetic criteria, Susanne Langer has written, "are not 
criteria of excellence; they are explanations of it. . . . As soon as 
they are generalized and used as measures of achievement they be­
come baneful."172 In like vein, John Dewey warns that ''standards, 
prescriptions, and rules [of beauty] are general while objects of art 
are individual. The former have no locus in time . . . . They be­
long neither here nor there. In applying to everything, they apply to 
nothing in particular." 173 The creative impulse, Siegfried Gideion 
adds, has "grow[n] only in liberty, for no command can open the 
way to the unexplored."174 
168. See note 149 supra. 
169. See text at note 140 supra . 
170. See text at notes 1 16-1 9  supra 222-3 1 infra. 
1 7 1 .  The problems of ensuring "compatibility" in the historic preservation field are can-
vassed in OLD AND NEW ARCHITECTURE, supra note 148. 
172. S. LANGER, supra note 1 30, at 406. 
173. J. DEWEY, supra note 3, at 301 .  
174. S. GIOEION, SPACE, TIME AND ARCHITECTURE 583 ( 1 94 1). 
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3.  Semantic Fallacy 
Under the two versions of visual beauty reasoning outlined ear­
lier, 175 the terms "beautiful" and "ugly" are predicated of, respec­
tively, the visual form of an environmental resource taken by itself 
or the visual relationship of that form to the visual form of other 
features that fill its perceptual field. For purposes of legal analysis, 
the first version is incorrect and the second incomplete. The visual 
appeal or offensiveness of an existing resource or new entrant is not 
constant as the first version requires. Resources may be objectiona­
ble in one setting and unobjectionable in another. Clotheslines or 
trailers in front yards, which, like the proverbial pig in the parlor or 
bamyard, 176 would go unnoticed in industrial districts, are perhaps 
incongruent in residential zones. Buildings that are regarded as out­
standing architecture when considered in isolation may be offensive 
in particular settings. 1 11 
The rationale's second version is preferable to its first because 
this version acknowledges that the terms "beauty" and ''ugliness" 
have relational connotations and that standards sensitive to the emo­
tions these terms express can sometimes178 be derived from the for-
175. See text at notes 1 12-14 supra. 
176. The pig-in-the-parlor metaphor has been employed by the Supreme Court not only in 
the land use context, see Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926), but in the first 
amendment context as well, see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 75 1 (1978). 
177. An artifact that has undoubted aesthetic merit or, at least, is nonoffensive taken by 
itself may become offensive in the wrong setting because the manner in which it is experienced 
is profoundly influenced by its perceptual and associational fields. For examples of proposed 
developments that were found objectionable on this basis, see, e.g. , Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 
I 130, 1 138 (4th Cir. 197 1) (prison presents ''jarring contrast to the existing architecture and 
atmosphere in [Historic] Green Springs"); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 
Fla. 480, 484, 3 So.2d 364, 366 (1941) (en bane) (commercial use incompatible with "character 
of [Miami Beach hotel district] as a resort"); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department 
of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 1 86, 1 93 N.E. 799, 8 1 6  (1935) (outdoor signs incompatible with 
"places [Beacon Hill and Town of Concord] hallowed by literary and humanitarian associa­
tions"), appeal dismissed, General Advertising v. Callahan, 297 U.S. 725 (1936); McCormick v. 
Lawrence, 83 Misc. 2d 64, 67-68, 372 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159-60 ( 1975) (boathouse incompatible 
with "unspoiled" "community setting" of Adirondack wilderness area), affd., 387 N.Y.S.2d 
919, 54 A.D.2d 123 (1976); Westfield Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 
528, 544, 324 A.2d I 1 3, 122 (1974) (group of signs "no matter how tasteful" incompatible with 
community character). 
This proposition is a staple as well of perceptual theory in modem psychology. See gener­
ally R. ARNHEIM, supra note 138; E. GoMBRICH, supra note 1 30; E. GoMBRJCH, supra note 
149. Amheim notes that "[t]he mind meets here, at an elementary level, a first instance of the 
general cognitive problem that arises because everything in this world presents itse!f in context 
and is modulated by that context." R. ARNHEIM, supra note 138, at 37 (emphasis added). 
It is on this basis that postmodemists object to modem architecture, see text at note 157 
supra, despite their willingness to concede that many modem buildings are spectacular arch!· 
lecture taken by themselves. The buildings' offensiveness to the postmodernists, therefore, is 
not an inherent attribute but a function of location in inappropriate settings. See generally B. 
BROUN, supra note 1 57; P. GOLDBERGER, supra note 38. 
178. See text at notes 292-97 infra. 
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mal visual qualities of the new entrants' settings. But its reliance on 
these qualities alone does not adequately account for the shock occa­
sioned by incongruent new entrants or for the vehement reactions of 
community groups. Most people simply do not "see" or interpret the 
physical environment with the same degree of visual refinement as 
do design professionals. On the other hand, their threshold of what 
might be termed semiotic sensitivity is often more acute. They, after 
all, must live with the designer's handiwork. And although often 
ignored, it is they, not design professionals, who are aesthetic regula­
tion's intended audience. 179 
No-change constituencies' portrayal of dissonant new entrants 
leaves no doubt that, for them, the niceties of aesthetic formalism are 
entirely secondary to the new entrant's message as the source of their 
reaction. New entrants are not condemned because they fail to re­
spect the canons of Vitruvius or Ruskin. The language employed by 
these constituencies reveals instead that they perceive the entrants as 
portending ills akin to sexual or marital outrage ("rape"; "plunder"), 
mutilation ("scar"), blasphemy ("sacrilege"), death ("obilterate"), 
and other shocking violations of personal or group identity. In re­
sponse to these perceptions, they organize, lobby for legislation and 
favorable administrative decisions, finance and prosecute lawsuits, 
and engage in the other costly, emotionally draining tactics de­
manded of combatants in aesthetics warfare. 
These considerations suggest that the visual beauty rationale's 
second version is not so much wrong as it is incomplete. Perhaps 
some people do react to an environmental resource solely on the ba­
sis of its compatibility with particular canons of aesthetic formalism. 
But aesthetic formalism is too slender a reed to account for citizen 
reaction generally. A broadened explanation is required, I submit, 
that appreciates the profound influence of the visual environment's 
semiotic properties on the way that people experience and describe 
that environment. 
179. The postmodemists' assault on modem architecture, see note 177 supra, essentially 
boils down to the assertion that the latter ignores human semiotic needs in favor of expression­
ism predicated on the modem architect's pursuit of abstract form. See B. BROUN, supra note 
157, at l 0 ("Public apathy is largely due to the fact that the majority of people are disturbed by 
the sterile appearance of modem buildings and are not interested in the intellectual ideas that 
buildings represent."); Colquhoun, Typology and Design Method, in PEOPLE AND BUILDINGS 
supra note 1 17, at 394 (rejecting modem architecture's premise that "shapes have physiog­
nomic or expressive content which communicates itself to us directly"); Wolfe, supra note 2 
(same). 
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"Aesthetic formalism," which considers "beauty" and "ugliness" 
to be ontologically based, accessible to human intelligence, and ren­
derable in systematic form as universal or p articularized canons or 
laws, represents a vision advanced by aesthetic writers over the mil­
lennia. The vision received its most optimistic expression in Renais­
sance aesthetic thought, for which art, like science, was both an 
expression and a discovery of the laws of nature. 180 It has been 
championed by mathematicians, experimental psychologists, and 
aesthetic philosophers as well as by kings, popes, and signorie. 
Although Hitler18 1 and other twentieth-century despots have con­
tinued to expound the vision, it has been severely scaled down, if not 
abandoned altogether, by modem students of human aesthetic re­
sponse. Among the reasons for their modesty are the inability to 
define canons of beauty or empirically to demonstrate their objective 
character, the impact of time as a relativizer of taste, and the vagar­
ies of human culture and perceptual response. Aesthetic formalism's 
most persuasive adversary, however, has been the exuberance of 
human creativity, which refuses to be immobilized by the rules or 
traditions of earlier times. 
The reasons underlying this new-found modesty establish that 
aesthetic regulation cannot satisfy the vagueness-due process re­
quirement of intelligible standards 182 if those standards attempt to 
1 80. As characterized by Hauser: 
The scientific conception of art, which form[ed] the basis of instruction in the academies, 
begins with Leon Battista Alberti. He is the first to express the idea that mathematics is 
the common ground of art and the sciences, as both the theory of proportions and the 
theory of perspective are mathematical disciplines. He is also the first to give clear expres­
sion to that union of the experimental technician and the observing artist which had al­
ready been achieved in practice by Masaccio and Uccello. Both try to comprehend the 
world empirically and to derive rational laws from this experience of the world . . . .  
A. HAUSER, supra note 30, at 64 (footnote omitted). 
1 8 1 .  Hitler invoked the vision to canonize the architectural traditions of Imperial Rome 
and to banish the Bauhaus School from the Third Reich. See B. LANE, ARCHITECTURE AND 
POLITICS IN GERMANY, 1918- 1 945, at 17 1 -72, 188-90 ( 1968); A. SPEER, INSIDE THE THIRD 
REICH 73-75, 15 1 -57 ( 1970). 
1 82. See text at note 58 supra. 
It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is 
so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits 
or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is 
prohibited and what is not in each particular case. 
Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 ( 1966). The vagueness doctrine rests in part on 
the concepts of fair warning, see Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926), in 
part on the fact that statutory unclarity frustrates judicial review of regulatory and criminal 
legislation, Note, Tlte Void-for- Vagueness lJoctrine in lite Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 
67, 80-8 1 ( 1960), and in part on the desire to have legislatures carefully "establish minimal 
guidelines to govern law enforcement." Smith v. Goguen, 415  U.S. 566, 574 ( 1974). 
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define "beauty" or "ugliness." For legal-aesthetics purposes at least, 
these terms express a positive or negative emotional response to ex­
trinsic factors without hinting at what those factors might be. Absent 
identification and evaluation of the relevant factors, standards-set­
ting in the name of these concepts is impossible. With that identifi­
cation and evaluation, beauty and ugliness become superfluous as 
analytic concepts; they are merely conclusory terms that express the 
emotional character of a particular aesthetic response. 
2. Freedom of Expression 
Should aesthetic measures premised exclusively on visual beauty 
reasoning survive a first amendment challenge? I think not. A legis­
lative ban on, or preference for, private expression based solely on its 
offensiveness or appeal is censorship in its baldest form. Although 
the Supreme Court has yet to hold that environmental features are 
"speech," the conclusion seems unavoidable in at least some 
contexts. 183 
For many, architecture and other environmental features com­
municate ideas more effectively than does language. Louis Sullivan, 
for example, views the architect as "a poet who uses not words but 
building materials as a medium of expression." 184 Critics of Robert 
Venturi's willingness to "learn from Las Vegas" 1 85 regard his work 
and ideas as an outrageous assault on their political and social be­
liefs. 186 For others, architecture expresses emotion through sensuous 
form, not ideas.187 But emotion-laden messages are as entitled as 
discursive ones to first amendment protection. Even when commu­
nication assumes a verbal form, the Supreme Court has stressed, the 
emotive function of language may be "more important" than its dis­
cursive function in conveying the "overall message sought to be 
communicated." 188 
The first amendment shelters individual self-fulfillment189 as well 
as unhindered communication. Both the artist's exercise of creative 
183. See text at notes 325-45 infra. 
1 84. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 32, at 140 (emphasis deleted). See generally P. COLLINS, 
supra note 145. 
1 85. See R. VENTURI, D. BROWN & s. IZENOUR, supra note 33. 
1 86. Venturi and co-authors Denise Scott Brown and Steven Izenour "have been called 
'Nixonites,' 'Reaganites,' or the equivalent, by Roger Montgomery, Ulrich Franzen, Kenneth 
Frampton, and a whole graduating class of Cooper Union." Id at 153 n. 1 8. 
187. See S. LANGER, supra note 130, at 92- 103. 
1 88 .  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 1 5, 26 (1971). 
1 89. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 3 1 9  U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943); L. 
TRIBE, supra note 61, at § 1 2- 1 .  On the relationship between self-fulfillment and architectural 
expression, see Williams, supra note 46, at 53-57; Note, supra note 60, at 1 83-85; cf Nimmer, 
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imagination and his or her audience's response afford as immediate 
a route to self-fulfillment as other activities safeguarded by the first 
amendment. 190 In fact, the power of art to enrich the lives of indi­
viduals and cultures has been compared to the power of religion. 191 
The comparison is instructive. Like religion, art plumbs the furthest 
depths of human thought and emotion. Its affirmations are, to be 
sure, as insusceptible as religious dogmas to verification in the posi­
tivistic mode embraced by the law. But nonverifiability does not 
mean that these affirmations are trivial. On the contrary, it cele­
brates their richness and ineffability. To permit the state to dictate 
which affirmations will be countenanced would be unsettling even if 
cogent justifications could be adduced and intolerable if they could 
not. 
Solicitude for expression and self-fulfillment interests explains 
why the Supreme Court requires that aesthetic measures regulating 
expressive activity based on the offensiveness of its content be "nar­
rowly drawn" and advance a "sufficiently substantial governmental 
interest." 192 The visual beauty approach satisfies neither require­
ment. A measure whose "standards" appeal to beauty in the abstract 
is not only intolerably vague, but also runs afoul of the injunction 
that it be "narrowly drawn." But aesthetic measures are rarely 
framed so broadly. Rather, they implicitly or directly look to the 
visual character of an existing style or resource for their standards. 
The Rice Mansion, for example, was designated under an ordinance 
that defined a landmark as a structure having a "special . . .  aes­
thetic interest or value," a criterion that the city's agencies presuma­
bly concluded the Mansion met by virtue of its mix of Beaux Arts 
and Neo-Georgian styles. 
Such measures appear to avoid the "narrowly drawn" objection 
because the visual characteristics of existing resources can often be 
detailed in legislation, regulations, or agency background studies. 
The first amendment problem, however, is not so easily overcome. 
In fact, it is exacerbated in these instances since the choice of one 
style or another as an authoritative exemplar of beauty is one that 
government may not make. Resolving the standards issue in this 
way presents an issue parallel to that faced by the Court in Burnstyn 
The Meaning of Symbolic Expression Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 57-60 
( 1973) (describing the self-expression in symbolic speech hair regulation cases). 
190. See, e.g. , Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, IO I S. Ct. 2176 ( 1 981) (nude dancing 
or "live entertainment" generally); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 1 5  (1971)  (jacket with in· 
scription "Fuck the Draft"). 
19 1 .  See S. LANGER, supra note 130, at 402. 
192. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, IOI S. Ct. 2 176, 2 182-83 ( 1981). 
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v. Wilson . 193 In Burnstyn, the Court invalidated a New York statute 
empowering a public board to ban "sacrilegious'' films partly be­
cause the board construed that term by reference to the content that 
particular organized religions had ascribed to it. As Justice Frank­
furter wrote in his concurring opinion: 
History teaches us the indefiniteness of the concept "sacrilegious" in 
another respect. . . . In the Rome of the late emperors, the England 
of James I, . . . or any other country with a monolithic religion, the 
category of things sacred might have clearly definable limits. But in 
America the multiplicity of ideas of "sacredness," held with equal but 
conflicting fervor by the great number of religious groups makes the 
term "sacrilegious" too indefinite to satisfy constitutional demands 
based on reason and fairness. 194 
If the term "ugly" is substituted for the term "sacrilegious," Justice 
Frankfurter's reasoning makes clear that the state cannot prefer 
Beaux Arts over Bauhaus or other styles simply because it believes 
that the former better exemplifies "beauty." 195 
3. Substantive .Due Process 
The substantive due process test is generally satisfied in land use 
litigation if the challenged measure prevents a landowner from im­
posing some "harm," proscribed under the police power, upon his 
neighbors or upon the community as a whole. 196 When aesthetic 
regulations are challenged, this question requires an inquiry into the 
character of the harm that government precludes by mandating that 
development be beautiful or, at least, not ugly. 
The response that beauty requires no justification beyond itself197 
may be summarily dismissed. Despite the broad presumption of va­
lidity that courts extend to police power measures challenged on sub­
stantive due process grounds, 198 government must point to some 
minimally plausible harm as the basis for its measure. Similarly, we 
may dismiss the claim derived from the moral theory of art ex-
193. 343 U.S. 495 ( 1952). 
194. 343 U.S. at 528. 
195. Whether or not the state may prefer this or tltat particular Beaux Arts building to a new 
entrant exemplifying another style is discussed in text at notes 322-86 infra. 
196. See text at note 64 supra. 
197. See text at note 1 1 5  supra. 
198. This presumption has been accorded to land use legislation since Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-89 (1926). See, e.g. , Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 ( 1 977); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 
416 U.S. I ,  7-8 (1974); Kolis, Architectural Expression: Police Power and tire First Amendment, 
16 URB. L. ANN. 273, 283-84 (1979); Note, supra note 61 ,  at 188-90. 
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pounded by Plato 199 and, later, by Tolstoy,200 which asserts in sub­
stance that bad art makes bad citizens and vice versa.201 Nor will the 
contention that offenses to the eye may be proscribed as nuisances 
no less than offenses to the ear and nose be given further attention 
other than to repeat that it confuses physiological with aesthetic 
reasoning. 202 
Two claims do merit extended consideration, but they too are 
unpersuasive. The first, propounded by architectural propagandists 
and planning commission design review staffs, 203 analogizes poorly 
designed buildings or urban design relationships to poorly designed 
consumer products. Under this reasoning, a "bad building" is 
viewed as comparable to a "bad automobile." But its proponents 
overlook that the term "design" may refer either to an object's visual 
qualities or to its fitness for its intended use. 204 Consumer products 
that are poorly designed in the latter sense, of course, may be regu­
lated under the police power to safeguard public health and safety. 
So too may buildings and urban design relationships, as the wide­
spread adoption of nonaesthetic development control regulation at­
tests. To be complete, however, the analogy requires proof that 
buildings and urban design relationships suffering from "bad" de­
sign in the former sense are likely to cause similar harms. Despite 
the repeated, often sweeping assertions to this effect in design litera­
ture, 205 the linkage has not been demonstrated. A comprehensive 
199. See PLATO, REPUBLIC 376-41 1 (I. Richards trans. 1 966); PLATO, LAWS 800-02 (A. 
Taylor trans. 1934). 
200. See L. TOLSTOY, What is Art?, in WHAT IS ART? AND ESSAYS ON ART 70 (A. Maude 
trans. 1 932). 
201 . This view has been endorsed by such critics as John Ruskin, see P. COLLINS, supra 
note 145, at 109-10, who regards a society's architecture and urban design as measures both of 
its political health and of its citizens' civic virtue. It was praised by Hitler as well who was 
alert to the propagandistic purposes that official architectural styles can serve. See note 181 
supra . Wholly apart from the obvious first amendment objections that attend the view, its 
metaphysical assertion of a linkage between art and civic virtue is simply too problematic to 
serve as a persuasive justification for aesthetic regulation. Indeed, Lewis Mumford takes a 
rather different view of the matter than Ruskin: "The more shaky the institution, the more 
solid the monument: repeatedly civilization has exemplified Patrick Geddes's dictum, that the 
perfection of the architectural form does not come till the institution sheltered by it is on the 
point of passing away." THE CULTURE OF CITIES, supra note 1 16, at 434. 
202. See text at note 123 supra. 
203. This contention has been most frequently voiced in interviews that the writer con· 
ducted in 1 980 and 1981  with members of the urban design staffs of planning commissions in 
Boston, New York City, and San Francisco. 
204. This distinction parallels that elaborated in this Article between the functional and 
nonfunctional associations of environmental features and settings. See text at notes 1 16-17 
supra. The position advanced in text is not persuasive because it confuses the latter with the 
former type of associations. 
205. Von Eckardt, for example, writes: 
Ralph Nader has improved automobile safety. Adelle Davis and others who have spoken 
January 1982] Law and Aesthetics 415 
review of the evidence concerning the linkage thesis, which is termed 
"biotechnical determinism" by social scientists, led one respected 
commentator to conclude that "[i]t is nonsense, . . .  to think of di­
rect, causal connexions between built form and human behavior ex­
cept at the grossest physiological level."206 
The second claim asserts that beauty's preservation maintains or 
increases property values. 207 Strictly speaking, its discussion is inap­
propriate in a critique of the visual beauty rationale, which the mod-
and written about food have, without doubt . . .  made people aware of the ill effects of 
edible junk. There has been no similarly sustained effort to inform and educate the public 
about the effect of junk building and urban design on their lives. 
W. VoN ECKARDT, supra note 84, at 9 1 .  Although she acknowledges that "[t]here is no such 
thing as simple environmental determinism," Ada Louise Huxtable asserts: 
A great deal of irreparable damage can be done to the complex human psyche, and 
even to patterns of behavior, by bad building. Non-neighborhoods that are the amenity­
less residue of speculative greed reinforce the sense of worthlessness of those who cannot 
escape. You can create desolate wastelands of the spirit as well as of the environment. 
You can scar people as well as land. 
But these are value judgments that social scientists shun. Fortunately environmental­
ists go where scientists fear to tread. 
A. HUXTABLE, supra note 31 ,  at 50. 
The question for this Article is whether or not the law should go there as well. If by "bad 
building," Huxtable means bad design in the second of the senses in the text, the answer, I 
believe, should be yes. The assertion of a relationship between such design and community 
well-being is plausible from the perspective of legal epistemology, however problematic it may 
be for the social sciences. See note 206 infra. But if she intends bad design in the second 
sense, i.e. ,  a violation of purportedly authoritative canons of aesthetic formalism, her injunc­
tion is difficult to defend notwithstanding legal epistemology's more relaxed standards. Not 
even minimal evidence has been forthcoming to support that . position, which, as argued 
throughout this Article, is based on a false question in any event. 
206. G. BROADBENT, supra note 130, at 172. The consensus is clear in the social science 
literature dealing with the relationship between the built and natural environments and human 
behavior that a simplistic cause-and-effect analysis that ignores the role of culture and other 
variables inadequately explains the influence of functional design, let alone nonfunctional de­
sign, on human behavior. See, e.g. , H. GANS, supra note 20; Broady, Social Theory in Architec­
tural Design, Cassel, Health Consequences of Population Density and Crowding, Gutman, The 
Questions Architects Ask, Rapoport & Watson, Cultural Variability in Physical Standards, in 
PEOPLE AND BUILDINGS, supra note 1 17, at 170, 249, 337, & 33 respectively. 
While his language is harsher perhaps than the other evaluators of the biotechnical deter­
minism thesis advanced by architectural propagandists and many design critics, Broady none­
theless represents their common position in his observation that 
at times, one stands aghast at the naivete, the sheer lack of intellectual discipline which 
often marks the enthusiastic designer's confrontation with social theory. Perhaps one 
ought not to worry about all this hot air: for it may not be taken seriously even by its 
exponents. Indeed, it sometimes seems to be used not so much· to guide design as to 
bolster morale and to add a patina of words to ideas intuitively conceived. In the end, 
however, one must be concerned. For phoney social theory is likely to produce phoney 
expectations and spurious designs. It may equally hinder effective collaboration between 
social scientists and designers and inhibit the development of more valid ideas about the 
relationship between architectural design and social structure. 
Broady, supra, at 171 (emphasis in original). 
Compare s. FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 29-30 (J. Strachey trans. & ed. 
1961 ): "ff]he science of aesthetics investigates the conditions under which things are beauti­
ful, but it has been unable to give any explanation of the nature and origin of beauty, and as 
usually happens, lack of success is concealed beneath a flood of resounding and empty words." 
207. See text at note 51 supra. 
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em period courts purportedly endorse, because the claim is a 
throwback to the supposedly discredited reasoning of the middle pe­
riod courts. Unlike other commentators, however, I believe that the 
sharp line drawn between the views of the two periods is largely ficti­
tious. Once it is acknowledged that substantive due process and first 
amendment strictures require a justification for aesthetic regulation 
beyond the pursuit of beauty per se, the "solely for aesthetics" lan­
guage of the modern period becomes unsupportable. B� identify�g 
benefits other than visual beauty as a basis for upholdmg aesthetic 
measures2os or asserting that these measures must be "related if only 
generally to the economic and cultural setting of the regulating com­
munity,"209 modern period judges behave much as their middle pe­
riod predecessors did. 
In truth, the relationship between aesthetic regulation and prop­
erty values is extremely variable. Reliable evidence indicates that 
aesthetic regulation can stabilize or increase property values under 
certain circumstances, as for example, the designation as a historic 
district of a neighborhood undergoing gentrification or already gen­
trified. 2 10 But preservation restrictions can work the other way as 
well. Depending on the building in question, landmark designation 
can severely reduce its value and its concomitant tax yields.2 1 1  Aes­
thetically based land use measures can freeze development at a level 
that falls well short of land's optimum economic use, as Walter Firey 
has documented in his study of land value and land use patterns in 
Boston's Beacon Hill and Back Bay areas.2 12  In many instances, 
moreover, the impact of an aesthetic measure on land values is sim-
208. See, e.g. ,  Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 858, 610 P.2d 407, 
41 1, 164 Cal. Rptr. 5 10, 514 (1 980), revd. on other grounds, I O I  S. Ct. 2882 (1981) (billboard 
ban serves traffic safety and visual beauty goals); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 466, 191 
N.E.2d 272, 274, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 737 (clotheslines ban serves property value maintenance 
and visual beauty goals), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963). 
209. Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 269, 225 N.E.2d 749, 753, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22, 27 
(1967). 
The term "cultural" is as critical as the term "economic" in the quoted phrase because it 
connotes values that can no more be comprehended under the visual beauty interest than can 
economic values. The argument of this Article, of course, is that the "cultural" values pro­
moted by aesthetic regulation are those embraced by the cultural stability interest. See Parts 
IV & V infra. 
Other "solely for aesthetics" opinions that refer to the promotion of cultural values as a 
valid governmental end include, e.g. , Sun Oil Co. v. City of Madison Heights, 41 Mich. App. 
47, 53-54, 199 N.W. 525, 529 (1972); A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 216, 258 
S.E.2d 444, 450 (1 979); Oregon City v. Hartke, 249 Or. 35, 47, 400 P.2d 255, 261 (1965). 
210. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, THE CONTRIBUTION OF HIS­
TORIC PRESERVATION TO URBAN REVITALIZATION (1979). 
2 1 1 .  See J. CosTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 5, at 65-68. 
212. See w. F!REY, LAND USE IN CENTRAL BOSTON ( 1947). 
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ply indeterminate.213 
Judicial evaluation of the relationship between aesthetics and 
property value also calls into question the supposed necessity of their 
covariance. Despite the generous lip service given to property values 
in the opinions, judicial efforts to verify this covariance in the record 
are perfunctory at best.214 More to the point, numerous courts have 
expressed their willingness to sustain aesthetic measures notwith­
standing their recognition that the measures may reduce the .value of 
affected property or hinder the economic welfare of the community 
as a whole.215 
These brief observations confirm Norman Williams's judgment 
that j udicial attempts to support aesthetic regulation by means of the 
property values argument are a product of "muddled thinking,'' 
which will "hardly . . .  stand under critical analysis."2 16 
Although the modem period courts have not rejected aesthetic 
regulation on substantive due process grounds,217 first amendment 
challenges furnish a context in which the defenses' flimsiness is likely 
to prove fatal. Long ignored in aesthetic jurisprudence,218  the 
amendment's potential disciplining influence upon aesthetic policy­
making has begun to surface in such recent Supreme Court opinions 
as Young v. American Mini Theatres,219 Metromedia, Inc. v. City qf 
San Diego ,220 and Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim .221 These 
opinions signal that the Court now regards aesthetic regulation as no 
more immune to the exacting scrutiny mandated by its first amend-
213.  An apt example is the impact on land values of a billboard ban in commercial and 
industrial areas. See United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. I, 10, 198 
A.2d 447, 452 (1964) (Hall, J., dissenting) (since the impact is likely to be negligible at best, 
billboard ban must be sustained on the basis of a "solely for aesthetics" rationale). 
214. See, e.g. , United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. I, 198 A.2d 447 
( 1 964); Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 1 19 Ohio App. 67, 1 92 N.E.2d 74 (1963); State ex 
rel Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 2 1 7  (1955). 
215. See, e.g. , General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 
149, 190-9 1,  193 N.E. 799, 8 1 8  ( 1 935); Oregon City v. Hartke, 249 Or. 35, 50, 400 P.2d 255, 263 
( 1 965). 
216. 3 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 39, at § 7 1 . 18. 
217. This outcome owes a good deal less to the defenses' merits than to the generic reluc­
tance of those courts to second guess the "wisdom" of legislative judgments. See note 198 
supra . 
218. Prior to the trilogy of Supreme Court opinions cited in notes 219-21 infra, the issue 
was addressed in People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191  N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal 
dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 ( 1 963), which sustained the conviction of a property owner who, in 
violation of a ban against clotheslines in front yards, had strung his front yard clothesline with 
tattered rags and undergarments to protest what he believed were unduly high real estate 
taxes. 
219. 427 U.S. 50 ( 1976). 
220. IOI  S. Ct. 2882 (198 1). 
221 .  IOI S. Ct. 2882 (1981). 
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ment jurisprudence than any other type of legislative measure that 
restricts expression whose content is deemed "offensive" by the 
state. 222 If the property values and "bad" design arguments are 
shaky under the looser substantive due process test, their prospects 
for survival lessen when exposed to the much harder look demanded 
by the first amendment. 
IV. STABILITY-IDENTITY NEEDS AS AESTHETIC REGULATION'S 
SOCIAL IMPETUS 
A. Summary of the Cultural Stability Hypothesis 
Cultural stability and individual, group, and community identity 
are reciprocal values whose relationship is mediated by social insti­
tutions - the loci of shared values that constitute societies' inte­
grated entities rather than loose collections of individuals pursuing 
the fulfillment of their biological drives.223 Family, religion, educa­
tion, language, and government, for example, manifest and reinforce 
values that orient the lives of individuals and groups. When rapid or 
fundamental changes threaten these institutions, society itself risks 
disintegration because the institutional clasps that hold it together 
may fail.224 Thus, society may seek to block the changes or to absorb 
them, permitting only interstitial modifications in the matrix of val­
ues that define its contours. 225 If unable to do either, society will no 
longer continue as the distinctive entity it formerly had been, and it 
may disintegrate altogether.226 
By virtue of its semiotic properties, the environment also plays a 
socially integrative and, hence, identity-nurturing role. Writers, 
painters, poets, and other artists have intuited and exemplified this 
fact in their work throughout recorded time. 227 Among social scien­
tists, no one has detailed it as well as Lewis Mumford,22s who de­
scribes the city as "both a physical utility for collective living and a 
symbol of those collective purposes and unanimities that rise under 
such favored circumstances."229 In addition to its utilitarian and 
222. See Part V (C) infra. 
223. See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 45-50. 
224. Id. at 90-9 1 .  
225. Id. at 103- 1 8. Berger and Luckmann refer to these responses as "universe-mainte­
nance" devices. Id. at 96, 104. 
226. Id. at 103. 
227. See Russell, How Art Makes Us Feel at Home in tlze World, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 
198 1, § 2, at 1, col. I .  
228. See, e.g. , L .  MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY, supra note 1 1 6; L. MUMFORD, CITY 
DEVELOPMENT (1 945); THE CULTURE OF CITIES, supra note 1 16 .  
229. THE CULTURE OF CITIES, supra note 1 16, at 5. 
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mute physical aspects, therefore, the environment is a visual com­
mons impregnated with meanings and associations that fulfill indi­
vidual and group needs for identity confirmation. "Identity remains 
unintelligible unless it is located in a world,"230 and the environment' 
as a network of socially determined meanings is a visible, relatively 
permanent component of that world. 
These general observations allow us to weave into a unified pat­
tern the various strands of the cultural stability hypothesis adverted 
to earlier. Preservation of identity and cultural stability is a key de­
terminant of individual and social behavior. Among the many 
forces that shape these reciprocal values are the "existing resources" 
in the prototypical format of aesthetic controversies. Like environ­
mental phenomena generally, their import is functional. But existing 
resources differ from other environmental phenomena because their 
import is usually much richer in associations that transform them 
into sources of orientation - "landmarks," if you will - in the emo­
tional and cognitive lives of individuals, groups, and entire commu­
nities. "New entrants" may imperil a correlative existing resource, 
thereby threatening the individuals, groups, or communities bonded 
to it by associational clasps. The threat materializes in the form of 
the destruction or alteration of the physical resource, but what 
shocks its constituencies is the concomitant loss or contamination of 
the network of meanings - spatially referred values - that it has 
come to embody for them over time. Their compulsion to blunt or 
eliminate such threats provides the social impetus for aesthetic pol­
icy. Their expectation is that these measures will either ban the new 
entrant, thereby precluding the harm altogether, or ensure that the 
new entrant will be as associationally congruent as public interven­
tion can make it. 
The cultural stability hypothesis views controversies about 
"beauty" as surrogates for disagreements about environmental 
change itself. Aesthetic policy, therefore, serves a role in the social 
system similar to that which homeostatic mechanisms serve in the 
human body.23 1 Physical well-being requires the maintenance of 
230. P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 4, at 174. 
23 1 .  For use of this concept in the social sciences, see, e.g. ' c. ALEXANDER, NOTES ON THE 
SYNTHESIS OF FORM ch. 5 (1964); E. GOMBRICH, supra note 130, at 195-2 16; P. MARRIS, Loss 
AND CHANGE ch. I (1974). 
The homeostatic func.tion of aesthetic regulation has been recognized in numerous judicial 
opin�ons. Pe
_
rhaps the cl�arest expression of this recognition is found in Sun Oil Co. v. City of 
Madison Heights, 41 Mich. App. 47, 53-54, 199 N.W.2d 525, 529 (1972), in which the court 
sustained a sign ordinance, observing: 
The modem trend is to recognize that a community's aesthetic well-being can contribute 
to urban man's psychological and emotional stability . . . .  We should begin to realize 
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certain biological constancies within the body. When they are im­
periled, biological indicators signal the danger, and corrective agen­
cies swing into action to prevent or minimize the disturbance. 
Likewise, individuals and groups must cope with threats to their per­
sonal and social identity and, hence, to cultural stability when new 
entrants imperil existing resources. What they seek when they press 
aesthetic demands upon governmental policy-makers are measures 
that will function, in essence, as socially homeostatic devices. From 
their perspective, the goal of these measures is to regulate the pace 
and character of environmental change in a manner that precludes 
or mitigates damage to their identity, a constancy no less critical to 
social stability than biological constants are to the human body's 
physiological equilibrium. 
B .  Stability-Identity Nexus Between Existing Resources and 
No-Change Constituencies 
The environment has long been viewed as a mute spatial frame­
work for utilitarian, economic behavior,232 and scholars have at­
tempted to rationalize public land use controls in terms of economic 
"extemalities."233 One can concede - indeed even applaud - the 
. . . that a visually satisfying city can stimulate an identity and pride which is the founda­
tion for social responsibility and citizenship. 
In Commissioner v. Benenson, 329 A.2d 437, 441 -42 (D.C. 1 974), which addressed the 
validity of a demolition permit issued for the Willard Hotel, a National Register of Historic 
Places entrant, the court noted that the "[r]etention of fine architecture, especially in the capital 
city of a relatively young country such as ours, lends a certain stability and cultural continuity, 
which can only contribute over the years to national substance." Likewise, in a dissenting 
opinion arguing that no "public use" supported Detroit's action in acquiring through eminent 
domain its Poletown neighborhood for sale to General Motors, a Michigan Supreme Court 
justice objected that the city 
chose to march in fast lock-step with General Motors to carve a "green field" out of an 
urban setting which ultimately required sweeping away a tightly-knit residential enclave 
of first- and second-generation Americans, for many of whom their home was their single 
most valuable and cherished asset and their stable ethnic neighborhood the unchanging 
symbol of the security and quality of their li�es. 
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 6 1 6, 658, 304 N.W.2d 455, 470 
(198 1) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Compare this view with text at notes 9 & 20 
supra. New Jersey's highest court has commented in another billboard case that "[t]he devel­
opment and preservation of natural resources and clean, salubrious neighborhoods contribute 
to psychological and emotional stability and well-being as well as stimulate a sense of civic 
pride." State v. Miller, 83 N.J. 402, 409, 4 1 6  A.2d 821 ,  824 ( 1980). See also General Outdoor 
Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 185-86, 193 N.E. 799, 815-16 
(1935); Parker v. Commonwealth, 1 78 Mass. 199, 203, 59 N.E. 634, 635 (1901); Westfield Mo­
tor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528, 541 ,  324 A.2d 1 1 3, 120-21 (1974). 
232. See generally W. FIREY, supra note 2 1 2; R. NELSON, supra note 22. 
233. The increasing utilization of economic methodologies and doctrines as a tool of policy 
analysis in law, see, e.g. ' G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1 978); R. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ( 1972); Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One new of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. l 089 (1972); Coase, The Prob-
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utility of such analysis for policy-making but condemn the implica­
tion that it preempts other types of analyses. This implication is par­
ticularly troubling if economic analysis omits or distorts factors that 
are demonstrably relevant in aesthetic policy-making. To support 
this Article's claim that other factors are relevant, we must establish 
both that individual and group identity are vitally linked to the envi­
ronment's symbolic import and that this linkage, which Donald Ap­
pleyard succinctly portrays as "the sense of self in a place,"234 aids in 
explaining why community groups clamor for aesthetic regulation 
and what they expect from it. 
Consistent with the homeostasis metaphor, the factual case cen­
ters on how crisis and change affect the associational bonds between 
people and places. These bonds, for example, cause immigrants and 
pioneers to name their new environments with the names of the old 
to achieve continuity in their communal and cultural lives. When 
cities are destroyed by catastrophe, their citizens move quickly to 
restore them, as Londoners and Chicagoans did after fires ravaged 
their cities in 1669 and 1 87 1 .  Following World War II, the Poles' 
painstaking restoration of Old Warsaw and the venerable quarters of 
other Polish cities drained their national treasury and delayed the 
reconstruction of their war-tom economy. Such compulsive rebuild­
ing undergirds Kevin Lynch's observations that the environment is a 
"vast mnemonic system for the retention of group history and ide­
als,"235 and that "[a]fter a catastrophe, the restoration of the sym­
bolic center of community life is a matter of urgency [owing to the 
power of the] symbolic environment . . . to create a sense of stability 
. . . . "236 The loss of a landmark is often experienced by those 
bonded to it as the loss of a beloved friend, prompting Norma Even­
son's comment that buildings, like cities, "are a projection of the 
human mind and spirit; they are part of human experience. They 
can be loved; they have a kind of life, and when they are destroyed it 
/em of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. I (1960), has encouraged a corresponding expansion of 
economics-based analysis of land use regulation. See, e.g. , Ellickson, Suburban Growth Con­
trols: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1 977); Ellickson, Alternatives to 
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 68 1 
( 1973); Krier & Montgomery, Resource A/location, Information Cost and the Form of Govern­
ment Intervention, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 89 (1973); Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Funda­
mental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299 ( 1977); Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. L. & 
EcoN. 71 (1970). For a recent discussion of the relevance of economic analysis to land use and 
environmental policy maJµng, see Symposium: Economic Analysis in the Teaching of Land Use 
and Environmental Law, I UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLY. (1980). 
234. Appleyard, supra note 1 1 6, at 152. 
235. K. LYNCH, supra note 1 16, at 126. 
236. K. LYNCH, WHAT TIME IS THIS PLACE? 40 (1972). 
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is a kind of death."237 
The uprooting and relocation of residents of urban renewal areas 
is another crisis whose effects evidence the powerful ties that bind 
people to places. After Boston's West Enders were displaced by the 
clearance of their "slum," they reportedly experienced an acute 
"grief reaction."238 Among its elements were "feelings of painful 
loss,'' "continued longing,'' a "general depressive tone," "frequent 
symptoms of psychological or somatic stress," a "sense of helpless­
ness," and "tendencies to idealize the lost place. "239 Accounts of the 
uprooting of residents from ramshackle sections of Nigerian cities240 
and from Rio de Janeiro's fave/as241 attribute similar feelings of be­
reavement to the loss of identity resulting largely from destruction of 
the identity-nurturing network of meanings that the displacees had 
associated with their homes. In light of these findings, it is difficult 
to quibble with Donald Appleyard's observation that "[t]he home 
environment, as it evolves with the modifications and adaptations 
that we make on it, becomes in some sense a part of ourselves ."242 
Appleyard concludes: 
[T]echnical planning and environmental decisions are not only value­
based, . . .  but identity-based . . . .  [P]hysical planning decisions can, 
and frequently do, threaten the identity and status of certain groups 
while enlarging the powers of others . . . .  The environment is di­
vided into "ours" and "theirs;" the trees may be ours, the billboards 
theirs, the authentic is ours, the phony theirs, downtown may be ours 
or theirs, as may be the wilderness, the oil, or other natural resources. 
The city and the natural environment are arenas of symbolic social 
conflicts and as such raise their own issues of social justice.243 
Revolution and protest, two of the most turbulent expressions of 
social change, reveal that the associations that places have for people 
can evoke hatred, disgust, and shame, as well as affection. In 1871 ,  
the Communards burned the Tuileries Palace and toppled the Col­
umn of the Place VendOme to vent their rage at France's Royalist 
237. N. EVENSON, supra note 84, at 1 24. 
238. See Fried, Grieving far a Lost Honie, in PEOPLE AND BUILDINGS, supra note 1 17, at 
233. 
239. Id. at 230. 
240. See P. MARRIS, supra note 23 1 ,  at 43-58. 
241 .  ]. PERLMAN, THE MYTH OF MARGINALITY 1 95-2 1 2  ( 1 976). 
242. �ppley�rd, supra note l l6, at 1 5 1  (emphasis added). 
Consistent with Appleyard's observation is the attitude of its residents toward the South 
Bro�, portrayed as !he most �otori�us symbol of the nation's urban ills by two A�erican 
pres1�en�s as "'.ell as m the motion picture Fort Apache. The residents offer a dissenting per· 
specuve m their retort: They Call It Fort Apache; We Call It Home, Village Voice, Feb. 1 1, 
198 l; at I, col. I .  
243. Id. at 152. 
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past. 244 In 1980, hordes of disaffected young Swiss, known simply as 
"Movement," attacked the Zurich Opera House after a $38 million 
restoration plan was unveiled.245 As they smashed its ornate win­
dows, they shrieked, "Everything for them, nothing for us!", "Money 
for rock 'n' roll!" and "Down with the theater of the elite!"246 
"Movement wants to tear down the opera house," commented one 
observer, "[because] it sees [it] as a symbol of everything that is 
wrong in Switzerland."247 
Discomfort with the associations of a building or setting may also 
cause people to oppose its preservation. In the 1 930s, Parisians bit­
terly debated whether the Saint Germain Quarter should be pre­
served or leveled. One passionate opponent of preservation cried: 
What crimes, history, one commits in your name. One ought, at least, 
to distinguish among the memories it leaves us. There are some it is 
better to forget. It is impossible to traverse the narrow streets which go 
from the Quai de Conti to the old abbey of Saint Germain de Pres 
without seeing again the horrible days of the revolution of which they 
were the theater, where the walls themselves have retained the cries of 
the victims of September, and where . . .  blood flowed like a river.248 
More recently, New Yorkers found themselves ambivalent about 
honoring the Tweed Courthouse with landmark status since its con­
struction added millions in boodle to the pockets of Boss Tweed and 
his cronies. 249 
Usually, however, time so mesmerizes later generations that they 
preserve even distinctive settings and places whose associations clash 
openly with current political, social or moral beliefs. The Indone­
sians, for example, have worshipfully maintained the colonial houses 
of their former Dutch rulers; the Soviets do the same with the pal­
aces and churches, not to mention the ballet and music, of Czarist 
Russia. Significantly, the Tweed Courthouse was eventually desig­
nated. Perhaps it is the rosy haze of time that explains why so many 
former whorehouses are landmarks in this country. 
New entrants may be rich in symbolic import, but they do not 
stand on the same footing as existing resources because they have 
not marinated as long in their viewers' consciousness and feelings. 
Accordingly, whether community groups will scorn a new entrant, as 
244. See N. EVENSON, supra note 84, at 9 .  
245. See Copetas, Trashtimefor Zurich, ESQUIRE, July 198 1 ,  at  44. 
246. Id. at 46-47. 
247. Id. at 50. 
248. N. EVENSON, supra note 84, at 69 (quoting Menebrea, Les Enseignements du Vieux 
Pon/ Neuf, URBANISME, Nov.-Dec. 1932, at 226). 
249. See A. HUXTABLE, supra note 3 1 ,  at 266-69. 
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the Committee of Three Hundred did the Eiffel Tower, depends on 
whether they experience its associations as harmonious or dissonant 
with those of its correlative existing resource. Recall that the Com­
mittee's objection to the Tower was stated in its question: "Is Paris 
going to be associated with the grotesque mercantile imaginings of a 
constructor of machines . . . ?"25o 
C. Current Legal-Aesthetic Theory's Dilemmas Revisited 
Because visual beauty-based aesthetic theory starts with the 
wrong question, it becomes mired in dilemmas that it can resolve 
only partially or not at all. The proper question is not the one it asks 
- "What is beauty?" - but the one posed by stability reasoning -
"Why do environmental resources ground aesthetic responses that, 
in turn, give rise to the pleasurable emotions connoted by the term 
beauty?" As a concept, beauty affords no answer to this question. 
However, stability reasoning does, positing that these emotions are 
ground�d, first, in cultural stability-identity bonds between existing 
resources and their constituencies, and, second, in the judgment that 
proposed new entrants and existing resources will be associationally 
harmonious. Given these premises, stability reasoning demonstrates 
that the dilemmas of visual beauty reasoning are preordained by its 
conceptual incoherency. 
1 .  Standards Dilemma 
To illustrate, the visual beauty rationale's search for standards, 
defined as obj ective canons of aesthetic formalism, is both unneces­
sary and futile. Associational harmony,25 1 not visual beauty, is what 
250. See N. EVENSON, supra note 84, at 132 (emphasis added). 
25 1 .  The associationist theory of beauty, i.e., the position that objects are often defined .as 
beautiful on the basis of associations that viewers have with them that are not necessarily 
related to the object's formal aesthetic qualities, has received the attention of psychologists, 
sociologists, and social commentators for at least two centuries. The most thoughtful British 
exponent of the theory is A. ALLISON, ESSAYS ON THE NATURE AND PRINCIPLES OF TASTE (6th 
ed. Edinburgh 1 827) ( 1 st ed. Edinburgh 1790), whose approach, Beardsley comments, "repre­
sents an abandonment of the persistent attempt to discover a neat formula for the perceptual 
conditions of beauty, and opens up the possibility of an indefinite range of beauties." M. 
B EARDSLEY, supra note 141,  at 204. Thorstein Veblen relied on an associationist linkage_�­tween "beauty" and "conspicuous consumption" in penning a devastating attack on the arusuc 
and architectural preferences of the wealthy classes of his time. For his architectural analys�, 
which describes "the fronts presented by the better class of tenements and apartment houses_ 
m 
our cities . . .  " as "an endless variety of architectural distress and of suggestions of expen�ive 
discomfort" and concludes that "(c]onsidered as objects of beauty, the dead walls on the sides 
and back of these structures, left untouched by the hands of the artist, arc commonly the best 
feature of the building," see T. VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 154 (1912). 
Herbert Gans's study of taste formation, see H. GANS, POPULAR CULTURE AND H10� Cu�­
TURE (1974), also employs associationist theory as a basis for I.inking particulai: a�lh;eUc pre -
erences with what he terms specific "taste publics." Whether or not the associat1orust theory 
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community groups primarily seek from aesthetic regulation, and 
standards of aesthetic formalism cannot be authoritatively rendered 
as objective, ontologically based "laws." Similarly misconceived are 
the premises that aesthetic regulation's standards must be as refined 
as those of the museum, and that their object is to create a beautiful 
environment. Instead, these standards are derived - or should be 
derived - from a profile of the characteristics of the existing re­
source that have generated the associational bonds between it and its 
constituencies. These standards are derivative rather than creative 
in nature, and they typically deal with the broader constancies of 
urban and natural form, not with their details.252 
The error of basing standards on sensory or physiological factors 
is equally apparent. While physiological factors play a role in how 
community groups experience existing resources and new entrants, 
so too do the intellects and feelings of the groups' members. Once 
intellects and feelings are acknowledged, however, it is impossible to 
deny that aesthetic response is necessarily subjective, in that re­
sponses are shaped by time, culture, habituation, and personal 
history. 
Visual beauty reasoning's semantic fallacy also results from the 
false question with which it begins. One of its versions predicates 
beauty on the visual form of an environmental resource considered 
as an isolated work of art; the second, on that form in relation to the 
visual form of the other resources within the protected resource's 
perceptual field. The first version impossibly burdens the standards­
setter. Even if beauty could be accounted for by formal rules of pro­
portion, color, line, and interval, the possible combinations of these 
elements are infinite. 253 How can the standards-setter hope to cate­
gorize them, let alone to select which among them are beautiful and 
which are not? The number of possible combinations is reduced 
under the second version, but the range of possible choices remains 
large, as illustrated by the challenge of fixing standards that ensure 
the "beauty" of the Manhattan skyline. 
Because stability reasoning dispenses with idealized visions of 
beauty, it reduces drastically the number of possible choices. It be­
gins by taking specific existing resources as the framework for con-
adequately explains "museum aesthetics" is a question on which I have been deliberately silent 
because "museum" and "legal aesthetics" raise entirely different issues, in my judgment. 
252. See text at notes 294·95 infra. 
253. See E. GoMBRICH, supra note 130, at 72-73; cf. C. ALEXANDER, supra note 23 1,  at 22-
27 (asserting that the search for a "good fit," ie. ,  ideal forum, is highlighted by the infinite 
possibilities of incongruity in size and color). 
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trols on correlative new entrants. That framework is further 
narrowed by focusing on those of the existing resource's visual char­
acteristics that ground the associations that caused it to be selected 
for preservation.254 Had these steps been followed in the Rice Man­
sion dispute, they would have indicated a straightforward and man­
ageable solution: namely, revising the West Side's zoning to ensure 
that, within reasonable margins, new entrants respect the neighbor­
hood's prevailing bulk, height, and scale relationships, as the pro­
posed thirty-story tower obviously did not do. 
The special case of landmarks and historic districts is consistent 
with the view that aesthetic regulation's standards are association-
254. Professor Alexander offers a parallel analysis and approach in his treatment of the 
terms "fitness" and "unfitness" as they bear on design, functionally defined. See C. ALEXAN­
DER, supra note 23 1, at 22-30. He posits that good design or, as he puts it, "good fit," can never 
be defined abstractly or positively because the variables bearing on it are infinite. See id. at 24-
25. But it can be negatively defined by identifying the elements that fit or fail to fit with the 
context in which the design problem arises. See id at 22. Whether a design is a fit or a misfit, 
therefore, can be determined by evaluating its congruency with the context in which it will 
function. See id at 26. He notes that "even in everyday life the concept of good fit, though 
positive in meaning, seems very largely to feed on negative instances; it is the aspects of our 
lives which are . . .  incongruous . . .  or out of tune that catch our attention." Id at 22. 
Much the same can be said about the "design problem" that aesthetic regulation poses if 
nonfunctional design is substituted for Alexander's functional design and the terms "beauti­
ful" and "ugly," for "fitness" and "unfitness." Aesthetic regulation cannot define beauty ab­
stractly or affirmatively. See text at notes 128-79 supra. Rather, the "beauty" of an existing 
resource is a societal given established by the bonds that have evolved over time between the 
resource's nonfunctional associations and community groups. Once selected for protection, 
the existing resource becomes the context against which harmony or dissonance is determined, 
a process for which beauty in the abstract is superfluous. Absent the existing resource as con­
text and the concept of dissonance as the pertinent yardstick, aesthetic regulation would be 
impossible because, to quote Alexander, the law would be "searching for some kind of har­
mony between two intangibles: a form [in fact provided by the new entrant} which we have 
not yet designed, and a context [in fact provided by the existing resource} which we cannot 
properly describe." C. ALEXANDER, supra note 23 1, at 26. 
Practical confirmation of this analysis is found both in the standards that aesthetic meas­
ures employ to regulate new entrants and in the manner in which challenges to specific aes­
thetic programs are frequently framed. Standards regulating new entrants are invaria�ly 
derived from a profile of the visual qualities of the existing resource. See, e.g. , Maher v. City 
of New Orleans, 5 16 F.2d 105 1 ,  1 062-63 (5th Cir. 1975) (Creole architectural style of french 
Quarter), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 ( 1976); La Salle Natl. Bank v. City of Evanston, 57 Ill. 
App. 2d 4 15, 432, 3 12  N.E.2d 625, 634 ( 1974) (tapered silhouette of skyline running from 
Evanston's downtown to its Lake Michigan shorefront). Litigation challenging bans on new 
entrants frequently features the claim that the existing resource has no discernible character, 
ie. , provides no context, against which the new entrant's harmony or dissonance may be �­
sessed. See, e.g. , Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, IOI S. Ct. 2882, 2893-94 (1981) (bill­
boards not incompatible with commercial and industrial districts because the latter lack a 
character with which the billboards can arguably be said to clash); Hankins v. Borough of 
Rockleigh, 55 N.J. Super. 132, 1 36-38, 1 50 A.2d 63, 67 (1959) (ordinance intended to preserve 
"Early American" character of borough irrational because over half of existing buildings �e 
not of that character); if. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 83 1 (2d Cir. 1972) (detention 
facility not incompatible with a high-density commercial apartment area) ("Absent �me 
showing that an entire neighborhood is in the -process of redevelopment, its existin_g envir�?­
ment, though frequently below an ideal standard, represents a norm that cannot be ignored. ), 
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 ( 1973). 
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rather than beauty-based. Visual beauty reasoning fails to explain 
the apparent anomaly that many landmarks and historic districts are 
not described as beautiful by their supporters.255 Stability reasoning 
explains not only their designation but also the designation of others 
that exemplify the canons of past traditions of aesthetic formalism. 
Underlying these designations are associational bonds between the 
resource and community groups. The Chicago Water Tower, for ex­
ample, was the sole survivor of the Great Fire of 1 87 1  in its area; 
Chicagoans esteem it as a symbol of the City's triumph over that 
catastrophe. Likewise, most New Yorkers treasure the "architectural 
melange" of the Greenwich Village Historic District not for the me­
lange as such, but for the Village's indelible associations as the 
center of bohemian artistic life in America. 
Landmarks and historic districts exemplifying traditional styles 
are designated because these styles are sources of associations that go 
back for generations or centuries, offering the fullest play for imagi­
nation, fantasy, and specious romanticism. Walter Kidney's study of 
eclecticism in American architecture from 1 880 to 1 930 supports this 
conclusion: He attributes the readiness of Americans to build in the 
motifs of past styles not only to their belief that these styles are 
"beautiful," but also to the fact that they are ':freighted with historical 
associations that every cultured person was familiar with ;"256 "When 
style was thus determined," he continues in a wonderfully evocative 
passage, 
a house was usually Georgian, Tudor, or Cotswold (Anglo-Saxon 
home atmosphere), unless it was a mansion and intended to look like 
one, in which case it might have been Jacobean or one of the Louis 
(aristocracy of wealth). A church - if not colonial - would, for an 
old and ritualistic sect, be Gothic (Christian heritage); if it was for 
some new sect, like the Christian Scientists, it might be decently but 
noncommittally wrapped in something classical. A synagogue, in the 
absence of a true Hebraic architecture, was usually Byzantine or Moor­
ish . . . . A school was Tudor or Jacobean (Oxford, Eton). A theater 
was either Louis XV (courtly diversions) or - especially if a movie 
house - something utterly fantastic, with some sort o f  high-pressure 
Mediterranean Baroque providing the norm (palace of illusions). For 
the center city, classicism was long the near-universal solution; a clus­
ter of styles, rather than a single style, it clothed the museum, the li­
brary, the memorial structure in cool eternal beauty, but broke into 
rustications, ressauts, and swags, giant orders and Renaissance cornices 
for the more worldly office buildings, the bank, the apartment house, 
255. See text at note 167 supra. 
256. W. KIDNEY, supra note 1 16, at 2 (emphasis added). 
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the theater, the clubhouse, and the town mansion . 257 
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A better core catalogue of the types of buildings now on the agenda 
of every historic preservation commission in America cannot be 
found. 
2. Social Interest .Dilemma 
What is the social harm that aesthetic regulation seeks to pre­
vent? Visual beauty reasoning either provides no response or, by 
addressing itself to the creation or preservation of a visually beauti­
ful environment, misconceives aesthetic regulation's purpose. Sta­
bility reasoning, on the other hand, locates that response in the 
preservation of the reciprocal values of cultural stability and iden­
tity. Additionally, stability reasoning furnishes a basis for linking its 
response to aesthetic regulation's "secondary effects." Both the mid­
dle and modem period courts recognized that aesthetic regulation is 
not unrelated to other police power objectives such as property value 
maintenance, increased tourism, and prevention of neighborhood 
deterioration.258 But the middle period courts went astray by claim­
ing that aesthetic regulation invariably produces these effects even 
though the constancy of the claimed relationship is by no means 
guaranteed. 259 Stability reasoning takes a different tack by distin­
guishing between the preservation of cultural stability and identity 
as aesthetic regulation's primary social impetus and these secondary 
effects as its probable, but not inevitable, concomitants. 
3. Aesthetic v. Land Use-Environmental Regulation .Dilemma 
Visual beauty reasoning sharply distinguishes between aesthetic 
and land use-environmental regulation because pursuit of visual 
beauty bears no apparent relation to the goal conventionally 
ascribed to the latter pair - preventing physical or economic harms 
resulting from proposed development's negative externalities. But 
this distinction is not so sharp. Both types of regulation are manip�­
lated by contending groups to control the pace and character of envi­
ronmental change. Measures deemed "aesthetic" by the courts, 
moreover, are often clothed in traditional land use and environmen­
tal garb. The Supreme Court, for example, has applied this label to 
urban renewal, 260 zoning to control the location of pornographic the-
257. Id. 
258. See text at notes 5 1  & 208-09 supra. 
259. See text at notes 207- 1 6  supra. 
260. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 ( 1954). 
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aters26 1 or of live nude dancing, 262 and environmental measures os­
tensibly addressed to ecological goals.263 Conversely, the Advisory 
Council on Historic Preservation has lauded preservation for its role 
in controlling crime, furthering energy conservation, stabilizing 
property values, and revitalizing neighborhoods. 264 In addition, the 
Court has taken the dramatic step of merging the two types of regu­
lation under the single "quality of life" banner.265 
These developments cannot be satisfactorily explained by visual 
beauty reasoning or by traditional externalities analysis. By distin­
guishing between nonfunctional and functional associations, on the 
other hand, stability reasoning illuminates why they have occurred 
and why it is difficult to untangle the two types of regulation. In its 
purest form, aesthetic regulation is called into being by the nonfunc­
tional associations of resources. The Water Tower was designated as 
a landmark because it symbolizes Chicago's survival, not because it 
is a waterworks. Nonaesthetic land use and environmental regula­
tion in its purest form deals with a resource's functions and its func­
tional associations. The high-rise is zoned out of the low-scale 
neighborhood because it will overload roads and sewers, not because 
it is an "ant heap," "megalith," or an "East Side building." 
But "pure" forms of anything are seldom encountered in nature 
and even less so in a reality of social constructs. Even if policy-mak­
ers might wish to do so, it is virtually impossible to regulate the envi­
ronment based on functions and functional associations without 
impinging on nonfunctional associations as well. The wedding cake 
form of New York City's pre- 1961  zoning, for example, is a product 
of its planners' efforts to bring more light and air to the streets. It 
does not derive from a mystical attachment to the ziggurat. As any 
tourist poster of the city illustrates, however, nothing characterizes 
its visual-associational image more than its ziggurat-punctured sky­
line. The converse is true as well. Preserving the Rice Mansion as a 
landmark or the French Quarter as a historic district maintains the 
nonfunctional associations of both. But it also precludes other forms 
of development that community groups might oppose on functional 
grounds that are entirely separable from their desire to retain these 
nonfunctional asociations. 
The line dividing the two types of associations wavers, moreover, 
26 1 .  Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 ( 1 976). 
262. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, IOI S. Ct. 21 76 (198 1). 
263. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
264. See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, supra note 210. 
265. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 108 (1 978). 
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especially for the apprehensive or hopeful. Community activists may 
say and perhaps believe that they oppose a high-rise building be­
cause of its functional character while the objection actually traces to 
some mix of its assumed functional and perceived nonfunctional as­
sociations. Board No. 7 opposed the thirty-story tower on both 
counts. Conversely, designating a building as a landmark may be 
urged less from attachment to it than from fear of the new entrant's 
functional implications. 
To complicate matters still further, associations termed "non­
functional" for semiotic purposes may be entirely functional from 
other vantage points. The shared perception that a new entrant - a 
concentration of adult theaters, for example - "pillages," "contami­
nates,'' or "rapes" may lead to group behavior consistent with the 
perception whether or not it is rooted in a real world linkage in­
dependent of that perception. The converse is true as well. A sym­
bolic public act - designation of an area as a historic district or a 
modest tree-planting program - may create group expectations of 
neighborhood revitalization or gentrification that in tum are fulfilled 
because of the perception that the area is on its way up. 
The "functional" role played by nonfunctional associations ex­
plains why aesthetic regulation may reinforce other police power 
goals. It also grounds one of aesthetic policy-making's most intracta­
ble genuine dilemmas: To what extent, if any, should legislative or 
judicial endorsement of an aesthetic measure require evidence, in­
dependent of the community's perception, that the ills a measure 
seeks to prevent or the benefits it is intended to secure would or 
would not occur absent its approval?266 
V. CULTURAL STABILITY RATIONALE: A DEFENSIBLE BASIS FOR 
AESTHETIC REGULATION? 
If the cultural stability hypothesis accurately defines aesthetic 
regulation's social impetus, does it follow that the impetus is one th�t 
aesthetic policy and aesthetic jurisprudence should honor? A posi­
tive response for either is by no means self-evident. 
Writers who concur that the visual environment is also a semiotic 
environment have expressed profound philosophical and social ob­
jections to preservation. Although Lewis Mumford, for example, . f h t d "267 views the city as the "best organ o memory man as yet crea e , 
he rejects historic preservation on the bases that the artifacts it safe-
266. See text at notes 306-1 9, 371-78 infra. 
267. L. MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY, supra note 1 1 6, at 562. 
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guards "are completely irrelevant to our beliefs and demands,"268 
and that "the city itself, as a living environment, must not be con­
demned to serve the specialized purposes of the museum."269 Kevin 
Lynch, who describes the environment as a "vast mnemonic system 
for the retention of group history and ideals,"270 nevertheless warns 
against the "danger" that "the preservation of the environment 
[may] encapsulate some image of the past . . � that may in time 
prove to be mythical or irrelevant [because] preservation is not siin­
ply the saving of old things but the maintaining of a response to 
those things."27 1 He turns preservation on its head by advising that 
its purpose should be "to make visible the process of change ,"272 and 
makes preservationists shudder with such phrases as the need for 
"self-terminating environment[s],"273 "disposal of the irrelevant 
past,"274 and "creative . . .  demolition."275 
However one views these contentions, they illustrate a crucial 
premise of this section: namely, a community's decision to preserve is 
not preordained but is a se!fdejining political and cultural choice whose 
validity must ultimately rest on its compatibility with shared community 
values. 276 The section also reflects my judgment that the choice to 
preserve, whether or not philosophically or culturally wise, poses no 
justiciable issue for the courts as long as the stability-identity interest 
is properly accommodated with constitutional values.277 The values 
discussed in this section are the three considered earlier in assessing 
the visual beauty rationale.278 Neither comprehensive nor definitive 
in scope or intent, the discussion seeks "chiefly [to start] a lot of hares 
268. THE CULTURE OF CITIES, supra note 1 16, at 438. 
269. Id at 446. 
270. K. LYNCH, supra note 1 1 6, at 126. 
271.  K. LYNCH, supra note 236, at 53.  
272. Id at 57 (emphasis added). 
273. Id at 1 12. 
274. Id at 1 16. 
275. Id at 57. 
276. See note 80 supra. 
277. This review of the relationship between aesthetic policy and court-applied law is by 
no means exhaustive because, as noted in text, a measure that satisfies that law's strictures is 
not necessarily a "wise" measure from a broader social policy perspective. I have in progress a 
study exploring some of the broader policy issues that space limitations preclude me from 
addressing in this Article. In addition to the Mumford and Lynch works cited above, other 
studies that constitute rich sources for that study include, e.g. , G. BANZ, ELEMENTS OF URBAN 
FORM ( 1 970); H. GANS, supra note 20; E. GOMBRICH, supra note 149; A. KUTCHER, THE NEW 
JERUSALEM ( 1973); J. ORTEGA y GASSET, supra note 33; R. SENNETT, THE USES OF DISORDER 
( 1970); T. VEBLEN, supra note 25 1 ;  R. VENTURI, D. BROWN & s. JZENOUR, supra note 33. 
278. See Part III (C) supra. 
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for people to chase,"279 and thus to coax the law-aesthetics debate in 
a direction that identifies and responds to real rather than imagined 
dilemmas. 
A. Standards 
Nothing more graphically illustrates the artificiality of that de­
bate than the standards issue. The visual beauty rationale's premise 
that standards must be based on "objective" canons of aesthetic for­
malism not only slights the important issues in legal-aesthetic con­
troversies, but also renders the definition of intelligible standards 
impossible. Stability reasoning, in contrast, premises that aesthetic 
standards find their source in intersubjective patterns of community 
preference. 280 If definable at all, these standards must be linked to 
the visual-semiotic context afforded by a particular existing 
resource. 28 1 
The aesthetics standards-setter must cope with a variety of con­
straints. The "clarity" of these standards is not a linguistic absolute 
but a practical trade-off among a variety of factors - the limitations 
of language, particularly as the latter is further cramped by its use 
for legal purposes; the depth of the community's conviction that reg­
ulation is necessary; the clarity or opaqueness of the purposes that 
the community expects regulation to achieve; the characteristics of 
the community and the resources in question; and the degree of pre­
cision necessary for regulation to achieve its purpose. Only if these 
trade-offs can be accommodated in a manner that produces stan­
dards meeting the threshold of intelligibility discussed earlier282 
should the regulatory enterprise go ahead. But that threshold, it 
must be emphasized, is not fixed independently of the variables with 
which the standards-setter must deal. As opinions in other fields 
point up, 283 courts view linguistically vague standards sympatheti-
279. Alfred North Whitehead on William James's pragmatism, quoted in S. LANGER, mpra 
note 1 30, at viii. 
280. See text at notes 80 supra, and 286 infra. 
28 1 .  See, e.g. Ely v. Velde, 45 1 F.2d 1 130, 1 138 (4th Cir. 1 971); City of Miami Bea�� v. 
Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 484, 3 So. 2d 364, 366 ( 1941); General Outdoor AdvertJS1ng 
Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 1 49, 186, 149 N.E. 799, 816 (1935); Westfield 
Motor Sales Co. v. Town of Westfield, 129 N.J. Super. 528, 544, 324 A.2d 1 13, 122 (1974); 
McCormick v. Lawrence, 83 Misc. 2d 64, 67-68, 372 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159-60 (1975). 
282. See text at note 59 supra. 
283. In Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 ( 1944), the Court upheld the Emergency J>r!C( 
Control Act of 1942 despite vague enabling legislation. The Act empowered the �cc AdllllJI· 
istration to establish maximum commodity prices when those prices threatened to nsc above a 
level "inconsistent with . . .  [its] purpose." The price level set by the Administration was to.be 
fair and equitable, consistent with the purposes of the Act, set forth in § I. of the A� as. 'to 
stabilize prices . . . [and] prevent speculative, unwarranted, and abnormal mcreascs ll1 pnces 
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cally if the object of the regulation is socially compelling. 
These constraints reveal why aesthetic regulation is problematic 
even if standards-setting is pursued on an a posteriori rather than a 
priori basis. Legal language is often a clumsy medium for encapsu­
lating visual-semiotic values. Louis Sullivan advised that art "will 
not live in a cage of words;"284 in design matters "there is a vast 
domain lying just beyond the reach of words" which can be plumbed 
only by thinking "in terms of images, of pictures, of states of feeling, 
of rhythm."285 Community groups are often confused or disingenu­
ous about the goals of aesthetic regulation: they may not know what 
they really want, or they may decline to express their desires clearly 
lest other groups find them unpalatable. In either case, it is difficult 
to determine whether their demands reflect shared community val­
ues or the values of a narrow elite. 
The United States, moreover, is not a homogeneous "design com­
munity," but a myriad of "design communities," some knowledgea­
ble about and deeply committed to particular design outcomes, 
others indifferent to them. The advent of a downtown skyscraper is 
a matter of vehement debate and attentive media coverage in San 
Francisco or Honolulu, but goes ignored by all but a small design 
coterie in New York City. The environmental resources controlled 
by aesthetic regulation also vary in character. Illustrative are the dif­
ferences between the San Francisco Bay, the midtown Manhattan 
skyline, billboards along interstate highways, and junkyards at the 
outskirts of a suburb. Finally, the exactitude required of aesthetic 
standards is variable as well. How precise standards should or 
should not be is a function not only of the character of the resource 
being controlled but of the expectations of the resource's constitu­
ency and of the capabilities of legal institutions to implement them. 
These complexities prompt the conclusion that intelligible stan­
dards are no more achievable under the stability-identity than under 
and rents . . . .  " Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § l (a), 56 Stat. 23. Chief Justice 
Stone, in the majority opinion, found the standards to be sufficiently precise. "The standards 
prescribed by the present Act, with the aid of the 'statement of considerations' required to be 
made by the Administrator, are sufficiently definite and precise to enable Congress, the courts 
and the public to ascertain whether the Administrator, in fixing the designated prices, has 
conformed to those standards." 321 U.S. at 426. This is not an isolated example of judicial 
deference to vague legislative standards. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 3 1 9  
U.S. 190 ( 1943) (upholding the "public convenience, interest, or necessity" standard of§ 303 of 
the Communications Act of 1934 as a sufficiently concrete standard); Amalgamated Meat Cut­
ters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 197 1)  (upholding the Economic Stabilization Act of 
1970 despite a lack of concrete standards guiding the delegation of legislative power). See 
generally B.  SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. §§ 15-18 (1976). 
284. L. SULLIVAN, mpra note 32, at 1 39. 
285. Id at 50. 
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the visual beauty approach. I have no hesitation in conceding that, 
depending upon the demands in question, this conclusion may in­
deed be correct, and in agreeing that when it is, legal institutions 
should not honor the demands. But the position that intelligible 
standards may be formulable under appropriate conditions hardly 
requires proof that public ordering must be capable of implementing 
al/ aesthetically based demands. The inquiry proposed here is nar­
rower and more practical: When legal institutions are asked to en­
dorse a specific demand, what factors should they consider in 
assessing whether it is confinable by intelligible standards? Stability 
reasoning's response can best be outlined by distinguishing between 
the challenge that the standards issue presents, first, for legislators, as 
the aesthetic regulation system's principal policy-makers, and, then, 
for the courts, as the arbiters of the standards' adequacy. 
1 .  Standards and Aesthetic Po/icy-Making 
Stability reasoning endorses aesthetic initiatives only if certain 
conditions are satisfied. First, the policy-maker must determine that 
associational bonds exist between an existing resource and commu­
nity groups and that the resource's protection will advance shared 
community stability-identity values and may further desirable or 
prevent undesirable "secondary effects." Second, criteria for con­
trolling new entrants must be derivable from those features of the 
existing resource's visual-semiotic character that account for the 
community's attachment to it. Finally, these criteria must be ren­
dered as standards that are sensitive to the legitimate needs of af­
fected property owners, administrative agencies, and reviewing 
courts. 
At the outset, policy-makers must recognize that the process by 
which environmental features or settings become "existing re­
sources" is extralegal, often turning upon serendipitous historical or 
cultural factors. What were once called "swamps," for example, are 
now called "wetlands." Dismissed for seventy-five years as a grimy 
factory district, New York City's Soho is now treasured by artists, 
tourists, and preservationists for its cast-iron architecture and spa­
cious lofts. Once these resources are called to their attention, policy­
makers should examine the claimed associational bonds between the 
resource and the community to determine whether protecting the re­
source will advance community-wide identity and stability values. 
These determinations, like decisions made in every other field of reg­
ulatory law, are inherently judgmental and hence vulnerable to e�­
ror. The issue for aesthetic regulation, as for these other fields, is 
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whether the risks of error are acceptable. Two factors suggest that 
these risks can be acceptably contained !(policy-makers choose their 
targets properly and impose legislative discipline on the regulatory re.­
gimes they author. 
First, policy-makers should require a plausible showing that the 
claimed associational bonds and stability-identity interest represent 
community values. If the "objectivity" of aesthetic standards resides 
in their consistency with patterns of community preference, the in­
quiry should focus upon the prevalence or absence of these patterns. 
Frequently, it can confidently be resolved one way or the other. 
Community preferences favoring billboard controls286 or preserva­
tion of historical-architectural ensembles such as the French Quar­
ter287 can be compared with one design critic's prescription that the 
skylines of America's "historic" cities should be "preserved" as na­
tional monuments. 288 Other proposals will fall somewhere in be­
tween. In every case, policy-makers should presume that public 
intervention is inadvisable, modifying that presumption only if the 
evidence marshalled · through hearings, staff studies, and similar 
sources substantiates the claimed concordance of the initiative with 
actual or reasonably likely community-wide preferences. The in­
quiry, in short, should parallel the one regularly conducted by legis­
lators in the zoning289 and eminent domain290 fields to determine 
286. The opinions in United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. I, 198 
A.2d 447 ( 1964), illustrate that only those uses or activities that are offensive or attractive to 
broad segments of the community may be addressed in aesthetic legislation. According to the 
majority, this regulation is appropriate in areas in which "concepts of congruity [are] held so 
widely that they are inseparable from the enjoyment and hence the value of property." 42 N.J. 
at 5, 198 A.2d at 499. Justice Hall's dissent states: 
Beauty and taste are almost impossible to legislate affirmatively on any very broad scale 
because they are generally such subjective and individual things, not easily susceptible of 
objective, non-arbitrary standards . . . . It would seem [however] that the approach 
could validly be made and legislation sustained squarely on this basis at least with respect 
to the prohibition or strict regulation of those activities or conditions which a court can 
find that practically everyone agrees are non-beautiful in their particular environment, so 
long as more important values are not overridden . . . . And I think a court can properly 
say we have reached that point with respect to outdoor advertising signs in many settings 
. . . . The situation has become one of the "concepts of congruity held so widely," as the 
majority puts it. 
42 N.J. at 1 1-1 2, 198 A.2d at 452 (Hall, J., dissenting). Significantly, the billboard legislation 
sustained in General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 1 49, 
193 N.E. 799 (1935), was enacted pursuant to an amendment to the Massachusetts constitution 
resulting from earlier Massachusetts decisions questioning the constitutionality of such meas­
ures. 289 Mass. at 158-59, 193 N.E. at 803-04. 
287. See Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 105 1 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 
U.S. 905 (1976). The legislation establishing the Vieux Carre (French Quarter) Historic Dis­
trict is based upon an amendment to the Louisiana constitution approved by that state's voters. 
See 516 F.2d at 1062 n.58. 
288. See note 84 supra. 
289. See, e.g. , Bartram v. City of Bridgeport, 136 Conn. 89, 68 A.2d 308 (1949); Dalton v. 
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whether a proposed initiative accords with a "public" purpose or 
merely advances the "private" interest of an individual or a group. 
Concededly, my suggestion will deny legal protection to many 
resources that some citizens believe merit protection. Given aes­
thetic regulation's obvious risks, however, the ·trade-off is both neces­
sary and prudent. Legislative determinations that an environmental 
feature or setting merits status as an "existing resource" and that its 
preservation presumptively advances community-wide values are es­
sentially unreviewable by the courts.291 If the legislature approves 
these claims perfunctorily, a much-needed source of discipline for 
the aesthetic regulation system will be forfeited. 
Second, the criteria that policy-makers and administrators use to 
regulate new entrants can further confine the risk of arbitrariness. 
Stability reasoning's identification of the pairing (existing resource­
new entrant) phenomenon as a constant of aesthetic controversies 
suggests that this phase of the standards-setting task may be less 
problematic than normally supposed, provided that there is an articul­
able visual-semiotic basis for the new entrant's claimed associational 
dissonance with the existing resource. Because visual-semiotic fea­
tures are object-based, public planners can and often do profile them 
neutrally. 292 To illustrate, San Franciscans are deeply attached to 
their city's image as one of hills descending gracefully to its Bay. 
This attachment, of course, is entirely subjective. But the criteria 
necessary to ensure that new entrants do not mar this image can be 
stated in terms of topographic, engineering, and other objective data 
and standards. Similarly, Board No. 7's perception of the thirty­
story apartment tower as an "East Side building" is rife with subjec­
tive connotations. But zoning controls that would preclude the tower 
and other buildings like it from upsetting the West Side's prevailing 
height, bulk, and scale constancies - and the West Siders' tranquil-
City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 400, 462 P.2d 199 ( 1969); Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 
463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 ( 1968). 
290. See, e.g. , Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. 
City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981); Price v. Philadelphia Parking Auth., 
422 Pa. 3 17, 221 A.2d 1 38 (1966). 
291 .  See text at note 298 infra. 
292. Outstanding illustrations of the type of background studies that provide a basis for 
such standards include, e.g. ' J. BARNETI', URBAN DESIGN AS PuBLIC POLICY (1974) (New 
York City); M. CoRBETI, supra note 157 (San Francisco); A. JACOBS, MAKING CITY PLAN· 
NING WORK (1968) (San Francisco); A. KUTCHER, supra note 277 (Jerusalem). See generally 
K. LYNCH, supra note 1 16. 
Favorable judicial responses to standards prepared on the basis of careful profiles of an 
existing context include, e.g. , Maher v. City of New Orleans, 5 16 F.2d !051 (1975) (French 
Quarter), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 ( 1 976); A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 258 
S.E.2d 444 (1979) (Oakwood Historic District). 
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ity about the preservation of their lifestyle - can also be based on 
objective standards. The same comments apply to billboards, junk­
yards, and a wide variety of other new entrants. However "subjec� 
tive" the factors accounting for patterns of community preference 
may be, technically competent planning staffs will often be able to 
devise appropriate visual controls to mitigate or preclude the associ­
ational dissonance that new entrants create. 
The standards problem, therefore, is frequently more a conse­
quence of unresolved community conflicts concerning an aesthetic 
measure's purposes than of technical challenges planning staffs en­
counter in profiling an existing resource's features.293 When policy­
makers paper over or ignore these conflicts, they complicate the stan­
dards-setting task by foisting on administrators and courts issues 
that, if resolvable, should be addressed by themselves or, if not re­
solvable, should have precluded their endorsement of the measure in 
the first place. In my judgment, their failure to heed this admonition 
is the single greatest cause of the aesthetic regulation system's cur­
rent woes. 
The most workable standards, moreover, are those addressing the 
broader constancies of environmental form and context, not those 
controlling design details. Public intervention's goal, as Jonathan 
Barnett puts it, should be to "design the city, [rather than] the build­
ings."294 But this prescription does not mean that policy-makers 
must ignore meritorious initiatives. New entrants that violate these 
constancies are usually the ones that upset the community. The 
Mansion dispute illustrates that West Siders were worried about 
their neighborhood's bulk, scale, and height constancies, not about 
the proposed tower's design as "good" or "bad" architecture. As a 
general matter, the new entrant in aesthetics controversies is similar 
to the tower in this respect.295 If public intervention should be predi­
cated on its responsiveness to widespread citizen concerns, these con­
cerns are more likely to be experienced when contexts,  not details ,  
are threatened. After all, changes in contexts are more likely to en­
gage widespread community attention. 
These considerations explain why visual beauty reasoning's 
premise that legal-aesthetic standards parallel museum standards in 
refinement and quality is misplaced and unworkable. They presage 
as well the problems that have plagued landmark, historic district, 
293. See A. JACOBS, supra note 292; A. KUTCHER, supra note 277. 
294. J. BARNETT, supra note 292, at 1 86. 
295. See note 177 supra and examples mentioned in text at notes 99-107 supra. 
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and architectural control regimes that endeavor to control detail 
rather than, or in addition to, context. As the need for exactitude in 
standards increases, it becomes more difficult for the community to 
agree on their content or for public agencies to manage them. Ab­
sent genuine architectural unity, standards that control details are 
virtually impossible to set or administer.296 
At this point, one of aesthetic regulation's most trying second 
generation dilemmas arises. Intelligible standards can be defined 
only if the community's attachment to an existing resource can be 
rendered in terms of the resource's articulable visual-semiotic char­
acteristics. But suppose that the attachment relates instead to diffuse 
socially determined meanings that cannot be translated in this man­
ner. The social impetus for aesthetic regulation is often as forceful in 
the second case as in the first. B ut community groups, tastemakers, 
and other no-change constituencies generally focus on outcomes, not 
on process, and lobby vigorously for preservation in both cases. 
Principled policy-making demands, therefore, that legislators con­
sider the critical difference between the two cases. Their failure to 
do so has created the hornet's nest of problems outlined earlier: im­
proper diversion of planning responsibilities from one public agency 
to another; devolution of growth control powers to private elites; reg­
ulatory overkill resulting from the imposition of, e.g. , historic preser­
vation controls that regulate down to the doorknob when what is 
actually required are zoning controls respecting broader urban de­
sign constancies; and needless introduction of instability and sub­
stantial hidden costs into private land markets.297 
296. Illustrative is the designation of New York City's Upper East Side as a historic dis­
trict. Perhaps no section of the city is as socially distinctive as this area, known popularly as 
the "Silk Stocking District." Although subareas of the designated district undoubtedly do pos­
sess the unity of an architectural-visual ensemble and hence could ground intelligible stan­
dards, the district as a whole clearly does not. It was on this basis that the writer opposed the 
district before the City's Board of Estimate. See Statement in Opposition by 10 Bleecker Cor­
poration, Transcript of the Stenographic Record of the Discussion on Calendar No. 76, M_eet­ing of the Board of Estimate (Sept. IO, 198 1). The same observations apply to the City's 
Greenwich Village Historic District, which, as noted earlier, has properly been termed an "ar­
chitectural melange." See text at note 167 supra. Such examples manifest the deep!� trou_ble­some issues identified in text concerning the role of municipal landmark comm1ss1ons ID a 
city's overall land use control regime. 
297. Policy-makers can control for arbitrariness by keeping alert to the constraints that 
court-applied Jaw imposes upon aesthetic policy-making. Strictly speaking, that la� need _not address the standards issue as such to serve this purpose. It might, for example, assist po_licy­makers to determine whether an aesthetic initiative serves the "general welfare," defined either 
intra- or extramunicipally. Suppose, to borrow from two earlier examples, that adherents of 
New York City's Little Italy Special District advanced it to favor one ethnic group at the 
expense of another, or that the demands leading to Marin County's environmental control 
regime derived from the desire of the county's existing residents to exclude blacks by prevent­
ing the construction of additional housing in the county. Policy-makers who ap�rec�ate that 
equal protection strictures function in part to ensure the equity of regulations havmg mtra- or 
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2. Standards and A est he tic Jurisprudence 
439 
The courts' role in the standards-setting process is a reactive one. 
Courts do not fix the content of a community's aesthetic values, and 
they should not second-guess the legislature's j udgment that the 
challenged standards result from firm community attachment to an 
existing resource. Both separation of powers considerations and the 
judiciary's inability to assess these matters warrant a presumption of 
legislative validity.298 Once the legislators have written their script, 
however, the courts, as guardians of constitutional values, should ac­
tively evaluate it to ensure its internal coherency and the consistency 
of the regime implemented under it. 
An intelligible aesthetic measure specifies with reasonable clarity 
its purposes, the pertinent visual-semiotic characteristics of the ex­
isting resource, and the criteria governing the regulation of new en­
trants. Absent any one of these elements, affected landowners 
cannot conform their development plans to the measure, regulating 
agencies exercise unbridled discretion, and the courts have no yard­
stick to detect unprincipled regulatory decisions. 
Without a clear sense of a measure's purposes, a court cannot 
determine whether its standards are rational or its subsequent imple­
mentation falls within its intended purview. The court would thus 
be unable to discipline a landmark commission that used its historic 
districting powers to control growth rather than to advance more 
limited, bona fide preservation purposes.299 Absent reasonable spec­
ification of the existing resource's visual-semiotic properties, the 
court could not assess a restricted landowner's contention that an 
extramunicipal effects would, one hopes, spurn such demands. They would do so not simply 
because initiatives enacted with the intent and purpose of achieving the above goals would be 
vulnerable to judicial attack, see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 ( 1 977); note 28 supra, but also because the reason for the goals' vulnerabil­
ity is that the values they exemplify cannot be squared with community-wide values as the 
latter may be defined consistently with the fourteenth amendment. For a thoughtful evalua­
tion of the issues of intermunicipal equity posed by historic preservation, see Rose, supra note 
1 1 ,  at 478-79, 504-05, 5 12-17, 521 -24. 
298. See note 198 supra. 
The point in text is reflected in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of 
San Diego, I 0 I S. Ct. 2882 ( 1 98 1  ), from the Court's invalidation of San Diego's billboard ban. 
On the question of the role of the judge in reviewing the city's determination that billboards 
are unaesthetic, he stated: 
Nothing in my experience on the bench has led me to believe that a judge is in any better 
position than a city or county commission to make decisions in an area such as aesthetics. 
Therefore, little can be gained in the area of constitutional law, and much lost in the 
process of democratic decision making, by allowing individual judges . . . to second­
guess such legislative or administrative decisions. 
IOI  S. Ct. at 2925 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
299. See note 296 and text at notes 22-25 supra. 
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"existing resource" label has been pinned on a feature or setting 
whose character fails to support the label.300 Likewise, unless such 
terms as "congruent," "compatible," or "harmonious" are defined in 
terms of visual features that give rise to associational dissonance be­
tween the new entrant and the existing resource, neither landowners 
nor courts can determine why a proposed new entrant has or has not 
been approved.301 
The principles underlying these prescriptions are hombook law. 
It is all the more extraordinary, therefore, that most modem period 
courts have not policed aesthetic measures in accordance with 
them. 3o2 Certainly the courts should not ignore the practical trade­
offs that must be accommodated in setting aesthetic standards. But 
neither should they acquiesce in legislative or administrative viola­
tions of these principles, which ensure the fairness and rationality of 
aesthetic measures and the integrity of the aesthetic policy-making 
process itself. Surely these values would be better served if, instead 
of rubber-stamping indefensibly vague measures, the courts sent 
them back to their authors for the disciplined consideration that they 
require. 303 
300. See, e.g. , State ex rel City of West Palm Beach v. Duffey, 158 Fla. 886, 30 So. 2d 492 
(Fla. 1947); Morristown Road Assocs. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 163 N.J. Super. 58, 394 
A.2d 157 ( 1978); Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh, 55 N.J. Super. 132, 150 A.2d 63 (1959); cf 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, IOI S. Ct. 2882 ( 1981)  (billboards compatible with 
commercial and industrial districts because latter lack a character with which billboards can be 
said to clash). 
30 I .  See note 300 supra; note 254 supra and accompanying text. 
302. Commentary is unanimous on this point. See, e.g. , Kolis, supra note 60, at 286; Wil­
liams, supra note 46, at 2; Note, supra note 60, at 180. 
Among the host of cases that have approved standards that are indefensibly vague on the 
basis of the reasoning in text are those cited in note 23 supra . The obvious defect of such 
standards is that they cite the factor of incongruity without offering any profile of the charac­
teristics of the existing resource that afford a context against which the claimed incongruity of 
the new entrant can intelligibly be assessed. Absent reasonable specification of the context, 
whether in the legislative measure, administrative regulations, or published background stud­
ies, the incongruity standard is meaningless, as Professor Alexander has noted in a related 
discussion. See note 254 supra. 
303. The Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Va. 1980), illus­
trates that judges can do the job while respecting the constraints of the judiciary's role in the 
aesthetic regulation system. See text at notes 8 1 -83, 291, 298 supra. The subsequent history of 
the opinion, which is clearly the most thoughtful treatment of aesthetic regulation's due pre; 
cess dimension in this century, also illustrates how legislatures, responding to outcome-on­
ented special interest groups, often improperly discharge their policy-making role in that 
system. 
Challenged in Bergland was the Secretary of the Interior's designation of the 14,000 acre 
Historic Green Springs District as a National Historic Landmark under the Historic Sites, 
Buildings and Antiquities Act of 1935,current version at 16  U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1976 & Supp. 
II 1978) (Antiquities Act), and the District's listing on the National Register of Historic Places, 
36 C.F.R. § 60.2(d)(2) (1981). The Antiquities Act provides for the designation of "kis�orlC 
sites . . . of national significance for the inspiration and benefit of the people of the Umted 
States," (emphasis added). Its language is narrower than that of the National Historic Preser· 
vation Act of 1966, current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-4701 ( 1976, Supp. I 1977, Supp. II 1978 
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B. Substantive .Due Process 
Depending on how the issue is framed, the compatibility of the 
& Supp. III (1979), as amended by Act of March 12, 1 980, Pub. L. No. 96-205, Act of May I,. 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-244, Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-555, cod(fied al at U.S.C.A. 
§§ 469c-2-470w-6 (West Supp. 1981) (Preservation Act), which provides for the listing on the 
National Register of "districts . . .  significant in American . . .  archileclure . . .  and culture" 
16 U.S.C.A. § 470a(a)(l)(A) (West Supp. 1981) (emphasis added). In revoking the District's 
listing on the National Register and remanding the matter to the Secretary, Judge Merhige 
identified the following flaws, inter al1a, in the Secretary's actions: the Secretary's possible 
confusion of the broader criteria of the Preservation Act with the narrower criteria of the 
Antiquities Act, 497 F. Supp. at 846�47; the "paltry statement of reasons for the Secretary's 
actions," 497 F. Supp. at 847; the Secretary's failure to promulgate either "adequate substan­
tive criteria" defining a National Historic Landmark or designation and listing standards and 
procedures that protect land-owners' "important property [and] liberty interest[s]," 497 F. 
Supp. at 854, or "control agency discretion," 497 F. Supp. at 854. 
Judge Merhige summarized the "due process failings" of the Secretary's actions by 
observing: 
The Department [of the Interior] had no fixed procedures published in advance by which 
the Green Springs landowners could plan their response (to the designation]. Important 
information relied on by the Department was disclosed, if at all, in piecemeal fashion 
often after any opportunity for meaningful response had passed. Department officials 
made several off-the-record, undisclosed recommendations to the Secretary, but were un­
available for on-the-record questioning. Finally, the Secretary neglected to explain in 
sufficient detail the rationale underlying the designation decision. 
497 F. Supp. at 856. In remanding for promulgation of both substantive and procedural regu­
lations comporting with his opinion, Judge Mehrige "urge[d]" the Secretary 
not simply to codify the criteria and procedures developed informally in the instant case, 
but to articulate meaningful standards in as much detail as possible so that the Depart­
ment's efforts are channeled efficiently, the public may make a meaningful response, and, 
in the event further judicial review is necessary, a court may determine that the proper 
standards have been applied. 
497 F. Supp. at 857. 
While Bergland was on appeal to the Fourth Circuit, preservation lobbyists succeeded in 
persuading Congress to add the following language to § l O l (a)(l)(B) of the Preservation Act: 
All historic properties listed in the Federal Register of February 6, 1979, as "National 
Historic Landmarks" [the Historic Green Springs District was so listed] . . . are declared 
by Congress to be National Historic Landmarks of national historic significance as of 
their initial listing . . .  for the purposes of this act and the [Antiquities Act) . . . . 
National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-5 15, § 20l (a), 94 Stat. 
2987. A Senate Committee Report explained that the amendment was intended as a response 
to 
[r)ecent legal challenges to the National Historic Landmark program [which] have sug­
gested that landmarks have been designated by the Secretary by inadequate procedures 
and beyond the scope of the (Antiquities Act] with respect to districts of architectural 
merit and other historic qualities not mentioned in the [Antiquities Act]. The definition of 
historic values contained in the [Preservation Act], as amended, is equally applicable to 
the historic values sought to be preserved by the [Antiquities Act], except for the latter's 
requirement of national historic significance. 
S. REP. No. 96-943, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. at 23 ( 1980). 
In response to the amendment, the Fourth Circuit remanded the proceedings to Judge 
Merhige. The Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd., No. 80- 1 822, No. 80-
1823 (4th Cir., order filed Jan. 27, 1981). Observing that "[t]he events that have occurred 
following the Court's [prior] judgment are somewhat out of the ordinary, and have left the case 
in an awkward stance," he held, contrary to the designation opponents' statutory interpretation 
argument that Congress did not intend to validate constitutionally infirm National Register 
listings, that "Congress intended that the Green Springs District . . . be designated in the 
National Register without further administrative action." But he also noted, ruefully one sus­
pects, that the opponents had failed to challenge the amendment's constitutionality, and that 
the "issue of whether the Department of the Interior need promulgate new regulations is now 
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cultural stability rationale with substantive due process presents both 
the least and the most troublesome dilemmas considered in this Arti­
cle. If the question is whether the preservation of stability-identity 
values is a proper police power concern, the question answers itself, 
as countless opinions hold304 and social theory confirms. 3os 
But the question can be posed in two other ways. First, should a 
category of "aesthetic hann"306 be recognized independent of the 
harms traditionally acknowledged by externalities analysis? Second, 
even if the validity of the stability-identity interest is conceded, is 
this interest "sufficiently substantial" to justify an aesthetic measure 
that impedes expression? 
For the better part of this century, courts and commentators have 
strained to rationalize land use regulation through externalities rea­
soning. This approach posits that the police power allows states to 
bar land uses that decrease the economic utility of neighboring 
properties or the economic welfare of the community. 3o7 In part, the 
position derives from the judgment of zoning's earliest supporters 
that only a property value rationale would withstand constitutional 
attack at a time when public restrictions on land use conflicted with 
moot," but warned that "should the Department seek to designate some other property not 
sheltered by the statute where circumstances similar to those found in the Court's prior opin· 
ion exist, it would have to comply with the conditions of the Court's prior order . . . .  " The 
Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. John Block, No. 77-0230-R, slip. op. at l (E.D. Va., July 20, 
1981). 
Although the Department has promulgated regulations, see 46 Fed. Reg. 56, 183, 56,209 
( 198 1)  (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §§ 60. 1 -60.6, 60.9, 60. 10, 60. 13-60. 15), the legality of which 
is as yet untested, the Bergland proceedings illustrate as forcefully as does New York City's 
Upper East Side Historic District designation, see notes 25 & 33 supra, the inattention to pro­
cess values of the nation's current aesthetic regulation system. To this observer, the system will 
remain seriously flawed until the fundamental process issues identified by Judge Merhige are 
addressed with candor and integrity by its participants, including, most pointedly, federal, 
state, and local legislators. 
304. See note 23 1 supra. 
305. See text at notes 223-50 supra. 
306. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981) . Justice Stevens 
also recognized in his dissenting opinion that the interests advanced by aesthetic measures -
in Metromedia, the billboard ban - "are both psychological and economic," IOI S. Ct. at 
2915, and that "(t]he character of the environment affects property values and the quality _of life . . . . " IOI S. Ct. at 2915. The statements of Justices White (who wrote the plurality 
opinion) and Stevens could be read, of course, simply as resuscitating the middle period view 
validating aesthetic regulation not because it advances aesthetic values, but because it supports 
such traditional police power goals as property value maintenance. See text at note 51  supra· 
A preferable and wholly defensible alternative is outlined in text at notes 258-66 supra. It 
recognizes, first, that aesthetics, defined in cultural stability terms, is an independent police 
power goal; second, that aesthetic regulation, so conceived, often, but not inevitably, advances 
traditional police power goals; and, third, when it does so, these advantages flow from t!te 
enhancement of stability-identity values insofar as that enhancement strengthens the "q�ality 
of life." This construction of Justice Stevens's language is substantiated by his reasonmg Ill 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See text at notes 347-52 infra. 
307. See text at note 64 supra. 
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the prevailing laissez-faire political philosophy.308 In part, it is the 
product of judicial reluctance to affirm that the prevention of psychic 
harm is a proper police power goal. 309 This reluctance is typified by 
Judge Cardozo's comment that "one of the unsettled questions of the 
law is the extent to which the concept of nuisance may be enlarged 
by legislation so as to give protection to sensibilities that are merely 
cultural or aesthetic."3 10 The position reappears today in the schizo­
phrenic modem period opinions, which extol zoning "solely for aes­
thetics" while hastening to point out that aesthetic regulation 
enhances property values. 3 1 1 
By explicitly identifying aesthetic regulation's purpose as the 
preservation of stability-identity values, stability reasoning frontally 
challenges the preemptive claims of traditional externalities reason­
ing. The challenge goes to both the factual and value premises of the 
economic approach. Its factual premise is that aesthetic measures 
invariably maintain or increase property values. In fact, the rela­
tionship between the two is by no means constant. The goal of pre­
serving stability-identity values does not coincide with the goal of 
preserving property values, and, indeed, may clash with it at times. 
308. See A. ALTSHULER, supra note 36, at 85-87; R. NELSON, supra note 22, at 28. 
309. The confused state of aesthetic jurisprudence in this century affords the most perti­
nent support for the proposition in text. . The "soft-look" NEPA opinions, see note 53 supra, 
are also pertinent, as evidenced particularly by the statement in Hanly v. Kleindeinst, 47 1 F.2d 
823, 833 (2d Cir. 1972), that "it is doubtful whether psychological or sociological effects upon 
neighbors constitute the type of factors that may be considered in making [a] determination [to 
prepare an environmental impact statement]." Also relevant is the sharp split among courts 
earlier in the century on the issue whether psychological harm could ground a private nuisance 
action. Compare Stotler v. Rochelle, 83 Kan. 86, 109 P. 798 ( 1 9 1 0) (cancer cottage); Street v. 
Marshall, 3 1 6  Mo. 698, 291 S.W. 494 ( 1 927) (funeral home); Everett v .  Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 
1 1 1  P. 879 ( 1 9 1 1) (tuberculosis sanitorium), with Stoddard v. Snodgrass, 1 17 Or. 262, 241 P. 73 
(1925) (funeral home); Houston Gas & Fuel Co. v. Harlow, 297 S.W. 570 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1927) (100- by 1 10-foot gas tank). The former group of cases held that the location of their 
respective uses in residential areas was a private nuisance; the latter, that it was not. The 
Street court summarizes the opposing contentions: 
[Defendant argues that] in order for . . .  [a funeral home] to constitute a nuisance, its 
character must be such as to directly affect the health or grossly offend the physical senses. 
This position is without support in the decided cases. While it is true that in many, if not 
all of them, the charge was made that the establishment complained of would communi­
cate contagion, and would emit noxious gases and offensive smells, such charges were 
almost universally found to be without substantial support in the evidence. A careful 
reading of the cases will disclose that what has been stressed . . . is this: Constant re­
minders of death . . . impair in a substantial way the comfort, repose, and enjoyment of 
the homes which are subject to them. 
316 Mo. at 705-06, 291 S.W. at 497. Everell puts the issue more briefly: ''The question is, not 
whether the fear is founded in science, but whether it exists; not whether it is imaginary, but 
whether it is real, in that it affects the movements and conduct of men." 6 1  Wash. at 5 1 , 1 1 1  P. 
at �80. Finally, it should be noted that dispute about the actionability of psychic harm is not 
limited to the land use sphere alone. See Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the 
Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 ( 1 936). 
3 1 0. People v. Rubenfeld, 254 N.Y. 245, 248-49, 172 N.E. 485, 487 (1930). 
3 1 1 .  See text at notes 208-09 supra. 
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Banning the construction of an office tower atop Grand Central Ter­
minal,'3 12 retaining Boston's centrally located Beacon Hill in a low­
density, predominantly residential status,3 13 or prescribing a tapered 
silhoµette for Evanston's skyscape3 14 cannot be explained solely or 
even primarily on the basis of utilitarian economic principles. On 
the contrary, such controls, which are commonplace in the aesthetic 
sphere, deprive public fiscs and restricted property owners of the in­
creased tax yields and profitability promised by new entrants that are 
incongruent with existing features or settings on the basis of the new 
entrant's nonfunctional, but not its functional, associations. 
The value premise is the externalities analyst's assumption that 
the interest in economic utility ought to prevail over other goals, 
such as nurturing stability-identity values, when the two conflict. 
Whether or not sound as a matter of policy, the premise is tautologi­
cal because the analyst assumes the very point in issue. Of course 
property value maximization should prevail if it is ranked first in the 
pertinent system of value priorities. But it is precisely this hierarchy 
that stability reasoning - and, often, aesthetic regulation itself -
contests by according greater weight to a new entrant's nonfunc­
tional associations than to its functional ones. 
The question can no more be resolved by stability reasoning than 
by traditional externalities reasoning because, again, the reasoning 
would be circular. Ultimately, the question is neither economic nor 
legal, but cultural. However helpful economic analysis may be in 
quantifying the costs and benefits of aesthetic measures based on a 
new entrant's functional associations, it cannot quantify those attrib­
utable to the entrant's nonfunctional associations or establish a value 
hierarchy for resolving conflicts between economic and stability­
identity goals. Law plays a greater role than economic theory, but 
only because it is the medium through which the society legitimates 
its aesthetic preferences. Law may endorse these preferences as they 
are exemplified in a new entrant's nonfunctional associations or, for 
nonaesthetic reasons, it may preclude their implementation. Their 
source, however, is not the law, but cultural factors anterior to it. 
Although stability reasoning does not resolve the question, it 
sheds fresh light on the factors that merit consideration in addressing 
it. It establishes why values that are not utilitarian in a narrow eco­
nomic sense shape the way that community groups perceive their 
3 1 2. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
3 1 3. See W. FIREY, supra note 2 12. 
3 14. La Salle Natl. Bank v. City of Evanston, 57 Ill.2d 415, 3 12  N.E.2d 625 (1974). 
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environments. It provides a realistic framework for appreciating 
what they, often unrealistically, expect aesthetic regulation to 
achieve. It challenges the premise, ostensibly dominant since zon­
ing's early days, that land use regulation's summum bonum should be 
the pursuit of economic efficiency. In its place it substitutes Walter 
Cannon's dictum that "[t]he organism suggests that stability is of 
prime importance. It is more important than economy."3 15 
Accordingly, stability reasoning forces a long-overdue reap­
praisal of the incomplete premise that the "harms" with which the 
police power should deal encompass only tangible, economically 
quantifiable impacts of land uses on neighboring properties.3 16 If 
impairment of stability-identity values bears as vitally on citizen ex­
pectations as this Article suggests, deliberate but discerning room 
must be made for it within the police power as well. Further consid­
eration of the interaction between aesthetic and economic harms is 
also in order. In many cases, the community subordinates the eco­
nomic to the aesthetic, and the flow of marketplace choices becomes 
explicable only by taking the primacy of aesthetic harms into ac­
count. The mix and character of residential and commercial uses on 
Beacon Hill, for example, is determined less by such functional vari­
ables as this location's proximity to goods, services, and transporta­
tion than by its status as a reservoir of values rooted in Boston's 
history and traditions. 3 11 
The reappraisal urged here has been resisted for the better part of 
this century.3 18 It is feared that there will be no stopping point once 
"aesthetic harm," defined in this Article's social-psychological man­
ner, is recognized as a proper police power category. The issue goes 
well beyond aesthetic regulation, for the latter is but the stalking 
horse of a problem that pervades land use and environmental regu­
lation generally, both of which have also been held in thrall to exter­
nalities reasoning.319 But my prescription leads to a dilemma of the 
first magnitude. Clearly, the issue is unavoidable because the physi­
cal environment is also a social environment in which many of soci­
ety's most compelling values are implicated. Just as clearly, legal 
institutions have in fact afforded protection against these harms for 
3 15. See W .  CANNON, THE WISDOM OF THE BODY 137  (2d ed. 1939) (emphasis added). 
3 16. This prescription is by no means original to the writer. See generally R. BABCOCK, 
THE ZONING GAME (1 968); w. FIREY, supra note 212; R. NELSON, supra note 22; c. PERRIN, 
supra note 99; s. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN (1969). 
3 17. See W. FIREY, supra note 2 12, at 9 1 -92, 262. 
3 18. See generally notes 309 & 3 16 supra. 
31 9. See generally note 3 1 6  supra. 
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most of this century while shrouding their actions in ill-fitting exter­
nalities garb. But the gap between community demands for a legal 
response to these harms and the availability of policy or analytic 
tools by which legal institutions can cogently evaluate the demands 
remains distressingly wide to this day. 
C. Freedom of Expression 
An expression-infringing aesthetic measure that satisfies the sub­
stantive due process test does not necessarily comport with the more 
stringent first amendment requirements that it be "narrowly drawn" 
and advance a "sufficiently substantial governmental interest." 
Measures premised solely on the visual beauty rationale are illustra­
tive: Standards of visual beauty cannot be "narrowly drawn"; nor 
does the community's purported interest in visual delight and the 
problematic relationship that it bears to visual beauty's assumed sec­
ondary effects add up to a "sufficiently substantial governmental 
interest. "320 
Would measures premised on the cultural stability rationale 
overcome these hurdles? Compliance with the "narrowly drawn" 
standard can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. The fol­
lowing discussion assumes what past experience suggests may often 
not be true: namely, that the aesthetic measures in question are 
"narrowly drawn." It concentrates instead on the question whether 
the preservation of stability-identity values and the concomitant ad­
vancement of their likely desirable secondary effects constitute a 
"sufficiently substantial governmental interest." The vehicle for this 
inquiry is a hypothetical drawn from the Grand Central Terminal 
landmarking controversy that led to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.32 1 
Suppose that the Penn Central Transportation Company, now 
joined by its architect Marcel Breuer,322 filed a second lawsuit,323 
"Penn Central II," challenging the New York City Landmarks Pres­
ervation Commission's refusal to approve the Breuer-designed, In­
ternational Style tower atop the Grand Central Terminal. This time, 
however, the issue is cast in first amendment rather than fifth 
amendment terms. The Commission, the plaintiffs argue, abridged 
their "freedom of speech" because its denial is premised on the mod-
320. See text at notes 183-95 supra . 
32 1 .  438 U.S. 1 04 (1978). 
322. Or a representative of the Breuer office. Breuer died in the spring of 1981. 
323. The original lawsuit, ultimately resolved in the Supreme Court, is Penn Cent. Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 ( 1978). 
January 1 982) Law and Aesthetics 447 
ernistic tower's "offensive" associational dissonance with the Beaux 
Arts Terminal. Indeed, they stress, the Commission's castigation of 
the tower as an "aesthetic joke"324 explicitly acknowledges that the 
tower conveys a cognitive and emotional message that displeases the 
Commission and, perhaps, citizens generally. If Penn Central I I 
made its way to the United States Supreme Court, how would the 
Court rule? How should it rule? 
My principal conclusions can be summarized briefly. First, new 
entrants often, but not invariably, are "speech" for first amendment 
purposes. Second, aesthetic measures that regulate or ban new en­
trants are content-based restrictions, not time, place, or manner re­
strictions. Third, the captive audience doctrine, as conventionally 
construed, does not assist in the issue's disposition. Fourth, the ap­
propriate first amendment doctrine for evaluating the issue is thus a 
reformulated version of the clear-and-present-danger test. Finally, 
the proper question under this test is whether preclusion of the bane­
ful secondary effects that the community claims will result absent the 
measure's implementation constitutes a "sufficiently substantial gov­
ernmental interest." The major dilemma exposed by the inquiry is 
one for the courts: How should they define the community's burden 
to show that the impairment of stability-identity values will give rise 
to effects whose prevention would probably be deemed a "suffi­
ciently substantial governmental interest?" 
1 .  New Entrants as ''Speech " 
The Court might consider denying that the tower is "speech" lest 
it be flooded with litigation asserting that every aesthetic measure 
raises a bona fide first amendment issue. This option is suggested by 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego ,325 which apparently held that 
communities may ban billboards containing commercial, but not 
noncommercial messages. Despite the variety of opinions in Me­
tromedia,326 all of the Justices appear to have agreed with Justice 
White's distinction between the billboards' "communicative aspect" 
324. 438 U.S. at 1 1 8 (quoting the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission). 
Breuer, in turn, reportedly castigated the Terminal's Beaux Arts facades, which his plan would 
efface, as a "provincial version of a decadent French classicism." J. BARNETT, supra note 292, 
at 7 1 .  As a former leading member of the Bauhaus School, Breuer viewed the Terminal's 
derivative, heavily ornamented, masonry style as a political and social, as well as visual, out­
rage. See generally Wolfe, supra note 2. 
325. IOI S. Ct. 2882 (198 1 )  (plurality opinion). 
326. Justice White's opinion for the Court was joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and 
Powell. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Blackmun, filed an opinion concurring in the judg­
me�t. Jus!ice Stevens partly concurred with and partly dissented from the plurality opinion. 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist filed dissenting opinions. 
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- defined by the messages inscribed on them - and their "non­
communicati ve aspect" - defined by the billboards themselves per­
ceived as unattractive visual entities. 327 If the Court drew the same 
distinction in Penn Central II, it would reason that landmarks legis­
lation deals with aesthetic concerns, review the legislation under the 
relaxed presumption of legislative validity standard,328 and almost 
surely sustain it. 
But its reasoning would be disingenuous. If nude barroom-type 
dancing,329 black armbands,330 and flags sewn on pants seats33t may 
at times be protected as "speech," it is unclear why the creative ex­
pression of one of the twentieth century's most influential architects 
is not. A categorical distinction cannot be drawn between aesthetics 
and the first amendment, moreover, if the latter's solicitude for com­
munication and self-fulfillment interests is to have any meaning at 
all.332 What the Justices should have stated in Metromedia is that 
environmental features and settings are not "speech" simply because 
their nonfunctional associations evoke an aesthetic response. 
Take the case of the billboards themselves. They owe their 
"meaning" to two factors: their graphics and their status as new en­
trants that, wholly apart from their graphics, were perceived as as­
sociationally dissonant with San Diego's character. Without 
question, San Diegans opposed the billboards as offensive on the lat­
ter basis, a fact that supports the dissenters' reasoning that the ordi­
nance was indeed "neutral" concerning the messages inscribed on 
billboards.333 By acknowledging that "meaning" in a broad semiotic 
sense and first amendment "speech" are not always coextensive, the 
Justices could deny first amendment status to the billboards, con­
ceived as aesthetic entities, but extend it to the Breuer tower without 
doing violence to logic or to first amendment values. 334 Although 
327. I O I  S. Ct. at 2889-90. 
328. See note 198 supra. 
329. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932-33 ( 1 975); California v. LaRue, 409 
U.S. 109, 1 1 8- 19 ( 1972). 
330. See Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969). 
33 1 .  Spence v. Washington, 4 1 8  U.S. 405, 410- 1 1  (1 973) (per curiam). 
332. See text at notes 1 84-92 supra. 
333. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, IOI  S. Ct. 2882, 2916-17 (1981) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); 10 1  S. Ct. at 2920-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); JO I S. Ct. at 2924-25 (Rehnquist, I., 
dissenting). 
334. Space limitations preclude treatment of this complex issue, which remains essentially 
unexplored in the Court's first amendment jurisprudence. As one commentator has noted, see 
Note, supra note 60, at 1 85-88, the Court's likely starting place will be its language in Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410- 1 1  (1974) (per curiam), that Spence's nonverbal expression - a 
flag displayed upside down with a peace symbol affixed to it - was "speech" because "[a)n 
intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances 
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exceptions cannot be ruled out,335 communication and self-fulfill­
ment interests are unlikely to be seriously undermined by regula­
tions banning billboards on associational dissonance grounds. 336 
But these values were frustrated by the Commission's decision to 
deny Breuer permission to build his tower. 
The Court might also characterize the tower as a hybrid of 
noncommunicative and communicative elements, and view the city's 
measure as directed only incidentally to the latter.337 If it opted for 
this course, it would likely invoke the time, place, or manner analysis 
the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." For 
pertinent nonlegal studies dealing with the semiotic quality of environmental features and 
settings, see note 1 16 supra. 
335. Suppose, for example, that Christo, the "environmental artist" who has wrapped the 
shoreline of Little Bay, Australia, in mesh fabric, erected a 24-mile "Running Fence" in Marin 
County, California, and proposed "The Gates," ( 1 1 ,000 to 15,000 banners for New York City's 
Central Park), were to propose a "Billboard Bonanza" to ring San Diego. On Christo's work 
and the legal complexities it has created, see Running Fence Corp. v. Committee to Stop the 
Running Fence, 5 1  Cal. App. 3d 400, 124 Cal. Rptr. 339 ( 1 975). 
336. Whether this conclusion contradicts that of the six Justices who voted against the 
billboard ban in Metromedia is unclear. The status of a total ban on billboards carrying com­
mercial and noncommercial messages was not resolved in the decision. 101 S. Ct. at 2896 n.20. 
But see IOI  S. Ct. at 2900 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). Had San Diego established 
more cogently that billboards, as such, were associationally dissonant with its character, more­
over, a different result may have ensued. See IOI S. Ct. at 2906 (Brennan, J., concurring in 
judgment) (total billboard ban in Williamsburg, Virginia, or Yellowstone National Park would 
be sustainable because the billboards' ''very existence would obviously be inconsistent with the 
surrounding landscape"). In addition, I suspect that Justice Steven's observation that "[i]f the 
First Amendment categorically protected the marketplace of ideas from any quantitative re­
straint, a municipality could not outlaw graffiti," IOI S. Ct. at 2914 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 
will come back to haunt the Court. Finally, the majority's reasoning in Metromedia is incon­
sistent with its view in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 101  S. Ct. 2176 (1981), that a 
total ban on one category of expression - "live entertainment" in Schad - may be permissi­
ble if a community cogently demonstrates that the category is associationally dissonant with its 
character. See text at notes 360-64 infra. The explanation for the Metromedia result lies else­
where. Despite the Court's ostensible willingness to extend first amendment protection to non­
verbal as well as to verbal expression, see notes 329-3 1 supra, its apprehension that first 
amendment values may be impaired is greater in the latter than in the former context, even 
when those values are not, in fact, seriously threatened. 
337. For opinions employing this analysis, see, e.g , Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 
( 1 965) (ban on picketing near courthouse upheld as protecting administration of justice from 
disturbance despite attendant restriction on expression); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87-89 
(1949) (ban on sound trucks emitting "loud and raucous noise" upheld as insuring community 
tranquility despite restriction on expression); cf Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 1 69-70 
(1 944) (ban on children selling magazines on streets upheld as advancing state's child welfare 
goals despite restriction on religious freedom of child and parents). The analysis may be 
viewed as a particular version of the "reasonable time, place or manner" or "less drastic 
means" analysis. Under this approach, regulation of conduct that includes expression -
whether verbal or nonverbal - as well as nonexpressive conduct may be regulated if the meas­
ure in question is neither intended to suppress the expression nor unreasonably limits it by 
precluding its communication at, through, or in reasonable alternative sites, media, or periods. 
See, e.g. , Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 1 1 6- 17  ( 1 972); Poulos v. New Hamp­
shire, 345 U.S. 395, 405-08 ( 1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, 3 12 U.S. 570, 574-76 (1941). For 
discussions of this analysis, including its relation to that in United States v. O'Brien, 3'J l U.S. 
367 (1968), see, e.g. , L. TRIBE, supra note 60, at §§ 12-2 to -7, 12-20; Ely, supra note 60. 
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that it used in United States v. O'Brien .338 In O'Brien, the Court 
sustained a conviction for draft card burning against the challenge 
that the relevant statute violated the defendant's first amendment 
rights. The O'Brien Court reasoned that 
a governmental regulation [incidentally limiting First Amendment 
freedoms) is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional powers 
of the Government; if it furthers an important or su bstantial govern­
mental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppres­
sion of the free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged 
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur­
therance of that interest. 339 
The Court would probably conclude that the tower ban comports 
with the O'Brien requirements: Penn Central expressly held that 
landmark preservation is within the government's constitutional 
powers;340 the important governmental interest served by the tower 
ban is the retention of the physical integrity of one of the city's and 
nation's premier examples of Beaux Arts architecture; the city did 
not intend to censor Breuer's expression; and the ban is the least re­
strictive alternative available to safeguard the Terminal's physical 
integrity. 
But this logic is faulty. It ignores that preserving the Terminal's 
physical integrity is only a means to the Commission's ultimate goal 
of preserving the Terminal's semiotic integrity. Recall that every ex­
isting resource is both a signifier and the message that it signifies.341 
Destroying the message's physical embodiment destroys the message 
itself, and it is the message that accounts for the community's attach­
ment to an existing resource. The Commission's objection was not 
that the Terminal would be physically altered: The landmark ordi­
nance expressly envisages that landmarks may be altered in appro­
priate instances,342 and the Terminal's original architects expected 
that a tower might be added to it. The Commission objected instead 
to the "content" of Breuer's proposed alteration. Accordingly, the 
O'Brien analysis is inapposite because the governmental interest in 
question - maintaining the Terminal's semiotic integrity - is di­
rectly related to the suppression of Breuer's free expression. The 
landmark ordinance and the Commission's decision under it, there-
338. 39 1 U.S. 367 (1968). 
339. 391 U.S. at 377. 
340. 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978). 
341 .  See text at notes 1 16-19, 227-30 supra. 
342. NEW YORK CITY CHARTER & Ao. CODE ANN., ch. 8-A, §§ 207-4.0 to -9.0 (Williams 
1976). 
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fore, are content-based rather than time, place, or manner 
restrictions. 
Would the Court sustain these measures if it characterized them 
in this manner? Predicting its response leads us to its decisions in 
Young v. American Mini Theatres343 and Schad v. Borough of Mount 
Ephraim ,344 which, along with Metromedia, are its only opinions 
dealing squarely with the aesthetics-first amendment issue. 
2. Revised Clear and Present .Danger Test and Expression­
Jnfringing Aesthetic Measures: Young and Schad 
Tentatively in Young and more definitively in Schad, the Court 
has refitted the clear and present danger test345 for use in evaluating 
aesthetic measures that hinder expression. With one qualification, 
the controversies addressed by these decisions exemplify the proto­
typical format outlined earlier for aesthetic controversies. In Young, 
the challenged measure was designed to preserve Detroit's neighbor­
hoods (existing resource) from invasion by a concentration of adult 
theaters (new entrant), which neighborhood residents perceived as 
associationally dissonant with their family-centered lifestyle. In 
Schad, the measure sought to immunize Mount Ephraim's character 
as a rural, family-centered borough (existing resource) from impair­
ment by the introduction of nude dancing into an adult bookstore 
(new entrant). The Young and Schad measures differ from the Penn 
Central landmark ordinance, however, because the former regulate 
land uses while the latter regulates structures. This difference would 
be significant for first amendment purposes if the "aesthetics" label 
could be attached only to measures concerning structures. But the 
Court itself has rejected this view by expressly characterizing use 
regulations as instances of "aesthetics" regulation that call first 
amendment doctrine into play.346 
In Young, eight Justices agreed that the Detroit ordinance was 
content-based because it imposed harsher restriction on theaters 
343. 427 U.S. 50 ( 1976). 
344. IOI  S. Ct. 2176 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
345 . As that test was stated by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 
(19 19), "[t]he question in every case is whether the words used are in such circumstances and 
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
s�bstantive �vils that Congre�s has a right to prevent." The test and the Court's leading deci­
sions under 1t are evaluated Ul, e.g. , L. TRIBE, supra note 60, at §§ 1 2-9 to - 1 1 ; Linde, "Clear 
and Present Danger" Reexamined: .Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 
1 163 ( 1970). 
346. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 101 S. Ct. 2176, 2 1 84 (1981); 101 S. Ct. at 
2187 (Blackmun, J., concurring); 101 S. Ct. at 2188-89 (Stevens, J., concurring); 101 S. Ct. at 
2192 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
452 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:355 
showing pornographic films than on those that did not.347 Only Jus­
tice Powell disagreed. He characterized the ordinance as an "inno­
vative, land-use regulation, implicating First Amendment concerns 
only incidentally"348 and approved it based on an O'Brien-type anal­
ysis. In contrast, Justice Stevens, joined by three other Justices, scru­
tinized the ordinance under a revised clear and present danger 
analysis. He agreed that the evils Detroit sought to prevent were 
sufficiently plausible and imminent to justify the ordinance's limited 
incursion on expression interests. Specifically, he reasoned that the 
concentration of adult use theaters portends a variety of "secondary 
effects"349 that would impair the city's "interest in attempting to pre­
serve the quality of urban life."350 Despite his alternative rationale, 
Justice Powell also extolled the city's efforts to preserve "stable 
neighborhoods."351 In approving the stability interest advanced by 
Detroit, a majority of the Court rejected the theater owners' conten­
tion that the city had acted on the "basis of nothing more substantial 
than unproved fears and apprehensions about the effects of [adult 
theaters] upon the surrounding areas."352 
Among the ordinance's claimed defects was the charge that con­
tent-based restrictions - those premised on expression's "offensive­
ness" - are permissible only "in the limited context of a captive or 
juvenile audience,"353 an exception not applicable to the Young 
347. They were Justice Stevens, who delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices 
White and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger joined; Justices Stewart and Blackmun who 
wrote dissenting opinions; and Justices Marshall and Brennan, who joined in both dissents. 
Justice Powell concurred in Justice Stevens's opinion subject to certain exceptions, including 
Justice Stevens's characterization of the Detroit ordinance as a content-conscious measure. 
348. 427 U.S. at 73 (Powell, J., concurring). 
349. 427 U.S. at 7 1  n.34. These "secondary effects" constitute the "substantive evils," see 
nme 345 supra, whose proscription is permitted under the clear and present danger test. 
350. 427 U.S. at 7 1 .  
35 1 .  427 U.S. a t  80 (Powell, J., concurring). 
352. 427 U.S. at 75 (Powell, J., concurring). The theater owners' contention in Young' .of course, is the classical surrebutter to the state's clear and present danger rebuttal of the cla1� 
that its measure infringes speech. See, e.g. , Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Term1-
niello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. I (1949). 
353. 427 U.S. at 86 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
Under the captive audience doctrine, activities or environmental features that are both 
offensive and unavoidable may be proscribed to protect the privacy rights of potential viewers 
even though the proscription is framed in terms that are not content-neutral. See, e.g. , .L.eh­man v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (poliucal 
advertising in public transit); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S.
_ 
728, 736�38 
(1970) (restrictions on promotional materials sent through the mails deemed offensive by rec1p· 
ient); cf. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 1 10 (1932) (billboards advertis�g tobacco). 
Other cases where the Court deemed the doctrine relevant in principle but inapplicable under 
the specific facts include, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-12 (197�) 
(drive-in movie screen); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 412 (1974) (per curiam) (Amen· 
can flag bearing peace symbol hung upside down in window visible from public way); Cohen 
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 ( 1971) (jacket bearing vulgar inscription worn in courthouse). 
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facts. Distressed by what they viewed as the maj ority's "drastic de­
parture from established principles of First Amendment law,"354 the 
dissenters did not deal explicitly with Detroit's assertions concerning 
the imminent evils portended by the concentration of adult theaters. 
Although they expressed their sympathy for its "well-intentioned ef­
forts . . . to 'clean up' its streets,"355 they warned that "it is in those 
instances when protected speech grates most unpleasantly against 
the sensibilities that judicial vigilance must be at its height."356 
In Schad, the Court invalidated Mount Ephraim's effort to ban 
"live entertainment" totally. Despite their diversity,357 the opinions 
indicate that the Justices are narrowing their differences on four aes­
thetics-first amendment issues that they hotly disputed or left unclear 
in Metromedia and Young. First, Schad, unlike Metromedia, recog­
nizes that an aesthetically based land use measure regulating nonver­
bal expression can hinder first amendment values. Disagreeing with 
the borough's assumption that "because the challenged ordinance 
was intended as a land-use regulation, it need survive the minimal 
scrutiny of a rational relationship test,"358 Justice Blackmun ex­
pressed the view, endorsed at least implicitly by the other four opin­
ion writers, that "where protected First Amendment interests are at 
stake, zoning regulations have no such 'talismanic immunity from 
constitutional challenge.' "359 
Second, Schad presages the Court's willingness to countenance 
content-based aesthetic measures even absent captive or juvenile 
audiences. All of the opinions indicate that communities may use 
such measures to prevent genuine instances of associational disso­
nance between existing resources and new entrants. Thus, Justice 
Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist in dissent, explicitly premised 
his approval of Mount Ephraim's selective ban on live entertainment 
At least one state has specifically invoked the doctrine in sustaining a billboard ban. See John 
Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 369 Mass. 206, 226-28, 339 N.E.2d 709, 
721-22 ( 1 975). Commentary portraying the doctrine as relevant in principle to unaesthetic 
activities or environmental features but presumptively insufficient to outweigh the interest in 
expression that would be forfeited by its application includes, e.g. , L. TRIBE, supra note 60, 
§ 12- 19; Williams, supra note 46, at 24-28, 29, 3 1 -32; �ote, supra note 60, at 197-98. 
354. 427 U.S. at 84 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
355 . 427 U.S. at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
356. 427 U.S. at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
357. Justice White wrote the opinion for the Court in which four other Justices joined. 
Concurring opinions were written by Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, although the 
latter concurred only in the judgment. Chief Justice Burger wrote a dissenting opinion in 
which Justice Rehnquist joined. . 
358. IO I S. Ct. at 2187 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
359. IO I S. Ct. at 2187 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 75 ( 1 976) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
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on the ground that "the citizens of the [b]orough . . meant only to 
preserve the basic character of their community."360 Justice Stevens 
voted against the borough principally because the record failed to 
establish whether live nude dancing "introduced cacophony into a 
tranquil setting or merely a new refrain in a local replica of Place 
Pigalle."361 Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, noted that a 
"more carefully drafted ordinance" than Mount Ephraim's measure 
"could be appropriate and valid in a residential community where 
all commercial activity is excluded."362 The remaining Justices 
agreed with Justice White that "our decision today does not establish 
that every unit of local government entrusted with zoning responsi­
bilities must provide a commercial zone in which live entertainment 
is permitted."363 Their objections, like those of Justices Stevens and 
Powell, were that the borough failed to show that live entertainment 
clashed with its character, and that it had authored a measure that 
was both under- and overinclusive in relation to its vaguely stated 
purposes. 364 
Third, Schad signals that the Court now views the clear-and­
present-danger reasoning of Justice Stevens in Young as the appro­
priate standard against which to gauge expression-infringing aes­
thetic regulation. As Justice White formulated that standard, "when 
a zoning law infringes upon a protected liberty, it must be narrowly 
drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial government inter­
est."365 First amendment analysis should, therefore, center upon the 
plausibility of government's claim that the new entrant 'portends 
evils that land use regulation may legitimately prevent.366 What 
those evils will be is unsettled, but both Young and Schad confirm 
that community stability provides the rubric under which they will 
be defined. In Young, the stability interest was exemplified by the 
impairment of neighborhood character;367 in Schad, by the impair­
ment of overall community character. 368 
The standard splits the difference between two types of tests. On 
the one side lies the "compelling state interest" and the classical 
360. 101 S. Ct. at 2192 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
361. 101 S. Ct. at 2190 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
362. 101 S. Ct. at 2188 (Powell, J., concurring). 
363. 101 S. Ct. at 2186 n.18. 
364. See 101 S. Ct. at 2185-86. 
365. 101 S. Ct. at 2182-83 (footnote omitted). 
366. See notes 345 & 352 supra. 
367. See text at notes 349-52 supra. 
368. See text at notes 360-64 supra. 
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"clear and present danger" tests suggested by earlier first amend­
ment jurisprudence. 369 On the other is the "rational relationship" 
test traditionally applied in the land use sphere.370 As applied in 
Schad, the standard properly detaches judicial attention from the 
sweeping generalities of past first amendment and land use cases, 
and focuses it precisely where it belongs: namely, on the defensibil­
ity of the particular aesthetic program considered in terms of the 
clarity of its standards, the internal coherence of its structure, the 
rationality of its actual administration, the extent to which it need­
lessly or necessarily restricts expression, and the cogency of the en­
acting government's claim that the regulated activity's offensiveness 
poses a threat to community stability. 
While praiseworthy, the Court's formulation of the standard i s  
but a first step in accommodating first amendment and aesthetics in­
terests. The next issue - identified earlier as the area's major di­
lemma - concerns the type of proof that government must advance 
to establish that an "offensive" new entrant impairs the "sufficiently 
substantial government interest" of community stability. Is it ade­
quate to establish that the offensiveness is of a type that predictably 
will create community apprehension that its stability-identity values 
are threatened? Or must the imminence of specific secondary effects 
also be shown, as the Court requires in applying the clear and pres­
ent danger doctrine to political speech?371 
Schad and Young suggest that more than the first showing is nec­
essary, but how much more is unclear. Schad invalidated the live 
entertainment ban because Mount Ephraim wholly failed to estab­
lish a nexus between that use and impairment of the borough's char­
acter. 372 Young sustained the adult theater dispersal ordinance 
because it accepted Detroit's contention that the concentration o f  
adult theaters "causes" the area to deteriorate and become a focus o f  
crime.373 In truth, however, Detroit enacted the ordinance princi­
pally in reliance on the testimony of Mel Ravitz, a sociology profes­
sor and former president of the city's Common Council, who 
reasoned that 
if people believe something is true, even if it is not originally, they will 
tend to act as if it were true, and in so doing, help produce the condi­
tion that originally was only believed: that if residents of any neigh-
369. See L. TRIBE, supra note 60, at § 12-8. 
370. See note 198 supra. 
37 1 .  See note 352 supra. 
372. See text at notes 361 -64 supra. 
373. 427 U.S. at 7 1  n.34. 
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borhood believe that the concentration of proscribed uses damages the 
neighborhood, they will act as if it were true, and will seek to move 
away and allow people with different standards to move in.374 
Stated alternatively, Detroit did not show that a concentration of 
adult theaters, by itself, "causes" the substantive evils that the city 
enumerated nor, existing literature suggests, would Detroit have 
been able to do so.375 Whether such proof is required at all, more­
over, is called into question by Chief Justice Burger's dictum in Paris 
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 376 that "[t]he fact that a congressional di­
rective reflects unprovable assumptions about what is good for the 
people, including imponderable aesthetic assumptions, is not a suffi­
cient reason to find that statute unconstitutional."377 
The issue, in short, remains open, and the dilemma that gives rise 
to it, tormenting. Land use planning seeks to anticipate deleterious 
trends before they come to pass, and to take steps to prevent them. 
Too stringent a rule would defeat these worthy ends.378 But if the 
rule is too lenient, the risks are grave, as Schad itself indicates, that 
communities will ban or restrict "offensive" new entrants because of 
their "o.ff ensiveness" and nothing else, thereby frustrating core first 
amendment values. 
The final issue - the role, if any, of the captive audience doc­
trine - is considerably less problematic although it has been con­
fused in earlier Court opinions and in commentary. Both have 
posited that, in principle at least, this doctrine might justify content-
374. As paraphrased in Brief for Petitioners (City of Detroit] at 1 8- 19, Young v. American 
Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 ( 1 976). 
Ravitz states in sociological terms the legal position endorsed by some early twentieth­
century courts, which held that uses causing psychic harm may be proscribed as nuisances. 
See note 309 supra . 
375. See generally E. SHAUGNESSY & D. TREBBI, A STANDARD FOR MILLER (1980); U.S. 
COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, REPORT 26-27 (1970); R. ZURCHER & R. 
KIRKPATRICK, CITIZENS FOR DECENCY ( 1976). 
376. 4 1 3  U.S. 49 (1972). 
377. 413  U.S. at 62 (emphasis added). 
378. An example of such a rule is that proposed by Linde in his argument that the clear 
and present danger test be discarded entirely: 
The First Amendment /should} invalidate any law directed in terms against some communica­
tive content of speech or of theJ'ress, irrespective of extrinsic circumstances either al the time 
of enactment or al the lime of enforcement, !f the proscribed content is of a kind which falls 
under any circumstances within the meaning ef the first amendment. 
Linde, supra note 345, at l l 83 (emphasis in original). Whether or not appropriate in the 
sphere of political speech - the focus of Linde's article - this test does not appropriately 
accommodate expression and land use interests, particularly in view of the Court's evident 
solicitude for the latter in recent years. See notes 40-43 supra. The categorical nature of 
Linde's reasoning, moreover, invites counter-responses such as Justice Stevens's reasoning in 
Young that nonobscene pornographic speech should receive lesser protection than political 
speech. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1 976) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
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based restrictions because environmental features like billboards and 
movie drive-in screens are thrust upon unwilling viewers.379 The 
doctrine, however, is premised on privacy grounds: the right of the 
individual not to be involuntarily exposed to material that he person­
ally deems offensive. 3so What lies behind the cultural stability inter­
est is 1 80 degrees in the opposite direction: namely, the interest of 
the community qua community in protecting its visual commons - the 
repository of its spatially ref erred values - from impairment by new 
entrants whose associational dissonance mars the quality of commu­
nity life.38 1 Significantly, the captive audience doctrine played no 
379. See note 353 supra. 
380. Id. 
3 8 1 .  The distinction drawn in the text between privacy and stability interests clearly ap­
pears in the Massachusetts Supreme Court's opinion in General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. 
Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935), sustaining a complex set of 
state-wide and local billboard restrictions. The court's recognition that the purpose of the 
billboard restrictions was to protect the community's visual commons rather than an individ­
ual's right to privacy is evident in its reasoning that the legislation "is not a mere matter of 
banishing that which in appearance may be disagreeable lo some. It is protection against intru­
sion by foisting the words and emblems of billboards upon the mass of the public against their 
desire." 289 Mass. at 182, 1 93 N.E. at 8 14 (emphasis added). Its later statements relating to 
particular billboard restrictions imposed in Concord and along Boston's Beacon Hill and 
Common, moreover, directly ground the public's "desire" in the cultural stability interest. The 
restrictions, the court noted, were intended to prevent "incongruous intrusions" upon the cher­
ished associations that these historic locations had come to possess over three centuries for the 
citizens of the Commonwealth. 289 Mass. at 201 ,  193 N.E. at 823. To like effect, see Sun Oil 
Co. v. City of Madison Heights, 41 Mich. App. 47, 199 N.W.2d 525 ( 1972), which, in also 
sustaining a billboard ban, stated: "[W]e do not think that the right to advertise a business is 
such that a businessman may appropriate common airspace and destroy common vistas. Nor 
do we believe that the right to advertise means the right to interfere with the landscape and the 
views along public thoroughfares." 41 Mich. App. at 54, 1 99 N.W.2d at 529 (emphasis added). 
My concept of a "visual commons" and its protectability under the police power's general 
welfare heading is not dissimilar, if I understand him correctly, to Professor Sax's concept of a 
"visual prospect" as a "common" protectable as a "public right." See Sax, Takings, Private 
Property and Public Rights, 8 1  YALE L.J. 149, 159, 162 ( 1 97 1 ). The theory advanced by Profes­
sor Sax "would recognize diffusely held claims as public rights, entitled to equal consideration 
in lt:gislative or judicial resolution of conflicting claims to the common resource base, without 
regard to the manner in which they are held." Id at 159. Concerning visual values, he rea­
sons that "[i]n a somewhat less conventional sense, a visual prospect is also a common. Thus, 
if the landscape as a visual prospect is not confinable to any single tract of land, no single 
landowner is entitled to dominate it." Id at 162. 
To illustrate what I take to be our common position, San Francisco officials would have 
been acting fully within the police power had they opted to bar the Transamerica Corporation 
from appropriating the visual-semiotic values of that city's skyline by constructing a view­
dominating, 853-foot pyramidal tower in its midst. Commenting on the success of the corpora­
tion's strategy in achieving a corporate "image" in the public mind through its pyramid, one 
journalist has written: 
Possibly the best-known aspect of Transamerica is its corporate home. It's not that the 
853-foot structure is reckoned to be the 14th-tallest building in the country, or that it is the 
tallest of all in San Francisco . It's the shape of the thing - a pyramid. . . . The tower is 
now an accepted part of the San Francisco skyline, one of the country's best-known build­
ings, and a considerable marketing tool, featured in corporate television commercials and 
print ads. The building has appeared on the cover of every annual report since 1972. If 
few know what Transamerica does, many know where it lives. 
Kleinfield, What Is Transamerica?, N.Y. Times, Mar. I, 1 9 8 1 ,  § 3, at 22, col. 3. 
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role in Metromedia despite the content-based character of its bill­
board ban, and the Court's recognition that billboards "are large, 
immobile structures that depend on eye-catching visibility for their 
value."382 
In light of the foregoing assessment of Young, Metromedia, and 
Schad, the Court's decision in Penn Central I I would ultimately tum 
upon its evaluation of the extent to which it believed that an associa­
tionally dissonant tower atop the Terminal would impair stability­
identity values. A clue to that outcome is furnished by at least six 
Justices' willingness to accept the city's claim in Penn Central that 
"preservation of the [Terminal] benefits all New York City citizens 
and all structures, both economically and by improving the quality 
of life in the city as a whole."383 But three factors cut against over­
confidence on this score. The quoted language was offered in the 
context of a "takings" challenge, in which the city's proof problems 
were markedly less onerous than if it were confronted with a bona 
fide first amendment objection.384 The language stresses the addi-
tional benefits that the city derives from the Terminal's preservation 
rather than the evils that might befall it were the Terminal not pre­
served. 385 Finally, how exacting the Court would be in demanding 
that the city furnish proof of the negative secondary effects that it 
would incur upon impairment of its stability-identity values is cur­
rently an open question. 386 
382. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, IOI S. Ct. 2882, 2902-03 (1981)  (Brennan, 
J., concurring in the judgment). 
383. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 134 ( 1 978). It is possible, 
however, that some Justices might see matters differently in Penn Central II because it presents 
a first amendment rather than a "takings" challenge. For example, Justice Brennan, who au­
thored the Court's opinion in Penn Central, independently evaluated and found wanting San 
Diego's claim that its billboard ban advanced substantial traffic safety and aesthetics interests. 
See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2903-06 (1981) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
384. See note 383 supra. 
385. Prior to Penn Central, many land use commentators ascribed major significance to the 
distinction. For example, Professor Dunham, following Professor Freund, argued that the po· 
lice power should be differentiated from the eminent domain power on the basis that govern­
ment, without compensation, may employ the former to prevent a landowner from imposing 
harms on others but must compensate through eminent domain when it seeks to compel the 
landowner to provide benefits for the community. See Dunham, A Legal and Economic Bas is 
for City Planning, 58 CoLUM. L. REV. 650, 663-69 ( 1 958). But see Sax, supra note 381 , at 48· 
50. But Penn Central appears to assimilate benefits to harms in its reasoning that any land use 
that frustrates a legislatively declared public purpose is a "harm," whether or not the use is 
harmful or benign considered independently of that purpose. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 1 33-34 n.30 (1978). 
386. See text at notes 37 1 -78 supra. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article's persistent theme is that aesthetic policy-making is 
a gamble even under the best of circumstances. Its recent history 
reveals serious flaws. Its future is clouded by political, conceptual, 
and philosophical dilemmas, none of which admits to facile resolu­
tion and some of which lead to no definitive solution at all. Why 
then not conclude that, whether cast as the pursuit of visual beauty 
or as a quest for cultural stability, it should be abandoned 
altogether? 
This course is neither possible nor desirable in my judgment. If 
the homeostasis metaphor is apt, community demands for aesthetic 
regulation, already at fever pitch, will intensify as the nation moves 
into a period of social, technological, and geopolitical change that 
threatens profound destabilization. Political and social pressures are 
likely to be such that legal institutions will be unable to spurn these 
demands even if they wish to. Moreover, "[a]esthetic considera­
tions," as Judge Van Voorhis has observed, "underlie all zoning, 
usually in combination with other factors with which they are inter­
woven."387 Legislators are condemned to attend to aesthetic values, 
therefore, unless they choose to abandon land use and environmen­
tal policy-making as well - an even more unlikely option. 
The law, moreover, should play a role in the piece. But it must 
be a prudent one, rather like that of Friar Laurence, who counselled 
the overzealous Romeo: 
These violent delights have violent ends. . . . Therefore love moder­
ately: long love doth so; Too swift arrive as tardy as too slow.388 
If aesthetic regulation can lead to "violent ends," it can also 
purchase "violent delights" because it is rare among legal initiatives 
in its power to respond to the community's most deeply felt desires 
and fears. It would be a mistake to dismiss as hyperbole the meta­
phors of physical and cultural disintegration that aesthetic contro­
versies evoke. For those who invoke them - most of us at one time 
or another - they are realities against which the ills traditionally 
addressed by the police power pale. 
Cultural stability's primacy as aesthetic policy's raison d'etre, 
moreover, is increasingly understood and supported by policy-mak-
387. People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 47 1, 191  N.E.2d 272, 277, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 741 
(Van Voorhis, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963). See generally text at notes 
260-66 supra. 
388. w. SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF ROMEO AND JULIET Act II, Scene 6 (G. Kit­
tredge ed. 1940). 
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ers. The Department of the Interior, for example, authored a policy 
directive on historic preservation in 198 1 acknowledging that 
[t]he historic buildings in a community are tangible links with the na­
tion's past that help provide a sense of identity and stability that is 
often missing in this era of constant change . . . . Preservation is an 
anchor that keeps communities together and reestablishes pride and 
economic vitality. 389 
Recognition of stability-identity values as the core interest served by 
aesthetic regulation, I submit, will also be the trademark of the 
postmodern period of aesthetic jurisprudence anticipated or perhaps 
even proclaimed by Young, Schad, and other recent opinions.390 
In the last analysis, the best prescription for coping with aesthetic 
policy may well be equal parts of a sense of humor, perspective, and 
wonder. Humor, to assist us in appreciating that, because aesthetic 
policy is the vehicle by which our culture expresses its most deeply 
felt values and apprehensions, some rather confused - even silly -
things may be urged in its name. Perspective, to gain sufficient dis­
tance from our immediate feelings in particular controversies to 
think through whether we really ought to demand that the law take 
on something that, perhaps, it cannot or should not handle. And 
wonder, to marvel not only at the mystery of human creativity but at 
389. A Federal preservation agenda/or the 80's, PRESERVATION NEWS, Oct. 1980, at 7. 
390. See notes 80 & 166 supra (patterned community preferences provide the basis for the 
substance and legitimacy of aesthetic regulation); note 381 supra (the physical environment 
also serves as a visual commons to which community identity values are spatially referred); 
note 23 1 supra (aesthetic regulation serves a homeostatic function by moderating or preventing 
environmental changes that threaten cultural stability and identity); notes 39-45 supra (aes­
thetic, land use, and environmental law share the common end of preserving the "quality of 
life"); note 306 supra (government under the police power may prevent "aesthetic" or "psycho­
logical harm" resulting from environmental changes); note 1 1 9, supra (associational mecha­
nism affords the basis for patterned community preferences); note 131 supra (aesthetic 
regulation not based solely on human physiological response); note 166 supra ("museum" 
standards differ in refinement, function, and source from legal aesthetic standards); note 140 
supra (aesthetic regulation seeks to preserve existing resources cherished by the community, 
not to mandate the creation of original forms of environmental "beauty"); notes 58, 300 & 303 
supra (courts should review and, in appropriate cases, invalidate aesthetic measures adminis­
tered to achieve unauthorized or constitutionally defective ends); note 215  supra (the validity 
of aesthetic regulation docs not depend upon its supposed function of maintaining prope�y 
values although the latter is often its effect); notes 1 13 & 1 1 9 supra (aesthetic controversies 
feature an existing resource-new entrant pairing; the propriety of banning or restricting the 
new entrants depends upon their "compatibility" with the paired existing resources); not�s 
100-07 & 1 19 supra (standards for the regulation of new entrants derive from the visual-assoc1-
ational characteristics of the existing resource with which they are paired); notes 345-82 supra 
(aesthetic regulation can impinge upon first amendment freedoms; the accommodation of �es­
thetic and speech values requires the reappraisal and modification of conventional doctnnes 
that evolved independently of one another in first amendment and land use jurisprude�ce); 
notes 208-09 supra (the formula that government may zone "solely for aesthetics" is essenually 
meaningless if "aesthetics" is defined as the pursuit of visual beauty as an end in itself; the 
modem period opinions, no less than those of the middle period, typically cite values other 
than the enjoyment of visual beauty alone in sustaining aesthetic measures). 
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the extraordinary fact that, despite our differences in personal his­
tory, attitude, and experience, our bonds with one another and with 
our visual commons shape and daily reinforce our shared humanity. 
